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INT·R ODU.C TION
On September 21, 1931, the rep.tesentative of the Chinese Government at
Geneva wrote to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations asking
him to bring to the attention of the
Council the dispute between China and
Japan which had arisen from the events
which took place at Mukden on the
night of September 18-19, and appealed
.. o the Council under Article II of the
~ovenant to "take immediate steps
to prevent the further development of
a situation endangering the peace of
nations."
On September 30th the Council · passed the following resolution:
"The Council
" l. Notes the replies of the Chinese
and Japanese Governments to the urgent appeal addressed to them by its
President and the steps that have
already been taken in response to that
appeal;
"2. Recognizes the importance of the
Japanese Government's statement that
it has no territorial designs in Manchuria;
"3. Notes the Japanese r epresentative's statement that his Government
will continue as rapidly as possible,
the withdrawal of its troops, which
has already been begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety
of the lives and pToperty of Japanese
nationals is effectively assured and that
it hopes to carry out this intention ln
full as speedily as may be;
"4. Notes the Chinese representative's statement that his Government
will assume responsibility for the safety
of the lives and pTOperty of Japanese
nationals outside that zone as the withdrawal of the Japanese troops continues and the C&inese local authorities
and poJiFe forces are re-established;
"5. Being convinced that both Governments are anxious to avoid taking
any action which might disturb the

peace and good understanding between the two nations, notes that the
Chinese and Japanese representatives
have given assurances that their respective Governments will take all
necessary steps to prevent any extension of the scope of the incident or
any aggravation of the situation;
"6. Requests both parties to do all
in their power to hasten the restoration of normal relations between them
and for that purpose to continue and
speedily complete the execution of the
above-mentioned undertakings;
"7. Requests both parties to furnish
the Council at frequent intervals with
full information as to the development of the situation;
"8. Decides, in the absence of an}
unforeseen occurrence which might
rende:.:- an immediate meeting essential.
to meet again at Geneva on Wednesday, October 14, 1931, to consider th e
situation as it then stands;
"9. Authorizes its President to cancel the meeting of the Council fixed
for October 14th, should he decide,
after consulting his colleagues, and
more particularly the representatives
of the two parties, that, in view of
such information as he may have received from the parties or from other
members of the Council as to the
development of the situation, the
meeting is no longer necessary."
China Suggests Inquiry
In the course of the discussions that
proceeded the adoption of this resolution, the Chinese representative expressed the view of his Government
that "the best method that may b ~
devised by the Council for securing
the prompt and complete withdrawal
of the Japanese troops and police and
the full re-establishment of the status quo ante, is the sending of a neutral commission to Manchuria."
The Council held a further session
for the consideration of the dispute,
1

from October 13 to the 24. In con. sequence of the opposition of the
Japanese
representative,
unanimity
could not be obtained for the resolution proposed at this session.
The Council met again on November 16th in Paris and devoted nearly
four weeks to a study of · the situationOn November 21st, the Japanese repre_sentative, after stati,ng that his
Government was anxious' _that the resolution of ., September. 30th should be
observed in the spir~t ,·a nd letter, proposed. that a corru;n\~ion of inquiry_
shoulp be sent to th~ spot. This proposal was subsequently welcomed by
all the other mem ~rs of- the Council
and on December 10, 1931, the following
resolution
was
unanimously
adopted:
· ·
"The . Council
"l. Reaffirms • the ' resolution -passed
unanimously by . it,· on September . 30.
1931, by which: th~ two parties declare
that they are ·solemnly bound; itr,there-.
fore calls upon the Chinese and ·Japa.nese Governments to take .. all steps
necessary to assure its execution so
th~t the · withdrawal ·· of . the Japanese
trqops within the ..railway zone· may
be .. :eJfected a;a ;\ speedily I as possible
under the cpnditic)n's set forth in the
said resolutioh;
"2. Considering that events have assumed an . even more serious aspect
since the Council meeting of Octo~r
24th;

"Notes that the two parties underfake to avoid any further aggravation
of the situation and to refrain from
any . initiative which may lead to further fighting and loss of life;
3. Invites the two parties to continue to keep the . Council infoqned as
to the development of the situation;
"4. Invites the other Members of
the Council to furnish the Council
with any information received from
fueir representatives on the spot;
"5. Without prejudice to the carrying out of the above-mentioned
measures;
"Desitung, in view of the special
circumstahces of the case, to . contribute toward a final and fundamental
solutio,n by the 1 wo Governments of
the. questions at · •issue between them:
''.Decides to ;ippoin~
commission of
five· members to study o.n the spot and

a
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to report to the Council on any circumstances which, affecting international relations, threaten to disturb
peace between China and Japan, or
the good understanding between them,
upon which peace depends;
"The Governments of China and of
Japan will each have the right to
nominate one assessor to assist the
commission.
"The two Governments will afford .
the commission all 'facilities to ob- ·
tain on· the · spot whatever information
it may require;
·
:·
''It ls Understood that. should the
two parties initiate ·a ny negotiations,
these · would not fall within the scope·
of the terms of· reference of the commission, nor would it be within the
competence of the commission t<> in- ·
terfere · with the military arrangements of' ~ither party.
' ~,
"The appointment and deliberation
of the commission shall not prejudice
in any way the underta),c\pg given by
the Japanese Government m. the , ,re- .
solution of September 30th as regards
the withdrawal, of the Japanese .~roop.5
within the railway z~me.
"6. Betw~en now and its next ordinary 8~s~on, . which will be held on
January .25th, 1932, the Council, which
remains seized of the matter, invites
its President to follow the question
and to summon it afresh if necessary."

Briand Makes Declamtion
In introducing this resolution, the
President, Mr. Briand, made the following declaration:
"It will be observed that the resolution which is before you ; provides
!or action on two separate lines; (1) ·
to put an end to the immediate threat
to peace; (2} to facilitate the final
solution of existing causes of dispute
between the two countries. . ·
"The Cou'1cil was glad to find dur ..
ing its present sittings that an inquiry · into the circumstances whkh
tend to disturb the relations between
China and Japan, in itself. desirable,
would ' . be acceptable to the parties.
The Council therefor'€ welcomed the
proposal to estabUsh a commission
which 'Fas brought before i~ on
November 21st. The final paragraph
of the ·resolution provides for .the ~ppoinfmeµt :;ind ., functioning of such a
commission. ·
' .....
' .. ·

t~

.. ' I . shal~ now make certaip _commeJ:?,ts
fes_olution, paragra_ph )?r ·:~f~a~ap :
.. .."Patagtaph 1.-::This paragraph reaffinn.s . the resolution unanimously
~dop"ted by the Council on September
?~h, 1ayir,ig particular stress on the
· withdrawal of the Japanese troops
within the railway zone on the conditions described therein as speedily as
possible.
'The Co:.mcil attaches the utmost
importance to this resolution and is
persuaded that the two Governments
will set themselves to the · complete
fulfillment of the engagements which
tliey assumed on September 30th.
''Paragraph 2.-It is an unfortunate
fact that, since the last meeting of the
Council, events have occurred which
. have seriously aggravated the situation, and have given rise to legitimate
apprehensionl It is indispensable and
urgent to ubstain from any initiative
·which may , lead to further fighting,
- and from · all other action likely to
aggravate the situation. ,
"Paragraph 4.-Under Paragraph 4,
the Members of the Council other
than the parties are requested to continue to furni~h the Council with information received from their reprezentatives on the spot.
"Such information having proved of
high value in the past, the. Powers
who have the possibility of sending
such representative3 to various localities have :c-greed to do all that is
possible to continue and improve thP
·p resent system.
· ''For thJs purpose, those Powers will
keep in touch with the two pat;ties, so
that the latter may, should they so
desire, indicate to them the localities
to which they would desire the dispatch of such ,;epresentatives.
"Paragraph 5.-Provides for the institution of a commission of inquiry.
Subject to its purely advisory character, the terms of reference of the commission are wide. In principle, no
question which it feels called upon to
study will be excluded, provided the
question rela1es to any circumstances
which, affecting international relations, threaten to disturb peace between China ~nd Japan, or the ~ood
understanding between them upon
which peace depends. Each of the
two Governments will have the ~ight

?n

•I

D-

es
) .

at
!al

,

'

;

I

Y~f

.~P r~u-~ ~
.fom~issipn }~ -~onsider
1
any -~~esf10~--1 t~1.. ex~~inabon of
whi_cIJ,_·. -~~ r1 ~~rv~u_larl;r . : ?~ir~s. ,' ,'.J:'ne
comnnJ:s,¥>p
d1stret~?n
1
to detetj_hine tfie. _q uestf~ upon which
it will report to the Council, and will
have power to make interim rt!ports
when IJ~sirable.
"If', f~~ unde~a~tngs given · by the
two parties according to the , resolution of :-September'. 30th have . not been
·carried crut by'· the •t inie of the arrival
of the commission~ the commissioh
should
speedily ·a s possible report
to the Council ..
' the situation.
I
1
' It is specially provided that, 'should
thP. two parties initiate any negotiations, tlrese would not fall within the
scope of the terms of reference of the
commission, nor would it be within the
competence of the commission ;o interfere with the lJlilitary arrangements
of either party'. This latter provision
does not limit in any way its faculty
of investigation. It is also clear that
the commission wi~l. enj9y full liberty
of movement in order to obtain the
information it may require for its reports."
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Japan Makes Reservation
The Japanese representative, in accepting the Resolution, made a reservation concerning paragraph 2 of the
rernlution, st~ting that he accepted it
on hehalf of his Government "on the
understanding that this paragraph was
not intended to preclude the Japanese
fore es from taking such action as might
be rendered necessary to provid~ directly for the protection of the lives
and property of Japanese subject
against the activities of bandits and
lawless elements rampant in various
parts of Manchuria."
The Chinese representative, on his
part, accepted the resolution, but asked
that certain of his observations and
reservations on points of principle
should be placed on record as follows:"!. China mu~t and does fully reserve any and all rights, remedies and
juridical positions to which she is or
may be entitled under and by virtue
of all the provisions of the Covenant,
under all the existing treaties to which
China is a party, and under the accepted principles of international law and
practice.
"II. The present arrangement evidenced by the resolution and the state3

ment made by the President of the
Council is regarded by China as a
.practical measure embodying four essential and interdependent elements:
(a) Immediate cessation of hostilities;
(b) Liquidation of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria within the
shortest possible period of time;
(c) Neutral observation and reporting upon all developments from now
on;
,
(d) A comprehensive inquiry into
the .entire Manchurian situation on
the spot by a commission appointed by
the Council.
The said arrangement being in effect and in spirit predicated upon
these fundamental factors, its integrity would be manifestly destroyed
by the failure of any one of them to
materialize and be effectively realized
as contemplated.
"III. China understands and expects
that the commission provided for in
the resolution will make it its first
duty to inquire into and report, with
its recommendations, on the withdrawal of the Japanese forces, if such
withdrawal has not been completed
when the commission arrives on the
spot.
"IV. China assumes that the said arrangement neither directly nor by implication affects the question of reparations and damages to China and
her nationals growing out" of the recent events in Manchuria, and makes
a specific reservation in that respect.
"V. In accepting the resolution laid
before us, China appreciates the efforts · of the Council to prevent further fighting and bloodshed by enjoining both China and Japan to avoid
any initiatbe which may lead to further fighting or any other action likely to aggravate the situation. It must
be clearly pointed out that this injunction should not be violated under
the pretext of the existence of lawlessness caused by a state of affairs
which it is the very purpose of the
resoiution to do away with. It is to
be observed that much of the lawlessness now prevalent in Manchuria
is due to the interruption of normal
life caused by the invasion of the
Japanese forces. Th~ only sure way
of restoring the normal peaceful life
4

is to hasten the withdrawal of the
Japanese troops and allow the- Chinese authorities to assume the responsibility for the maintenance of peace
and order. China cannot tolerate the
invasion and occupation of her territory by the troops of any foreign
country; fa::.· less can she permit these
troops to usurp the police functions
of the Chinese authorities.
"VI. China notes with satisfaction
the purpose to continue and improve
the present system of neutral obs.e rvation and reporting through representatives of other Pcwers, and China will
from time to time, as occasion requires, indicate the localities to which
it seems desirable to dispatch such
representatives.
"VII. It should be understood that, in
agreeing to this resolution which provides for the withdrawal of the Japanese forces to the railway zone, China
in no way recedes from the position
she has always taken with respect to
the maintenance of military forces in
the said railway zone.
"VIII. China would regard any attempt by Japan to bring about complications of a political character affecting China's territorial or administrative integrity (such as promoting
so-called independence movements 01·
utilizing disorderly elements for such
purposes) as an obvious violation of.
the undertaking to avoid any further
aggravation of the situation."

Membership Approved
The members of the commission
were subsequently selected by the
President of the Council, and, after
the approval of the two parties had
been obtained, the membership wa3
finally approved by the Council on
January 14, 1932, as follows:
H. E. Count Aldrovandi (Italian),
General de Division Henri Claude!
(French).
The Rt. Hon. The Earl of Lytton,
P.C. G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., <British).
Major-General Frank Ross McCoy
(American),
H. E. Dr. Heinrich Schnee (German).
The Euro:,:,can members, with a r~
presentative of the American rilell,lber, held two sittings in Geneva on
January 21st, at which Lord Ly~ton
w as ,.manb1ously elected chairman
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and a provisional program of work
was approved. The Governments of
hpan and China, each of which had,
by virtue of the resolution of December 10th, "the right to nominat~
one assessor to assist the commission,"
subseq-:.iently appointed as their • assessors H. E. Mr. Isaburo Yoshida,
Ambassador of Japan in Turkey, and
H. E. Dr. Wellington Koo, a former
Prime Mimster and former Minister
of Foreign Affairs of China.
The Secretary-General of the League
d€signated Mr. Robert Haas, Director
in the Secretariat of the League, to
act as secretary-general of the commission.(•)
In the course of its work the com •
mission was assisted by the technical
advice of Professor G. H. Blakeslee,
professor at Clark University, U.S.A.,
Ph. D., L.L.D., Mr. Donnery, Agrege
de l'Universite de France, Mr. Ben
Dorfman, B. A., M. A., William Harrison Mills Fellow, University of California, U. S. A.; Dr. A. D. A. de Kat
Angelino, Colonel T. A. Hiam, assistant
to the chairman of the Canadian National Railways, G. S. Moss, Esq ,
C.B.E., H.B.M. Consul in Weihaiwei,
Dr. C. Walter Young, M. A., Ph. D.,
Far Eastern Representative of the Institute of Current World Affairs, New
York City.
The European members of the commission sailed from Le Havre and Ply(") The secretary-General had put at
the disposal of the secretariat of the commission:
Mr. Pelt, member of the information
section; Mr. von Kotze, assistant to the
Under Secretary-General in charge of the
International Bureau; Mr. Pastuhov, member of the Political Section; the Hon.
W. W. Astor, temporary member of the
Secretariat a~ting as secretary of the
Chairman of the commission; and Mr.
Charrere, of the information section.
Major P. Jouvelet, Army Medical Corps,
French Army acted as personal assistant
to General Claude!, and Lieutenant Biddle
as personal assistant to General McCoy,
and collaborated also in the general work
of the secretariat.
Mr. Depeyre, French Vice-Consul at
Yokohama, acted as interpretor in the
Japanese language.
.
Mr. Aoki and Mr. Wou Sao-fong, members of the information section, collaborated with the secretariat of the commission.

mouth on February 3rd, and were
joined by the Amer ican member at
New York on February 9th.

Article 15 Invoked
Meanwhile the development of the
situation in the Far ·E ast . caused the
Chinese Government, on January 29th,
to submit a further appeal to the
Le.a gue of Nations under Articles 10,
11 and 15 of the Covenant. On Feb:r uary 12, 1932, the Chinese represen.tative requested the Council to submit the dispute to the Assembly in
accordance with paragraph 9 of Article 15 of the Covenant. Since no
further instructions were received
from the Council, the commission continued to interpret its mandate according to the resolution of the Council of
December 10th. This included:
1. An examination of the issues between China and Japan, which were
referred to the Council, ·including their
causes, development and status at the
time of the inquiry;
2. A consideration of a possible
solution of the Sino-Japanese dispute
which would reconcile the fundamental
interests of the two countries.
This conception of its mission determined the program of its work.
Before reaching Manchuria the main
theater of the conflict, contact was
established with the Governments of
Japan and China and with representa-·
tives of various shades of opinion, in
order to ascertain the nature of the
interests of the two countries. The
commission arrived in Tokyo on February 29th, where· it was joined by the
Japanese assessor. It had the honor
of being received by His Majesty the
Emperor. Eight days were spent in
Tokyo, and daily conferences were
held with members of the Government (and others) , including the Prime
Minister, Mr. Inukai, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Inukai, the Minister of Navy, Admiral Osumi. Int~views were also held W:~tih leading
bankers, businessmen, representatives
of various organizations and· oi.hers.
From all of these we :received inforrnation regarding the rights and intcresfs
of Japan in Manchuria and her historical associations with that country.
The Shanghai situation was also discussed. After leaving Tokyo we learn5

ed while in Kyoto of the establishment
of a new "State" in Manchuria, under
the name of "Manchukuo" {flle Manchu State). In Osaka conferences were
arranged with represent~tives of the
lusiness community.
The commission reached Shanghai
on March 14 and was joined there
by the Chinese assessor. Here a fortnight was 0 ccupied, in addition to our
general inquiry, in learning as much
as possible about the facts of the recent fighting and the possibility of an
&rl'l'Wtice, which we had previously
discussed with Mr. Yoshizawa in Tokyo. We paid a visit to the devastated
ar eas, and heard statements from the
Japanese naval and military authorities rega1·ding recent operations. We
also interviewed some of the members
of the Chinese Government and leaders of busine~s, educational, and other
circles, incl•.tding Canton.

Nanldng Leaders Inte~wed
On March 26th, the commission proceeded to Nanking, some of its members visiting Hangchow on the way.
Dur ing the following week it had the
honor of bei'ng received by the ?.resident of the National Government. lnterviews were held with Mr. Wang
Ching-wei, :President of the Executive Yuan, General Chiang Kai-shek,
Chairman of the Military Council, Dr.
Lo Wen-kan, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. T. V. Soong, Minister of
Finance, General Cheng Ming-chu,
Minister of Communications, Mr. Chu
Chia-hua, Minister of Education, and
other members of the Government.
In order to acquaint ourselves more
fully with representative opinion and
with conditions existing in various
pa,rts of China, we proceeded on April
1 to Hankow, stopping en route at
Kiukiang. Some representatives of the
c0mmission visited Ichang, Wanhsien
and Chungking in the Provinces of
Hupeh and Szechuan.
On April 9 the commission arrived
at Peiping (as Peking is now called)
where several conferences were held
with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and
with officials who 'had been members
of the adniinistration in Manchuria
until September 18.
Evidenc·e was
also given by the Chinese generals who
had been in command of the troops
6

at the ba•rracks a t Mukden on the
night of ~tembet 18th.
Our stay in Peiping was prolonged
owing to difficulty which arose regarding the entry into Manchuria of Dr.
W dlington Koo, the Chinese assessor.
In proceeding to Manchuria, the
com.mission divided into two groups,
some of the party traveling to Mukden
by rail via Shanhaikwan, and the remainder, including Dr. Koo, by sea via
Dairen, thus remaining within the
Japanese railway area. The objection
to Dr. Koo's entry into "Manchukuo"
territory was finally withdrawn after
the arrival of the commission in
Changchun, the northern terminus of
the Japanese railway area.
We remained in Manchuria for about
six weeks, visiting Mukden, Changchun, Kirin. Harbin, Dtliren, Port
A~hur, Anshan, Fushun and Chlnchow. We had intended to visit Tsitsihar as well, but while we were in
Harbin there was continuous fighting
in the surrounding districts, and
Japanese military authorities stateJ
that they ·11ere unable at that moment
to guarant-ee the safety of the commission by rail on the western branch
of the Chine5e Eastern Railway. Accordingly, some members of our staff
visited Tsitsihar by air. From there
they traveled by the Taonan-Angangcbi and Ssupingkai-Taonan railways
and rejoined the main body in Mukden.
Dur-ing our stay in Manchuria w e
wrote a preliminary report, which we
dispatched to Geneva on April 29th.
We had numerous conferences witc
Lieutenant-General Honjo, Commander
of the Kwantu.ng Army, other military
officers, and .Ja:panese consular officials.
At Changchun we visited the Chief
Executive of "Manchukuo", the former
Emperor, Hsuan Tung, now known by
his personal name of Henry Pu-yi. We
also had intervi-ews with members of
the "Manchukuo" Government including officiails and advisers of Japanese
nationality, and governors of provinces.
Delegations wete received from the
local population, most of which were
presented by the Japanese or "Manchukuo" authorities. In addition to
our public meetings, we were able to
arrange interviews with a great number

of individuals, both Chinese and foreign.
Analysis in Peiping
The commission returned to Peiping
on June 5th, where an analysis of the
voluminous documentary materi~l ,collected was begun. Two more conferences were also held with Mr. Wang
Ching-wei, President of the Executive
Yuan, Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Minister of
Foreign Affairs, and Mr. T. V .. Soong,
Minister of Finance.
,
:
On June 28 the commission proceeded to Tokyo via Chosen (Korea). Its
departure for Japan was delayed . by
the fact that no Foreign Minister had
yet been appointed in the Cabinet of
Admiral Viscount Saito. After thetr
arrival in Tokyo on July 4, conferences were held with leaders of the
new Government, including the Prime
Minister, Admiral Viscount Saito, the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count
Uchida, and the Minister of War,
Lieutenant-General Araki. From these
we learned the present views and policy
of the Government regarding the development of the situation in Manchuria and Sino-Japanese relations.
Having thus renewed contact with
bo h the Chinese and the Japanese
Governments, the commission returned
to Peiping, where the drafting of thP.
report was undertaken.
·
The two assessors, who throughout
spared no effort to assist the work of
the comnuss1on, presented a great
amount of valuable documentary evidence. The material received from each
assessor was shown to the other, and
an opportunity given for subsequent
comment. These documents will be
published.
The large number of persons and
organizations interviewed, as listed in

the appendix, will illustrate the amount
of evidence examined. Further, in the
course of our travels we have been
presented with a great quantity of
printed pamphlets, petitions, appeals,
and letters. In Manchuria alone we
received approximately 1,550 letters in
Chinese and 400 letters in Russia, without mentioning those written in English, F-r ench or Japanese. The arrangement, translation and study of ~hese
documents involved a considerable
labor Which was carried out · in ~ite
of our continual mov·e ment from place
to place. It was finally c6rhplet~a• on
our return to Peiping in July :ahcf b~1
for e our last visit to Japan. '.
1. ·
The C011\IIliSSion's concept~on of
mission, which determined the program
of its work and itinerary, has equally
guided the plan of its report. .
First we have tried to provide an
historical background by describing the
rights and interests of the two countries in Manchuria which prqvide the
fundamental causes of the dispute; the
more recent specific issues which immediately preceded the actual outbreak
were then examined and the .course?
of events since September 18th, ,1931,
described. Throughout this review . of
the issues we have insisted less tm tlie
responsibility for past actions than on
the nece~sity of finding means to avoid
their repetition in the future.
Finally, the report concludes with
some reflections and considerations
which we have desired to submit to
the Council upon the various issues
with which it is confronted, and with
some suggestions of the lines on whic:h
it seemed to us possible to effect a
durable solution of the conflict and the
re-establishment of a good under~tanding between China and Japan.

its

CHAPTER I
Outline of Recent Developments in China
.. The events of September 18, 1931 ,
which first brought the presep.t conflict to the notice of the League of
Nations were but the outcome of a
long cha.in of minor occasions of friction, indicating ~ growing tension in
the relations between China and
J,pan. A knowledge of ·the essential
factors in the recent relations of thea~
two: countries is necessary to a complete understanding of the present
conflict. It has been necessary, therefore, to extend our study of the issues beyond the limits of Manchuria
itself and to consider in their widest
aspect all the factors which determine
present Sino-Japanese relations. The
m{tional aspirations of the Republic
of China, the expansionist policy Jf
the Japanese Empire and of the former Russian Empire, the present dissemination of communism from the
U. S. S. R., the economic and strategic
needs of these three countries: such
matters as these, for example, are factors of fundamental importance in any
study of the Manchurian problem.
Situated as this part of China is
geographically betweeh the territories
t>f Japan and Russia, Manchuria has
become politically a center of conflict,
and wars between all three countrier
have been fought upon its soil. Manchuria is in fact the meeting ground
of conflicting needs and policies, which
themselves require investigation before
the concrete facts of the present conflict can be fully appreciated. We shall
therefore begin by reviewing these essential factors seriatim.

1. Development of China
The dominating factor in China is
the modernization of the nation itself
which is slowly taking place. China
today is a nation in evolution, showing
evidence of transition in all aspects of
8

its national life. Political upheavals,
civil wars, social and economic unrest,
with the resulting weakness of the
central gove:rnment;, have been the
characteristics of China since the Revolution of 1911. These conditions have
adversely affected all the nations with
which China has been brought into
contact and until remedied will continue a menace to world peace and iA
contributory cause of world economk
depression.
Of the stages of which the present
conditions have been reached only a
brief summary can here be given.
which in no sense aims at bemg a
comprehensive history, Throughout the
first centuries of her intercourse with
individua\ Occidentals, China remained,
as far as W estem influence is concerned, practically an isolated country. Thic,
condition of isolation was bound to
come to an end when, at the beginning
cV. the nineteenth century, the imp rovement of modem communications
diminished distance and brought the
Far East within easy reach of other
nations, but in fact the country was
not ready for the new contact y.,hen
it came. As a result of the Treaty of
N~nki~g, which ended the war of 1842,
some ports were opened to foreign
trade and residence. Foreign influences
were introduced into a country whose
government had made no prepa1ations
to assimilate them. Foreign trader,;;
began to settle in her ports before
she could provide for their administrative, legal, judicial, intellectual
and sanitary requirements. The latter
br ought with them conditions and standards to which they were accustomed.
Foreign cities sprang up in the Treaty
Ports. Foreign methods of organization, of administration and business,
asserted themselves. Any efforts there
may have been on either side to mitigate the contrast were not effective,

and a long period of friction and misun'derstanding followed.
The efficacy of foreign arms ha'ving
been: demonstrated in a series ·of armed
conflicts, China hoped by building arsenals and 1 by military training according to Western methods to meet
force with force. Her efforts in this
direction, restricted as they were in
scope, were doomed to failure. Much
• mor~ fundamental reforms were needed to enable the country to hold its
own ' against the foreigner, but China
did riot desire such reforms. On the
contrary, she wanted to protect her
culture and clominion against them.

Japan Solved Problems
Japan had to face similar problems
when that country was first opened to
Western influences: new contacts with
disturbing ideas, the conflict of different standards, leading to the establishment of foreign settlements, one-sided
tariff conventions and extraterritorial
claims. But Japan shelved these problems by internal reforms, by raising
her standards of modern requirements
to those of the West and by diplomatic
negotiations. Her assimilation of Western thoughts may not yet be complete,
and friction may sometimes be seen between the old an'd the new ideas of different generations. But the ~apidity
and the thoroughness with which
Japan has assimilated Western science
and technique and adopted W estem
standards without diminishing the
value of her old traditions, have aroused general admiration.
However difficult Japan's problems of
assimilation and transformation may
have been, those faced by China were
much more difficult, owing to the vastness of her territory, the lack of national unity of her people, and her
traditional financial system, under
which the whole of the revenue collected did not reach the Central Treasury. Although the complexity of the
problem which China has to solve may
be .so much greater than that which
confronted Japan as to malce unjust
any comparison between the two, yet
the solution required for China must
ultunately follow lines similar to those
adopted by Japan. The reluctance fJf
China to receive •foreigners, and her
attih1de 'toward those who were in the

country was bound to have serious
consequences. It concentrated the attention of · her foreign influence, and
prevented her from profiting by the experience of more mode:rn conditions in
the foreign settlements. As, a result
the constructive reform necessary to
enable the country to cope with the
new conditions was almost completely
neglected.
The inevitable conflict of two irre·concilable conceptions of respective
rights and international relations led
to wars and disputes resulting in the
progressive surrender of sovereign
rights and the loss of territory either·
temporary or permanent. China lost
a huge area on the north bank of the
Amur River, and the Maritime Province; the Luchu Islands; Hongkong;
Burma; Annam, Tongking, Laos, Cochin-China (provinces of Indo-China);
Formosa; Korea; and - several other
tributary states; she also granted long
leases of other territories. · Foreign
courts, administration, police and military establishments were admitted on
Chinese soil. The right to regulate
at will her tariff on imports and exports was lost for the time being.
China had to pay damages for injuries to foreign lives and property and
heavy war indemnities which have
been a burden to her finances ever
since. Her very existence was even
threatened by the division of her territory· into spheres of interests of foreign Powers.
Her defeat in the Sino-Japanese war
of 1894-95, and the disastrous consequences of the Boxer uprising of 1900
opened the eyes of soine thoughtful
leaders to the necessity of fundamental reform. The reform movement was
at first to accept the leadership of
the Manchu house, but turned away
from this dynasty after its cause and
its leaders had been · betrayed to the
Empress Dowager, and the Emperor
Kwang Hsu was made to expiate his
hundred days of reform in virtual imprisonment to the end of his life in
1908 . .

Manchu Dynasty Weakens
The Manchu dynasty had ruled China
for 250 years. In its later years it was
weakened by a series of rebellions:
the Taiping rebellion (1850-65); the
9

Mohammedan rising in Yunnan (1856and the risings iq . Chinese Tu~k~stan (1864-77). The Taiping rebeJlj9n
especially shook the - Empire to , ,its
found~tion, and dealt a blow to the
. prestige of the dynasty from. which jt
.never recovered. Finally, after the
death of the then ~mpress -Dowager in
1908, it collapsed through its own inherent weakness.
After some minor attempts at insurrection, the revolutionaries were
successful in South China. A brief
period followed during which• a Re·publican Government was established
at Nanking, with Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the
leading figure of the Revolution, as
provisional President. On February 12,
1912, the then Empress Dowager in
the name of the child Emperor signed
a decree of abdication, and a .provisional constitutional regime, with Yuan
Shih-kai as President, was th.en inaugurated. With the abdication of th~
Emperor his representatives in provinces, prefectures and districts lost
the influence and moral prestige which
they had derived from his authority.
They became ordinary men, to be
obeyed only in so far as they were
able to enforce their decisions. The
gradual substitution to military for
civil governors in the provinces was an
inevitable con~equence. The post of
central executive could, likewise, be
held only by the military leader who
had the strongest army or was S\:lpported by the strongest group of prpvincial or local military chiefs.
This tendency toward military dictatorship, which was more apparent
in -the north, was facilitated by the
fact that the army had gained some
popularity by the support it had given
in many instances to the Revolution.
Military leaders did not hesitate to lay
claim to the merit of having made the
Revolution a success. Most of them
were northern leaders, to a certain extent grouped together in the so-called Peiyang Party-men who had risen
from a low status to higher command!:
in the model army trained by Yuan
Shih-kai after the Sino-Japanese war.
They could more or less be trusted by
him because of the tie of p&sonal al•
legiance which, in China, has not yet
given place to the corporate loyalty
which characterizes ,o rganizations in

µ),
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the West. These men were .appointed
military governors by ~ _
uap' Slµp~*'ai
i~· .the provinces under his cQµ~ol.
'.J'pere the power rested in their hSAd:~
and pr-0vincial revenues could, accordingly, ,b e taken at will by them .~ ,.}?e
used for their personal armies , 1~nd
adherents.
In the southern provinces the situa•tion was ,d~fferent, partly as a resuit
of intercourse with foreign countries
;md J»trtly on account of the different
sdeial ,customs of the population. The
p_e ople of South China have always
been averse to military autocracy and
official interference from outside. Dr.
Sun Yat-sen and their other leaders
remained faithful to the idea of constitutionalism.
They had, however.
little military force behind them, ., pecQuse the reorganization of the .Q~y
had not yet progressed very far in . ,l be
provinces south of the Yangtze, and
they had no well-equipped arset;1a1s.
KuomJntanr Revolts
When, after much procrastination, the
first Parliament was convened in Peking in 1913, Yuan Shih-kai had consolidated his military position, iatked
only sufficient financial reso1.111ces to
ensure the loyalty of the provincial
armies. A huge foreign loan, the socalled Reorganization Loan, provided
1im with the necessary financial me~.
13ut his action in concluding that loan
without the consent of Parliament
brought his political opponents of , the
Kuomintang or Nationalist Party under
Dr. Sun's leadership, into open - revolt. In a military sense the South
was weaker than the North, and was
still more weakened when the victorious northern commanders, after
conquering a number of southern provinces, placed the latter under northern
generals.
There ~ere several attempts to reinstate the 1913 Parliament, which had
been dissolved by Yuan Shih-kai, or
to convene bogus Parliaments, two attempts to establish monarchical rule.
many changes of Presidents and Cabinets, continuous shifting of allegiance
among military leaders, and many declarations of temporary independence
of one or more provinces. In Canton.
the Kuomintang Government, be~ded
by Dr. Sun, succeeded in maintairung
itself from 1917 onwards, with oc~-

sio~l:...intervals dUI.'ing which it ceao;ed . •16 function. During these year,s:,
Chima was · ravaged by warring factions •and the everpresent bandits grew
into ·veritable armies by the enlistment of ruined farmers, desperate.'· inhabitants ·of famine-stricken districts, ·
or unpaid soldiers.' Even the constitu- ·
tionalists, who were fighting in the
South, were repeatedly opposed to the
danger of militarist feuds arising in
their midst. ·
In 1923, convinced by Russian revolutiorusts that a definite program, strict
party discipline, and systematic propaganda were necessary to , ensure · the
victory of his cause, Dr. Sun Yat-sen
reorganized the Kuomintang with a
program which he outUnea in his
"Manifesto" and "Three Principles of
the People." ( * ) Systematic organization ensured party disci'.pline and unity
of action through the intermediary of
a Central Executive Committee-.
A
political -training institute instructed
propagandists and organizers of local
branches, while a military training institute at Whampoo, with the help of
Russian officers, was instrumental in
providing the party with ·an effiicent
army, the leaders of which . were permeated with the idea of . the party.
Thus equipped, the Kuomintang was
soon ready to establish contacts with
the people at large.
Sympathizers
were organized in local branches or in
peasant and labor unions affiliateJ with
the party. This preliminary conquest
of the . people's mind was, after the
death of Dr. Sun in 1925, followed up
by the successful Northern Expedition
of the Kuomintang army, which by
the end of 1928 succeeded. in producing.a nominal unity for the first time in
many years, and a measure of actual
uni(y which lasted for a ~ime.

Military Phase Ended
The first, or military, phase of Dr.
Sun's program had thus been brought
to a successful end.
The second period of political tutelage under party dictatorship could
begin. It was to be devoted to the
education of the people in the art of
self-government and to the reconstruction of the country.
- ·-~;
(* ) Nationail· independence, democratic
government and social. i;eorganization. ·

In ,1927 a Central Gove~mnent was
established at .Nanking. It ;was -con-.
trolled. by the party-it was, jn1• fa<:t,
me:tely one important . organ , ·o~ the •
party. · It consisted of five Yuans or
Boards (tht:! , Executive, the Legislative,
the '•Judicial, the Control, and ·the Examination Boards). The Government
had been modeled as closely as, pos- ..
sible on · the lines of Dr. Sun's "Five
Power Constitution" the Trias 'Politica
of Montesquieu with the addition of '
two old Chinese institutions, the Censorate and · the Public Services Examination Board-in order to facilitate
the transition to the final, dr con- .
stitutional stage, when the . people,
partly directly and partly through its
elected representatives. would itself
take charge of the direction of its gcw- ·
ernment.
In the provinces, similarly," a con:imittee system was adopted for the organization of · provincial governments.
while in villages, towns and · districts
the people were to be trained in the
handling of local self-government. The
party was now ready to put into
operation its schemes of political and
economic reconstruction, but was prevented from doing so by internal dissensions, the periodical revolt of various generals with personal armies, and
the menace of communism. In fact,
the Central Government had repe:itedly
to fight for its very existence.
For a time unity was maintained on
the surface. But not even the semblance of unity could be preserved
when powerful warlords concluded alliances among themselves and marched
their armies against N anking. Though
they never succeeded in their object,
they remained, even after defeat, potential forces to be reckoned with. Moreover, they never took the position that
war against the Central Government
was an act of rebellion. It was in
their eyes simply a struggle for supremacy between their faction and an- ·
other one which happened to reside
in the national capital and to be recognized as the Central Government by
foreign Powers. This lack of hierarchical relations is all the more dahgerous because serious:i.. dissensions in
the party itself have' weakened the
title of the Central Gove:mment ·to be
the unquestione(h.ucc-essorS'·of Dr. Sun. ·
The new schisnd1as ·led to the' estrange1t

ment of influential southern leaders,
who retired •to €anton, where the local
authorities and the local branch of ··the
Kuomintang frequently acted independently of the Central Government.
From this summary description it
appears that disruptive forces in China
are still powerful. The cause of thic;
lack of cohesion is the tendency of
the mass of the people to think in
terms of family and locality, rather
than in terms of the nation, except in
periods of acute tension between their
country and foreign Powers. • Although
there are, nowadays, a number of
lNiders who have risen above particularist sentiments, it . is evident that
a national outlook must be attained
by a far greater number of citizens before real national unity can result.

Considerable Progress Made
Although the spectacle of China's
transitional 'period, with its unavoidable
political, social, intellectual and moral
disorder, is disappointing · to her impatient friends and has created enmi •
ties which have become a danger to
peace. it is nevertheless true that, !O
spite of difficulties, delays and failures,
considerable progress has in fact been
made. An argument which consfautl.y
reappears in the polemics of the present controversy is that China- is "not
an organized State" or "is in a cond!tion of complete chaos and incredible
anarchy,'' and that her present-day
conditions should disqualify her from
membership in the League of Nation<.:
and deprive her of the protective
clauses of the Covenant. In this connectiori it may be useful to remember
that an altogether different attitude was
taken at the time of the Washington
conference by all the participating
Powers. Yet, even at that time, China
had two completely separate Governments, one at Peking and one at Can-ton, and was rlisturbed by large bandit
forces which frequently interfered with
communications in the interior, while
preparations were being made for a
civil war involving all China. As a
result of that war, which was preceded by an ultimatum sent to the
Central Government on January 13,
1922, when the Washington conference
was still in session, the Central Government was overthroWn in May, and
the independence of Manchuria from
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the Government installed at Peking in
its place was declared in July by Marshal Chang Tso-lin. Thus, there existed no fewer than three governments
professing to be independent, not -to
mention the virtually autonomous
status of a number of provinces . or
parts of provinces. Although, at prese11t, the Central Government's iauthority is still weak in a number .of
provinces, the central authority is not,
at least openly repudiated, and there
is reason to hope that if the Central
Government as such can be maintain~. provincial administration, military
forces and finance will acquire an increasingly national character. These,
among others, were d()ubtless the reasons which induced the Assembly of
the League of Nations last September
to elect China to the Council.
The present Government has tried
to balance its current receipts and expepditures and to adhere to sound financial principles. Various taxes have
been consolidated and simplified. In
default of a proper budgetary system,
an annual statement has been issued
by the Ministry of Finance. A Central Bank· has been established. A
National Financial Committee has been
appointed, which includes among its
members influential representatives of
banking and commercial interests. The
Ministry of Finance is also trying to
supervise the finances of the provinces,
where the methods of raising taxes are
often still highly un~tisfactory. For
all these new measures the Government is entitled to credit. It has, howe:ver, been forced by recurrent civil
wars to increase its domestic indebtedness by about a billion dollars (silver ), since 1927. Lack of funds has
prevented it from executing its ambitious plans of reconstruction, or completing the improvement of communications which is so vitally necessary
for the solution of most of the country's problems. In many things, no
doubt, the Government has failed, but
it has already accomplished much.
Nationalism Is Normal
The Nationalism of modern China i,c;
a normal aspect of the period of
political transition through which the
country is passing. National senti!nents and aspirations of a similar kind
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would be fou.nd in any country placed
in the same position. But, in addition
to the natural desire to be free from
any outside control in a people that
has become conscious of national unity .
~he influence of the Kuomintang .h as
mtroduced into the nationalism of
China an additional and abnormal
~inge of bitterness against all foreign
mflnenc-es, and has expanded its aims
so as to include the liberation of all
Asiatic people still subject to "imperialistic oppression." This is partly
due to the slogans of its early com:r.1unistic connection. Chinese nationalism today is also permeated by memories of former greatness, which it so
desires to revive. It demands the return of leased territories, of administrative and other. not purely commer~ial ri~hts exercised by a foreign agency
m railway areas, , of administrative
rights in concessions and settlements,
and of extraterritorial rights which
imply that foreigners are not amenable
to Chinese laws, law courts and taxation. Public opinion is strongly opposetl
to the continuance of these rights
which are regarded as a nationai
humiliation.
Foreign Powers have in general taken
a sympathetic attitude towards these
desires. At the Washington conference,
1921-22, they were admitted to be acceptable in principle, though there was
divergence of opinion as to the best
time and method of giving effect to
them. It was felt that an immediate
surrender of such rights would impose
upon China the obligation to provide
administration, police and justice of a
standard which, owing to financial
and other internal difficulties, she could
not at present attain. The present
single issue of extraterritoriality might
lead to a number of separate issues
with Foreign Powers if the former
were abolished prematurely. It was
also felt that international relations
would not improve but would deteriorate if foreign nationals were to be exposed to the same unjust treatment
and extortionate taxation as Chinese
citizens were subjected to in so many
parts of the country. In spite of these
reservations, much was actually accomplished, especially at Washington,
or as a result of that conference. China
has recovered two out of five leased
territories, many concessions, admin-

istrative rights in the area of the Chi- .
nese Eastern Railway, Customs autonomy, and postal rights. Many treaties on the basis of equality have als~
been negotiated.
Hampered by Propaganda
Having started upon the road of international co-operation for the purpose of solving her difficulties, as was
done at Washington, China might have
made more substantial progress in the
ten years that have since elapsed had
she continued to follow that road. She
has only been hampered by the virulence of the anti-foreign propaganda
which has been pursued. In two particulars has this been carried so far
as to contribute to the creation of the
atmosphere in which the present conflict arose, namely, the use made of the
economic boycott, to which reference is
made in Chapter VII, and the introduction of anti-foreign •J )ropaganda
into the schools.
It is provided in the Provisional Con:..
stitution of China promulgated on
June 1, 1931 that "the Three Principles
of the People shall be the basic principles of education in the Republic of
China. "The ideas of Dr. Sun Yat-sen
are now taught in the scliools as if
they had the same authority as that
of the Classics in former centuries. The
sayings of the Master receive the same
veneration as the sayings of Confucius
received in the days before the Revolution. Unfortunately, however, mO'l"e
attention has been gfven to the negative than to the constructive side of nationalism in the education of the
young. A perusal of the textbooks used
ip the schools leaves the impression
on the mind of a reader that their
authors. have sought to kindle patriotism with the flame of hatred, and to
build up manliness upon a sense of injury. The result of this virulent antiforeign pr~paganda, begun in the
schools and carried through every
phase of public life, has been to induce the students to engage in politi cal activities which sometimes have
culminated in attacks on the persons.
homes or offices of Ministers and other
authorities, and in attempts to overthrow the Government.
Unaccompanied b.y ~ffective internal reforms or
impr ovements in national · standards,
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this attitude tended to alarm the Foreign;· Powers and to increase their reluctance to surrender the rights which
are · at the moment their only protection.
In connection with the problems of
maintaining law and order, the present , inad~quate means of communication. in China is a serious handicap.
Unless c;?ommunioations are sufficient
to -ensure p!'cmpt tnm~portation of national forces, the safeguarding of law
and . order must largely, if not completely, be entrusteci. to provincial authorities, who on account of the distance of the Central Government, must
be allowed to use their own judgment
in handling provincial affairs. Under
such conditions independence of mind
and action may easily cross the boundary· of law, with the result that the
province gradually takes on the aspect
of a private estate. Its armed force ';. >
are also identified with their commander, not with the nation. The transfer
of a commander from one army to
another by order of the Central Government is, ,in many cases, impossible.
The danger of civil war must continue
to exist so long as the Central Government lacks the material means to
make its authority swiftly and permanently . felt all over the country.
Banditry Nationwide
T1'e problem of banditry, which may
be tx:ace~ throughout the history of
China, and which exists today in all
parts of the country, is subject to
the same considerations. Banditry has
always existed in China and the administration has never been able to
suppress it thoroughly. Lack of proper communications was one of the
reasons which prevented the administration from getting rid of this evil
which increased or decreased according
to changing circumstances. Another
contributory cause is to be found in
the ·local.. uprisings and rebellions
which have often occurred in China,
especially as a result of maladministration. Even . after the successful suppression of such rebellions, bandit
gang~ recruited from the ranks of the
rebe~ often remained active in parts
of th«:! country. This was especially
the case in the period following the
suppfession of the Taiping Rebe.l lion
(1850--65). In more recent times ·'6an14

dits' h'ave aTso originated from the ranks
of ' unpkiid · soldiers who were not able .
to find other means of')living and nad ·
beeri accustomed to looting during the
civil ' 'wars in which they had tliken ·
pert. :
' '.'
Other causes which have given rise
to an · increase of banditry in parts of •
China were. floods and droughts. These :
are more or less regular occurrences, ,
and they have always brought famineand banditry in their wake. The problem has been further aggravated by
the pressure of a rapidly increasing ·
population. In congested areas normal ·
economic difficulties were still fu1:'~ :,
ther increased, and among people living on a bare subsistence level with no
margin to ·' meet times of crises the
slightest deterioration in the conditions
of life • might bring large numbers to
the · point of destitution.
Banditry,
theretore, has been largely influenced
by the prevailing economic conditions.
In .prosperous periods or districts it
has .~ diminished, but where for any of
the reasons . mentioned the struggle for •
existence was intensified or the· political conditions were disturbed, it was
sure to increase.
When once banditry had become well
established in any area, its suppression ·by force was rendered difficult
becaus.e of the defective communications ip. the interior of the country.
It is· in regions which are difficult of
access, where a few miles may involve days of travel, that large armed
ban<~s can move freely, appearing and
disappearing suddenly, without their
abodes and movements being known.
When bandit suppression has been
long neglected, and when the soldiers
even co-operate with bandits secretly,
as has happened often enough, traffic
along highways and waterways is interfered with. Such occurrences can
only be stopped by adequate police
forces. In the districts of the interior,
bandit suppression is much more difficult, because guerilla warfare inevitably develops.
But though the personal armies of
local generals and the prevalence of
bandit hordes throughout the country
may. disturb the internal peace of the
country, they are no longer a menace
to· -the authority of the Central Gov-·
ernment as · such. There is, however;

a menace of this kind from another
source, namely, Communism.
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Communism Starts in 1921
The communist movement in China,
remained restricted within intellectual
and labour circles, where the doctrine
gained considerable influence in the
period 1919-24. Rural China was, at
that time, scarcely touched by this
movement. The manifesto of the Soviet Government of July 25, 1919, declaring its willingness to renounce all
privileges "extorted" from China by
the former Tsarist Government, created a favorable impression throughout
China, especially among the intelligentsia. In May, 1921, the "Chinese
Communist Party" was formally constituted. Propaganda was especially
conducted in labor circles at Shanghai where Red syndicates were orgar{ized. I.n June, 1922, at its second
Congress, the Communist Party which
did not then number more than three
hundred members, decided to ally itself with the Kuomintang. . 1r. Sun
Yat-sen, although opposed to the communist doctrine, was prepared to admit individual Chinese Communists
into the party. In the autumn of 1922
the Soviet Government sent a mission to China, headed by Mr. Joffe.
Important interviews, which took place
between him and Dr. Sun resulted in
the joint declaration of January 26,
1923, by which assurance was given of
Soviet sympathy and support to the
cause of the national unification and
independence of China. It was explicitly stated, on the other hand, that
the communist organization and the
Soviet system of government could not
be introduced at that time under the
conditions prevailing in China. Following this agreement, a number of
military and civil advisers were sent
from Moscow by the end of 1923, and
"undertook, under the control of Dr.
Sun, the modification of the internal
organization of the Kuomintang and
of the Cantonese Army."
At the first National Congress of the
Kuomintang, convened in March, 1924,
the admission of Chinese Communists
into the party was formally agreed to,
on the condition that such members
should not take any further part in the
preparation of the proletarian revolution. · The period of tolerance with re~d to communism thus began.

This period lasted from 1924 until
1927. Early in 1924 the Communists
counted about 2,000 adl}.erents, and· Red
syndicates approximately 60,000 members. But the Communists soon acquired enough influence ,inside the
Kuomintang to raise anxiety among the
orthodox members of that party.· They
presented to the Central Committee, at
the end of 1926, a proposal going so far
as to include the nationalization of all
landed properties except those belonging to workmen, peasants or soldiers;
the reorganization of the Kuomintang ;
the elimination of all military leaders
hostile to communism; and the arming
of 20,000 Communists and 50,000 workmen and peasants. This proposal, however, was defeated and the Communists
ceased to support the intended campaign
of the Kuomintang against the Northern
militarists although they had previously
been most active in the organization of
the Nationalist forces. Nevertheless, at
a later stage they joined in it, and
when the' N orthem Expedition reached
Central China and established a Nationalist Government at Wu-Han, in
1927, the Communists succeeded in obtaining a controlling position in it, as
the Nationalist leaders were not prepared to join is.sue with them until
their own forces had occupied Nanking
and Shanghai. The Wu-Han Government put into operation, in the provinces of Hunan and Hupeh, a series
of purely communistic measures. The
Nationalist Revolution was almost on
the point of being transformed into
a Communist Revolution.
No Longer Tolerated
The Nationalist leaders at last decided that communism had become too
serious a menace to be tolerated an:-,•
longer. As soon as they were firmly
established at Nanking, where another
National Government was constituted
on April 10, 1927, a proclamation was
jssued in which the Nanking Gqvernment ordered the immediate purification of the army and the civil service
fro~ communism. On July 15 the
majority of the Central Executive of
the Kuomintang at Wu-Han, who had
so far refused to join the Nationalist
leaders at Nanking, adopted a resolution excluding Communists from the
Kuomintang and ordering the Soviet
advisers to leave China. As a ·result
of this decision, the Kuomintang re-
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gained its unity, and the Government
at Nanking became generally recognized by the party.
During the period of tolerance, several military units had been gained
to the- communist cause.
These
had been left in the rear, mostly in
Kiangsi Province, when the Na tionalist
Army was marching to the North.
Communist agents were sent to coordinate these units and to persuade
them to take action against the National Government. On July 30, 1927,
the garrison at Nanchang, the capital
of Kiangsi Province, together wit.h
some other military units, revolted and
subjected the population to numerous
excesses. However, on August 5 they
were defeated by the Government
forces and withdrew to the south.
On December 11 a communist rising at
Canton delivered control of the city
for two days into their hands. The
Nanking Government considered that
official Soviet agents had actively
participated in these uprisings. An
order of December 14, 1927, withdrew
the exequatur of all the consuls of
the U.S.S.R. residing in China.
The recrudescence of civil war favored the growth of communist influ ence in the neriod between 1928 and
1931. A Red· Army was organized, and
extensive areas in Kiangsi and Fukien
were sovietized. Only in November,
1930, shortly after the defeat of a powerful coalition of northern militarists,
was the Central Government able to
take up the suppl,"ession of communism
in earnest. The communist forces had
operated in parts of Kiangsi and Hunan
Provinces, and were then reported to
have caused in two or three months
the loss of 200,000 lives and of property valued at about one billion dollars (silver). They had now become
so strong that they were able to defeat the first and frustrate the second
expedition sent against them by the
Government. The third expedition, directed by the Commander-in-Chief,
General Chiang Kai-shek, defeated the
communist armies in several encounters. By the middle of July, 1~31, the
most important communist strongholds
had been taken, and their forces were
in full retreat toward Fukien.
Whilst constituting a political commission to reorganize the areas which
had been devastated, General Chiang
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Kai-shek pursued the Red armies, and'
drove them into the mountainous region southeast of Kiangsi.
The Nanking Government was thus
on the point of putting the principal
Red army out of action. when event~
occurred in different parts of China
which obliged them to suspend this.·
offensive, and to withdraw a large part
of their troops. In the North had oc-.
curred the rebellion of General Shih
Yu-san, supported by a hostile intervention on the part of the Cantonese
troops in the province of Hunan; simultaneously with this intervention came
the events of Seotember 18 at Mukden.
Encouraged by these circumstances, the
Red resumed the offensive, and before:
long the fruits of the victorious cam- '
paign were almost completely lost.
Some Areas Sovietized
i..a.q ;c parts of the 1irovinces of
Fukien and Kiangsi, and parts of
Kwangtung, are reliably reported to
be completely sovietized. Communist
zones · of influence are far more extensive. They cover a large part of
China south of the Yangtze, and parts'
of the provinces of Hupeh. Anhwei,
and Kiangsu north of that river.
Shanghai has been the center of communist propaganda. Individual sympathizers with communism may probably be found in every town in Chinn.
So far two provincial communist governments only have been organized
in Kiangsi and Fukien, but the number of minor soviets runs into hun- ·
dreds.
The communist government
itself is formed by a committee elect-.
ed by a congress of local workers and .
peasants. It is, in reality, controlled
by representatives of the Chinese Communist Party, which sends out trained
men for that purpose, a large number
of whom have been previously trained
in the U.S.S.R. Regional committees.
under the control of the Central Com mittee of the Chinese Communist ,
Party, in their turn control provincial.
committees and these, again, district
committees, and so on, down to thecommunist cells organized in factories,
schools, military barracks, etc.
When a district has been occupiedby a Red Army, efforts are made to
sovietize it, if the occupation appears
to be of a more or less permanent na-·
ture. Any opposition from the popu-·

lation is suppressed by terrorism. A
communist government, as described,
is then established. The complete organization of such governments comprises: Commissariats for. Internal A~fairs for the struggle agamst: the antirevolutionari es (G. P. U.) , for Financial Affairs. for Rural Economy, for
Education, for Hygiene, for Post and
Telegraph, for Communications; and
Committees for Military Affairs and
for the control of workmen and peasants. Such elaborate government organizations exist only in completely
sovietized districts.
Elsewhere the
organization is more modest.
The program of action consists in
the cancellation of debts, the distribution among landless proletarians and
small farmers of land forcibly seized,
either from large private owners or
from religious institutions, such as temples, monasteries and churches. Taxation is simplified; the peasants have to
contribute a certain part of the produce of their lands. With a view to
the improvement of agriculture, steps
are taken to deve:op irrigation, rural
credit systems, and co-operatives. Public schools, hospitals and di~pensaries
may also be established.
Thus the poorest farmers derive considerable benefit from communism,
whereas the rich and middle-class landowners merchants and local gentry
are co~pletely ruined, either by immediate expropriation or by levies anc~
fines; and in applying its agrarian program the Communist Party expects to
gain the support of the masses. . In
this respect, its propaganda and action
nave met with considerable success,
notwithstanding the fact that communist theory conflicts with the Chinese social system. Existing grievances
resulting from oppressive taxation, extortion, usury and pillage by soidiery
or bandits, were fully exploited.
Special slogans were employed for
farmers, workmen. soldiers and intellectuals, with variations especially
adapted to women.
Communism in China not only
means as in most countries other than
the U :s.S.R., either a political doctrine
held by certain members of existing
parties, or the organization of a special party to compete for power with
other political parties. It has become
an actual rival of the National Gov-

ernment. It possesses its own ia#,
army and government, and its own
territorial sphere of action. For this
state of affairs there is no parallel in
any other country.
Moreover, in
China the disturbance created by the
communist war is made more serious
by the fact that the country is going
~hrough a critical period of internal
1 econstruction, still further complicated
during the last eleven months by an
external crisis of exceptional gravity.
The National Government seems to be
determined to regain the control of
the districts under communist influ •·
ence, and to pursue in these districts,
once their reco_v<>ry is ac.hievcd, a policy of economic rehabilitation; but in
its military campaigns, apart from difficulties already mentioned, both internal and external, which weaken its
position, it is hampered by lack of'
funds and defective communications.
The problem of communism in China
is thus linked with the larger problem
of national reconstruction.
In the summer of 1932 important military operations, having for their object
a final suppression of the Red resistance, were announced by the Government of Nanking. They were commenced, and, as stated ·above, were to
have been accompanied by a thorough
Eocial and administrative reorganiza~
tion of the recaptured regions. But up
to the present no important results
have been announced.
·
So far as Japan is China's nearest
neighbor and largest customer she has
suffered more than any other Power
from the lawle'ss conditions described
in this chapter. Over two-thirds o~
the foreign residents in China are Japa-:
nese, and the number of Koreans in
Manchuria is estimated at about 800,000.
She has more nationals, therefore, than
any other Power who would suffer if
they were made amenable to Chinese
law, justice and taxation under present
conditions.
Japan felt it impossible to satisfy
Chinese aspirations so long as satisfactory rnfeguards to take the place of
her treaty rights could not be hoped
for. Her interests in China, and more
especially in Manchuria, began to be
more prominently asserted as those ~f
the other major Powers receded into
the background. Japan's anxiety to
safeguard the life and property of her
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subjects in China camed her to intervene repeatedly in times of civil war
or of local disturbances. Such action
was bitterly resented by China, especially when it resulted in an armed
clash such as occurr-ed in 1928 at Tsinan.
In recent years the claims of Japan
have come to be regarded in China as
constituting a more serious challenge to
national aspirations than the rights of
all the other Powers taken together.

Of International Interest
This issue, however, though affecting
Japan to a greater extent than other
Powers, is not a Sino-Japanese issue
alone. China demands immediately the
surrender of certain exceptional powers and privileges because they are felt
to be derogatory to her national dignity and sovereignty. The foreign Powers have hesitated to meet these wishes
as long as conditio.ns in China did not
ensure adequate protect\on of their
nationals, whose interests depend on
the security afforded by the enjoyment
of special treaty rights . The process
of fermentation, inevitable in a period of transition, which this chapter
has attempted to describe, has developed forces of public opinion which will
probably continue to embarrass the
Central Government: in the conduct of
their foreign policy, as long as they
are weakened by failure to complete
the unification and reconstruction of
the country . The realization of China's
national aspirations in the field of foreign relations depends on her ability
to discharge the functions of a modern
government in the sphere of domestic
affairs, and until the discrepancy between these has been removed, the danger of internatio.nal friction and of in-

cidents, boycotts and armed interventions will continue.
The present extreme case of international friction having forced China
once more to seek the intervention of
the League of Nations, should, if a
satisfactory settlement can be effected,
convince her of the advantages of t);le
policy of international co-operation
which was inaugurated at Washington
with such beneficial results in 1922.
China has not at the moment the capital nor the trained specialists necessary for the unaided accomplishment
of her national reconstruction.
Dr.
Sun Yat-sen himself realized this, and
actually drew up an ambitious plan of
international participation in the economic development of his country.
The National GQvernment, too, has in
recent years sought and accepted international help in the solution of her
problems-in financial matters since
1930, in matters relating to economic
planning and <;ievelopment in liaison
with the technical organizations of the
League of Nations since the constitution of the National Economic Council
in 1931, and in relief of the distress
caused by the great flood of the same
year. Along this road of internationc!
co-operation China would make the
surest and most rapid progress toward
the attainment of her national ideals.
and such a policy would make it
easier for foreign Powers to give what
support the Central Government ma~,
seek, and to help in the removal as
rapidly and as effectively as possible
of any c~uses of friction which may
endanger her peaceful relation-; w:th
the rest of the world.
·

CHAPTER II
Manchuria
Description, Relations With Rest of China and With RtJ.ssia

'

I. Description
Manchuria-which is known in China
as the Three Eastern Provinces-a
large fertile region only forty years
ago almost undeveloped and even now
still under-populated, has assumed an
increasingly important role in the
solution of the surplus population problems of China and Japan. The provinces Qf Shantung and Hopei have
poured millions of destitute farmers
into Manchuria, while Japan has exported. to that country her manufactured ai:ticles and capital, in exchange for food supplies and raw
materials. In providing for the respective ~eeds of China and Japan, Manchuria has proved the usefulness of
theil" partnership.
Without Japan's
activity, Manchuria could not have attracted and absorbed such a large population. Without the influx of Chinese farmers and laborers Manchuria
could ~ot have developed so rapidly, •
I?roviding Japan thereby with a market and with supplies of food, fertjlizers, and raw moterials.
Yet, Manchuria so largely dependent
on co-operation. was destined, for
reasons ~lrea<;ly indicated, to b~come e
region of conflict: at first between Russia and Japan, later, between China and
her two powerful neighbors. At first,
Manchuria entered into this great conflict of policies only as an area, the
occupation of which was thought to
imply domination of Far Eastern politics. It became coveted for its own
sake later, when its agricultural, mineral
and forestry resources had been discove,r ed. Exceptional treaty right::;. were
acquired in the first ill$tance by Russia
at the expense of China. Those which
concerned South Manchuria were subsequently tr-ansferred to Japan. The
use of the privileges so acquired became more and more instrumental in

furthering, the economic dexelopmeot
of South Manchuria. Strategical considerations have remained paramouµt,
but the extensive economic interest$
resulting from the active part taken by
Russia and Japan in the development
of Manchuria found an ever-increasing
insist-ence in the foreign poli~y of these
two countries.
China at first showed little activity
in the field of development. She almost allowed Manchuria to pass from
her control to that of Russia. Even
after the Treaty of Portsmouth, which
reaffirmed her sovereignty in Manchuria, the economic activities of Russia and Japan in developing those Provinces figured more ]?rominently than
her OWJ;l in the eyes of the world
Meanwhile the immigration of millions of Chinese farmers settled the future possession of the land. This immigration was in fact an occupation,
peaceful, inconspicuous but none the
less real. White Russia and Japan. were
engaged in delimiting their r.espective
spheres of intere~ in North and South
Manchuria, Chinese farmers took possession of the soil, an~ Manchuria is
now unalterably Chinese. In such circumstances China could afford to wait
for a favorable o!)portunity to reassert
her sovereign rights. The Russian revolution of 1917 gave her that oppol'tunity in North Manchuria. She be-gan to take a more active part in the
government and developwent of the
countrY, which had been so long neg- ·
lected. In recent years she has tried
to diminish Japan's influence in South
Manchuria. Growing friction resulted
from that policy, the culminating point
of which was reached on September 18,

i931.
Population About 30,000,000
The total population is estimated at
about 30,000,000, of whom 28.000,000 are,
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said to be Chinese or assimilated Manchus. The number of Koreans is put
at 800,000, of whom a large number arC"
congregated in the so-called Chientao
District on the Korean border, the remainder being widely scattered in
Manchuria. Mongol tribes live in the
pasture lands bordering Inner Mongolia, their number being small. There
may be about 150,000 Russians in Manchuria, most of them being in the area
along the Chinese Eastern Railway.
especially at · Harbin. About 230,000
Japanese are mainly concentrated in
the settlements along the South Manchuria Railway and in the Kwantung
Leased Territory (Liaotung Peninsula).
The total number of Japanese, Russians and other foreigners (excluding
'Koreans) in Manchuria does not exceed
400,000.
Manchuria is a vast country with an
area as large as that of France and
Germany taken together, estimated at
about 380,000 square miles. lq. China
it is always referred to as the "Three
Eastern Provinces" because of its administrative division into the three provinces of Liaoning (or Fengtien) in the
South, Kirin in the East, and Heilungkiang in the North. Liaoning is e·s timated to have an area of 70,000 square
miles, Kirin of 100,000, Heilungkiang
of over 200,000.
Manchuria is continental in its characteristics. There are two mountain
ranges, the Changpai range in the
Soutfieast and the Great Khingan
range in the Northwest. Between these
two mountain ranges lies the great
Manchurian plain, o! which the north€:rn part belongs to the basin of the
Sungari river and the southern part to
that of the Liao river. The watershed
between them, which has some historical importance, is a range of hills
dividing the Manchurian plain into a
northern and a souther npart.
Manchuria is bounded on the west
by the province of Hopeh and by
Outer and Inner Mongolia. Inner Mongolia was formerly divided into three
special administrative areas:
Jehol,
Chahar and Suiyuan, which were given
the full status of provinces by the National Gov<:?rnment in 1928.
Inner
Mongolia, and more especially J ehoL
has always had relations ·:.rith Manchuria, and exercises some influence in
20

Manchurian affairs. On the northwest,
northeast and east, Manchuria is
bounded b.Y che Siberian provinces of
the U.S.S.R., on the southeast by
Korea, and on the south by the Yellow Sea. The southern end of the
Liaotung Peninsula has been held by
Japan since 1905. Its area is over 1,300
square miles, and it is administered as a
Japanese leased territory. In addition,
Japan exercises certain rights over a
narrow strip of land, which extends
beyond the Lease Territory, and which
contains the lines of the South Manchuria Railway. The total area is only
108 square miles, whereas the length Qf
the lines is 690 miles.
Transportation Essential
The soil of Manchuria is generally
fertile, but its development is dependent on transportation facilities. Many
important towns flourish along its
rivers and railways. Formerly, development was practically dependent on
the river system, which is still of
much importance, though the railways
have now taken the first place as a
means of transport. The production of
important crops, such as soya beans,
kaoliang, wheat, millet, barley, rice, oats
has doubled in fifteen year~. In 1929
these crops were estimated at over
876.000,000 bushels. According to estimates given in the Manchurian Year
Book 1931 only 12.6 per cent of the
tota] area has been brought under cultivation in 1929, whereas 28.4 per cent
was cultivable. A Jarge in.crease of
production may therefore be expected
in the future if economic condition~
improve. The total value of the agricultural products of Manchuria· for
the year 1928 was estimated at ovet
£130,000,000 sterling. A large part of
the agricultural produce is exported.
Pongee or tussah silk is another important article of export from Manchuria.
The mountainous regions are rich in
timber and minerals, especially coal.
Important deposits of iron and gold
are also known to exist, while large
quantities of oil shale, dolomite, magnesite, limestone, fireclay, stoatite and
silica of excellent quality have been
found. The mining industry may therefore be expected to become of gr.eat
importance.

11. Relations with the rest of Chh1a
, Manchuria has, since the dawn of
,history, been inhabited by various Tungus tribes, who mixed freely with
Mongol Tartars. Under the influence
of Chinese immigrants of superior civilization they learned to organize themse!ves, and established several king. doms which sometimes dominated the
northern districts in China and Korea.
great.er part of Manchuria and some
northern districts in China and Korea.
The Liao, Chin and Manchu dynasties
even conquered large parts or the whole
of China over which they ruled for
·centuries. China, on the other hand,
under strong emperors, was able to
stem the tide from the north, and in
her turn to establish sovereignty over
large parts of Manchuria. Colonization
by Chinese settlers was practised at a
very early date. Various Chinese towns
which radiated the influence of Chinese culture through the surrounding
districts, date from the same early time.
For two thousand years a permanent
foothold has been maintained, and Chinese culture has always been active in
the southern-most part of Manchuria
The influence of this culture had become very strong during the rule of
the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) , whose
authority extended over practically the
whole of Manchuria.
The Manchus
were permeated by Chinese culture and
had amalgamated to a great extent
with the Chinese before they overthrew
·the Ming administration in Manchuria
in 1616, and in 1628 passed the Great
Wall to conquer China. In the Manchu army were large numbers of Chinese who were organized in separate
military units known as Chinese Banners.

After the conquest, the Manchus
quartered their garrisons in the more
important cities of China, forbade Manchus to engage in certain professions,
prohibited intermarriage between Manchus and Chinese, and restricted the
immigration of Chinese into Manchuria
and Mongolia. These measures were
inspired more by political than by racial
discrimination, and aimed at safeguard.ing the permanent dominance of the
dynasty. They did not affect the numerous Chinese Bannermen, who enjoyed
practically the same privileged status
as the Manchus themselves.

The exodus for the Manchus and their
Chinese allies greatly reduced the
population of Manchuria. However, in
the south, Chinese communities continued to exist. From this foothold a
few settlers spread across the central
part of Fengtien Province. Their num~
her was increased by a continuous in
filtration of immigrants from China,
who succeeded in evading the exclusion laws, or who had profited by their
modifications from time to time. Manchus and Chinese became still more
amalgamated, and even the Manchu
language was virtually replaced by
Chinese. The Mongols, however, were
not assimilated but pushal back .by the
advancing immigrants. Finally, to stem
the Russian advance from the north,
the Manchu Government decided ·to encourage Chinese immigration. In 1878
various parts of Manchuria were accordingly opened and various forms of
encouragement given to immigrants,
with the result that at the time of the
Chinese Revolution in 1911, the population of Manchuria was estimated at
18,000,000.
Manchus Reform Administration

In 1907, a few years only before its
abdication, the Manchu Dynasty had
decided to reform the administration in
Manchuria. These provinces had hitherto been administered as a separate,
extra-mural dominion, with its own
form of government. The Chinese practice of entrusting the civil administration in the provinces to scholars who
had passed the competitive examinations had not been followed in Manchuria, which had been placed under
a purely military regime in which
Manchu officials and traditions were
maintained. In China officials we~e
not allowed to hold office in their native province. Each Manchurian province had a military governor, who
exercised complete power in civil as
well as in military matters. Later, at'tempts had been made to separate military and civil administration. The results were not satisfactory. The demarcation of the respective spheres - of
authority was not adequate; misunderstandings and intrigues were frequent
and inefficiency resulted. In 1907, th€refore, this attempt was given up. The
three military governor:; were replaced
by a Viceroy for all Manchuria, with
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the object of centralizing authority,
especially in the domain of foreign
policy. Provincial civil governors under
the control of the Viceroy were in
charge of provincial administration.
This reorganization prepared the way
for the later administrative reforms
which introduced the Chinese system
of provincial government. These last
measures of the Manchus were very
effective, thanks to the able administrators in charge of Manchurian affairs after 1907.
When the Revolution broke out in
1911, tne Manchurian authorities. who
were not in favor of the Republic succeeded in saving these provinces front
the turmoil of civil war, by oroe.ting
Chang Tso-lin, who was later to become the dictator of both Manchuria
and North China, to resist the advance of the revolutionary troops.
When the Republic had been established, the Manchurian authorities accepted the fait accompli and voluntarily followed the leadership of Yuan
Shih-kai, who was chosen the first
President of the Republic. To each
province both civil and military governors were appointed. In Manchuria
as in the rest of China the military
governors soon succeeded in putting
their civil colleagues. into the background.
In 1916, Chang Tso-lin was appointed military governor of Fengtien Province, concurrently acting as civil
governor. His personal influence extended much further. When the question arose of declaring war against
Germany, he joined the military leaders in China in their request to dissolve the Parliament which had opposed that measure. When the request was rejected by the President
he declared his province independent
from the Central Government at Peking. Later, he withdrew that declaration and in 1918, in recognition t)f
his service to the Central Govffnment. he was apponited InspectorGeneral of all Manchuria. In this, way
Manchuria again became an administrative unit with its own special regime.
Chang Tso-lin accepted the honors
accorded by the Central Government,
but this attitude from time to time depended on th-e nature of his peJ'Sonal
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relations with the military leaders
who controlled the changing central
authorities. He seems to - have looked
upon his relations with the Government in the sense of a personal
aliiance. In July, 1928, when he failed
to establish his authority south of the
Great Wall and saw his rivals taking
c:ontrol of tht;> Peking Government, he
renounced allegiance to the Centrai
Government and maintained complete
independence of action in Manchuria
until he extended his authority south
of the Wall and became master of
Peking as well.
He expressed his
willingness to respect foreign rights,
and accepted the obligations of China,
but he rE'Quested foreign Powers to
negotiate henceforth directly with his
administration in all matters cocemL-r1g Manchuria.

Soviet Agreement Changed
Accordingly, he repudiated the SinoSoviet agreement of May 31, 1924,
though very advantageous to China,
~nd persuaded the U.S.S.R. to conclude a separate agreement with him
in September, 1924. It was virtually
identical with that of May 31, 1924,
with the Central Government. This
fact emphasized Chang Tso-tin's insistence on the recognition of his complete independence of action, botlil in
ciomestic and foreign policy.
In 1924 he invaded China again and
was successful, because General (no.w
Marshal) Feng Yu-hsiang abandoned
his superior, General (now Marshal)
Wu Pei-fu, at a critical moment in the
campaign. The immediate result wa
the overthrow of the Central Gov6Dment and the expansion of Marshal
Chang's influence as far south as
Shanghai.
In 1925 Marshal Chang had again to
resort to arms, this time against his
late ally, General Feng. In this campaign one of his commanders, Kuo
Sung-lin, abandoned him at most critical moment in favor ,o f General Feng.
The mutinY, of Kuo Sung-lin, i.n November, 1925, was of more than pa.ssing interest, because it involved both
the U.S.S.R~ and Japan, the action ol
the former having been indirectly, of
advantage to General Feng, and that
of the latter to Marshal Chang. Kuo-Sung-lin, though a subordinate of the
Marshal, shared Genera} Feng's views
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about social reform, and turned against
bis superior in the belief that his downfall was necessary to put an end to
civil war. This defection put the Marshal in a most critical position. Kuo
Sung-lin was in possession of the territory west of the railway and the Marshal was at Mukden with greatly reduced forces. At this moment Japan,
in her own interests in South Manchuria, declared a neutral zone of 20
11 (7 miles) on each side of the South
Manchuria Railway, across which she
would allow no troops to pass. This
prevented Kuo Sung-lin from advancing against the Marshal and allowed
tune for the re-enforcements from
Heilungkiang to reach him. They were
delayed by the action of Soviet railway authorities who refused to allow
th.mi to travel over the Railway without ~t paying their fares in cash,
but they managed to travel by another :r:oute. The arrival of these reenforcements and the more or less
open help given by the Japanese settled the campaign in the Marshal's
favor. Kuo Sung-lin was defeated and
Genel'al Feng was forced to withdraw and abandon Peking to Marshal
Chang. Marshal Chang resented the
action of the authorities of the Chinese Eastern Railway on this occasion
nd left no stone 'Ullturned to retaliate by continuous encroachments on the
rights of this railway. The experience provided by this incident appE:arS
to have been an impoi:tant fl:lctor in
causing hlm to build an indepep.dent
railway system co,nnecting the three
l)rovincial capitals of Manchuria.
The independence declared by Marshal
Chang Tso-lin at different times never
meant that he or the people of Manchuria wished to be separated from
China, His armies did not invade
China as if it were a foreign country,
but merely as participants in the civil
war. Like the warlords of any other
province, the Marshal alternately supported, attacked or declared his territory independent of the Central Government, but never in such a way as
o involve the partition of China into
_eparate states. On the contrary, mo.st
Chinese civil wars were directly or indirectly connected with some ambitious
scheme to unify the country under a
really strong Government. Through all
its wars and periods o_f "independence,"

therefore, Manchuria remained an integral part of China.
Did Not Favor Con!ftitution
Although Marshal ChQng Tso-Un and
the· Kuomintang had been allies in 1:1,e
wars against Wu Pei-fu, the former did
not himself accept the doctrines of t~
Kuomintang. He did not approve. of
the constitution as desired by Dr. SlUl,
as it did not seem to him to hapnoni~
with the spirit of the Chinese people;
but he desi,red the unification of Chine,
and his policy with rega.rd to the
spheres of interest of the U.S.S.R. and
Japan in Manchuria shows that be
would have liquidated both if he could
have done so. Indeed, he almost succeeded in accomplishing this in the case
of the sphere of the U.S.S.R., and initiated the policy of railway con~uction
already referred to, a result of which
was to cu.t off the South Manchuria
Railway from some of its feeder districts. This attitude toward, U.S.$.R.
and Japanese interests in Manchuria
may be attributed partly to impatience
at the limitations of his authority in
dealing with these countries, and part;Jy
to the resentment which he Ehared with
all shades of Chinese opinion regarding the privileged position of foreigners
in China. In fact, in November, 1924,
he invited Dr. Sun to a Reorganization
Conference in the program of which the
latter wanted to include the impro.vement of the standard of living, the
convening of a National Convention and
the abolition of unequal tre-aties. Dr.
Sun's fatal illness prevented this conference from taking place; but his propornls suggest a certain understanding
with the Ma.rshal and a possible ba.si.5
of agreement between them with regard
to the £oreign. policy of their co1:1ntty•.
In the last yeai,s of his life, Marshal
Chang Tso-lin showed inc)ieal!ing \mwillingness to allow Japan to profit by
the privileges she derived {rom various
trE:aties and agreements. Their relations at times became somewhat strai.nred. Japanese advice that he should
keep out of the factional strife in China
and concentrate his energy on the development of Manchuria he resented
and disregarded, as did his son aftj:!r
him. After the defeat of General Feng-,
Chang Tso- lin became the chief of the
alliance of the Northern militarists,
with the title of Great Marshal:
In 1928 he suffered defeat at the
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hands of the Kuomintang army, in their
Northern Expedition referred to in
Chapter 1. and was advised by Japan
to withdraw his armies into Manchuria
· before it was too late. The declared
: object · of Japan was to save Man. churia from the evils of civil war which
. would have resulted from the entry
of a defeated army pursued by its
· victors.
The Marshal resented the advice, but
was obliged to follow it. He left Peiping (formerly Peking) on June 3, 1928
for Mukden, but was killed the next
day by an explosion which wrecked
' his train just outside the city at the
spot where the Peiping-Mukden Railway passes underneath the bridge over
which run the lines of the South Manchuria Railway.
Shrouded in Mystery
The responsibility for this murder
'has never been established. The tragedy remains shrouded in mystery, but
the suspicion of Japanese complicity tc
· which it gave rise became an additional factor in the state of tension which
Sino-Japanese relations had already
reached by that time.
After the death of Marshal Chang
Tso-lin his son, Chang Hsueh-liang
became the ruler of Manchuria. He
shared many of the national aspirations of the younger generation, and
desired to stop civil warfare and assist the Kuomintang in its policy of
unification.
As Japan had already
some experience of the policy ann
tendencies of the Kuomintang, she did
not welcome the prospect of such influence penetrating into Manchuria.
The Young Marshal was advised accordingly. Like his &ther, he resented that advice and decided to follow his own counsel. His relations
with the Kuomintang and with Nanking became closer, and in December,
1928, he accepted the national flag and
·declared his allegiance to the Central
.Government. He was made Commander-in-Chief of the Northeastern Frontier Army and was also con.firmed as
chief of the administration of Manchuria, with the addition of Jehol, a
part' of Inner Mongolia with an area of
.about 60,000 square miles.
The union of Manchuria with Nationalist
China
necessitated
some
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changes in the administrative organizatioin, which was made to approximate that of the Central Government. The committee system was introduced nnd Kuomintang headquarters
were established. In reaiity, the old
system and its personnel continued to
function as before. The interference
of party branches with the local cldministrations, such as continually occurred in China. was not tolerated in
Manchuria. The provision which required all irr;portant military officers
and civil officials to be members of the
Kuomintang was trrnted as a mere
formality. The relationship with the
Central Governmt'nt de:pended in all
affairs military, civil, financial and
foreign, on voluntary co-operation.
Orders or instructions requiring unquestioning obedience would not have
been tolerated. Appointments or dismissals against the wishes of the Manchurian authorities were unthinkable.
In various other parts of China a
similar independence of action in GoY ernment and party affairs existed. All
important appointments are, such cases,
reaily made by the local authorities
and only confirmed by the Centr..al
Government.
Foreign Policy Effected
In the domain of foreign policy, the
union of Manchuria with the Nationalist Government was to have more
important consequences, although, in
this respect, the local authorities were
also left much liberty of a_c tion. The
persistent assaults of Marshal Chang
Tso-lin on the position of the Chinese
Eastern Railway in Manchuria, and his
disregard of certain rights claimed by
Japan, show that in Manchuria a "forward policy" had already been adopted
before the union with the Nationalists.
However, after the union, Manchuria
was opened to well-organized and systematic Kuomintang propaganda. In its
official party publication and numerous
affiliated organs it never ceased to insist on the primary importance of the
recovery of lost sovereign rights, and
abolition of unequal treaties, and the
wickedness of imperialism. Such propaganda was bound to make a profound
impression in Manchuria, where .the
reality of foreign interests, courts,
police, guards or soldiers on Chinese
soil was apparent. Through the. Na-

tionalist schoolbooks Party propaganda
entered the schools. Associations such
as the Liaoning Peoples' Foreign Policy
,Association made their apearance. They
stimulated and intensified the nationalist sentiment and carried on an antiJapanese agitation.
Pressure was
brought to I bear on Chinese houseowners and landlords to raise the rents
of Japanese and Korean tenants, or to
refuse renewal of rent contracts. The
Japanese reported to the comlnission
many cases of this nature. Korean
settlers were subjected to systematic
persecution. Various orders and instructions of an anti-Japanese nature
were issued. Cases of friction accumuJated, and dangerous tension developed. The Kuomintang Party Headquarters in the provincial capitals were
established in March, 1931, and subsequently branch organizations were
set up in the other towns and districts.
Party propagandists from China came
North in increasing numbers. The
Japanese complained that the antiJapanese agitation was intensified every
day. In April, 1931, a five days' conference under the auspices of the People's
Foreign Policy Association was held
at Mukden, with over three hundred
delegates from various parts of Manchuria in attendance. The possibility
of liquidating the Japanese position in
Manchuria was discussed, the recovery
of the South Manchuria Railway being
included in the resolutions adopted.
At the same time, the U. S. S. R. and
her citizens suffered from similar tendencies, while the White Russians, although they had no sovereign rights or
exceptional privileges to surrender,
were subjected to humiliation and illtreatment.
As regards domestic affairs, the Manchurian authorities had retained all the
power they wanted, and they had no
objection to following administrative
rules and methods adopted by the Central Government so long as the essentials of power were not affected.
Political Committee Formed
Soon after the union, the Political
Committee of the Northeastern Provinces was established at Mukden. It
was, under the nominal supervision
of the Central Government, the highest administrative authority in the
northeastern Provinces.
It consisted

of 13 members, who elected one of
their ·number as President:. The committee was responsible for the directic.-1 and supervision of the work of
the governments of the four provinces
of Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang and
J ehol, and of the so-called Special District which, since 1922, had replaced
the administrative sphere of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The committee
had authority to deal with all matters
not specifically reserved to the Central
Government, and to take any action
which did not conflict wtih their laws
and orders. It was the duty of the
the Special District to carry out the
governments of the provinces and of
decisions reached by the committee.
The administrative system of the provinces did not differ essentially from
the organization adopted in the rest
of China. The concession made with
regard to the preservation of Manchuria as an administrative unit - was
the most important difference. Without this concession, voluntary union
would probably not have taken place.
In
fact,
notwithstanding
external
·changes, the old conditions continued
to exist. The Manchurian authorities
realized that as before their power derived much more from their armies
than from Nanking.
This fact explains the maintenance
of large standing armies numbering
about 250,000 men, and of the huge
arsenal on which more than $200,000,000 (silver) are reported to have
estimated to have amounted to 80 percent of the total expenditure. The remainder was not sufficient to provide
for the costs of administration, police,
justice and education. The treasury
was not capable of paying adequate
salaries to the officials. As all power
rested in the hands of a few military
men, office could be obtained only
through them. Nepotism, corruption
and maladministration continued to be
the unavoidable consequences of this
state of affairs. The Commission found
grave complaints concerning this maladministration to be widely current.
This state of affairs, however, was not
peculiar to Manchuria, as similar ·or
even worse conditions existed in other
parts of China.
Heavy taxation was needed for the
u pkeep of the army. As ordinary revenues were still insufficient, the au25

thorities . further taxed the people by
steadily depreciating the irredeemable
provincial currencies. This was Qften
done, particularly of late, in connection with "official bean-buying'' operations, which by 1930 had already assu,med monopolistic proportions.
By
gaining control
over Manchuria's
staple products. the authorities had
hoped to enhance their gains by <:ompeJling the foreign bean-buyers, particularly the Japanese, to pay J;i.igher
prices. Such transactions show the extent to which the authorities controllecj baJ:)ks and commerce. O.fficials
likewj,se e1,1ga,ged freely in aU sorts of
private enterprise, and used their
power to gather wealth for themselves
and their favorites.
Achievements N-0ted
Whatever the shortcomings of the administration in Manchuria may, have
been in the period preceding the events
of Septem.b er, 1931, efforts were ma.de
in some parts of the country to improve the administration, and certail}
achievements must be noted, particUr
lal'ly in the field of educational progres·s, of municiJ?al administratio.n, and
public utility work. It is necessary in
particular to emphasize that during this
period, under the administration of
Marsha.I Chang Tso-lin and Ma,i;shal
Cha.ng Hsueh-liang, the Chinese population a1;1d Chinese interests played a
-much greater part thau :( ormerly in
the development and organization of
t~e, economic resources of Manchuria.
· The extensive settlement of Chinese
im.migrants, already mentioned, helped
to develop the economic and social relations between Manchuria and the rest
of China. But apart from this colonization, it was dwing this period, that
Chinese railways, independent of Japanese capital, notably the MukdenHailun.g, the Tahushan-Tungliao (a
brapch of the Peiping-Mukden system) ,
th.e Tsitsihar-Koshan, and the HulunHailun ~ailways, were buUt, and that
the Hulutao Harbor project, the Liao
River Co~ervancy work, and some
navigation enterprises on various rivers,
were started. Official and private Chinese interests participated in many
enterpdses. In mining, they had an
interest in the Penhsihu, MuUng,_Chalainoerh and Laot.oukou coal mines, .and
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sole responsibility for the development
of other mines, many of them under
the direction of the official North-Eastern Mining Adminisb::ation: they were
also interested in gold mining in Hei:..
lungkiang prov,ince. In forestry they
had a joint interest with Japanese in
the "¥alu Timber Company, and were
eng:;iged in the timber industry in Hei1:ungkiang and Kirin provinces. Agricultuz:al experimental stations were
started in various places in Manchuria,
and agricultural associations and irrigation projects were encouraged. Finally, Chinese interests were engaged in
milling and te~tile industries, bean,
oil and flour mills in Harbin, spinning
and weaving mills for Pon.gee or Tussah
silk, cotton and wool.
Commerce between Manchuria and
the rest of China also i:J;1,c reased. Tbis
trade was partly financed by ChinPSe
banks, notably the Bank of China,
which had established bran,ches in the
leading towns in Manchuria. Chinese
steamships and nati,ve ju~s pliecj between China Prop.er and Dairen, Ying~
kow (Newchwang) and Antung. They
carried increasing amounts of cargv
and occupied second place in Mai~chu•
ria's shipping, beu:g exceeded only by
Japanese tonnage. Chinese insu"6nce
bt.Jswess was also on the it'c:r;-ease1 and
the Chinese Maritune Ct:sto,Jll$ d,eri\'~d
aa e\'er-increas~e; revenue from the
trade of Manchuria.
'fhus, during the pe:riod p,recec;liJ,>.S
the- c<,nflict b.e tween China and Jap~n,
both the political and econormc, ~
be~een Manchuria and the rest. of
China w-ere gFQdually strengthened.
This growing interd,e~nclence ~Qntrihuted. to in<;luce Chin-ese leaden;,
both in Manchuria and in Nanking, tp
pursue an increasingly nationalist
policy directed against the inte.-ests
and rights acquired by Russia. or
Japan.
UI. Relations With R~s,sia
The Sjno-Japanese war of 1894-95 had
given RW>$ia an opportunity to intervene, QStensibly on behalf of Cl:w;la,
but in fact in her own interest, as sl,lb,sequen.t events proved. Japan was forced by diplomatic pressure to return to
China the Lia otung Peni.Il.$\lla in South
,Ma,nchuria, which had been ceded to
Japan by the Treaty of Shimono,5eki

~re
i!.
y
in

of

ed.

pn:rs,
tp
list
ests
Ol'

had

~

~

-

-

~ to

uth
to
eki

in 1895, and Rm:sia assisted China to
pay off the w,ar indemnities which
had been imposed by Japan. In 1896
a secret defensive alliance was concluded between the two countries, and in
the same year, in consideration of the
services above referred to, Russia was
authorized by China to carry a branch
of the Trans-Siberian Railway across
Manchuria in a direct line from Chita
to Vladivostok. This line was said to
be needed for the transportation of
Russian forces to be sent to the East
in case Japan should again attack
China. The Russo-Chinese Bank Oater
Russo-Asiatic Bank) was established to
mask somewhat the official character
of the enterprise. The Bank formed in
its turn the Chinese Eastern Railway
Company for the construction and
operation of the railway. J3y the terms
of the contract of September 8, 1896,
between the Bank and the Chinese
Government, the Company was to build
the railway and operate it for eighty
years, at the end of which it was to
become the property of China free of
charge, but China had the right of
purchasing h at a price to be agreed
upon at the end of thirty years. During
the period of the contract the company
was to have the absolute and exclusive
right of administr~tion of its lands.
This clause was interpreted by Russia
in a much broader way than various
other stipulations in the contract seem
to warrant. China prote-sted against
the continuous Russian attempts to enlarge the scope of the contract, but was
not able to prevent it. Russia gradu~lly
succeeded in exercising in the Chinese
Eastern Railway area, with its rapidly
developing
railway
towns,
rights
equivalent: to rights of sovereignty.
China had also consented to hand over
free· of charge all government lands
needed by the railway, while private
lands might be expropriated at current
prices. The Company had furthermore
been permitted to construct and operate
the telegraph lines necessary for its own
use.
In 1898, Russia secured a lease fo~·
twenty-five years lof the southern part
of the Liaotung Peninsula, which Japan
had been force~ to give up in 1895,
and also secured the right to conn~ct
the Chinese Eastern Railway at Harbin.
with Port Arthur and Dalny, (now
Dsiren) , in the leased territory. Authority was given for the construction

of a naval port at Port Arthur. In the
area traversed by this branch line the .
Company was granted the right to cut
timber and to mine coal for the use
of the railway. Ali the stipulations of
the contract of September 8, 1896, wer-:>
e,xtended to the supplementary branches. Russia was authorized to make
r.er own tariff arrangements inside the
leased territory. In 1899 Dalny (new
Dairen) was declared a free port and
opened to foreigp shipping and commerce. No r&ilway privileges were to
be given to the subjects of other
Powers in the area traversed by the
branch line. In the neutral grol,llld
north of the leased · territory no ports
were to be opened to foreign trade and
no· concessio!1s or privileges were to
be granted without the consent of
Russia.
In 1900 Russia occupied Manch1,1ria
on the ground that the Boxer rising
had endangered her nationals. Other
Powers protested and demanded thP.
withdrawal of her forces, but Russia
delayed taking action in this sense.
In February, 1901, the draft of a
seoret Sino-Russian treaty was discussed in St. Petersburg, by the terms
of which China, in return for the
restoration of her civil authority in
M;mchuria, was to sanction the maintenance of the railway guards which
Russia had established under Ciause 6
of the fundamental contract of 1896,
and to engage not to trans£er to other
natiQns or their subjects without the
consent of Russia, mines or other interests in Manchuria, Mongolia, and
Sinkiang.
These and some other
clauses in the draft treaty, when they
became known, aroused opposition
:frCJm public opinion in China and other
countries, and on April 3, 1901, the
Russian Govermnent issued a circular
note to the effect that the project had
been withdrawn.
Japan followed these maneuvers
with particular attention. On January
30, 1902, she had concluded the AngloJapanese treaty of alliance and accordingly felt 'herself more secure. However, she was still concerned at the
prospect of Russian encroachments into Korea and Manchuria. She there
fore pressed with the other Powers for
the evacuation of the Russian forces in
Manchuria. Russia declared her ·wm~
ingness to withdraw on conditions
4
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which would have virtually closed
Manchuria and Mongolia to other than
Russian enterprise. In Korea, Russian pressure increased also. In July,
1902, Russian troops appeared at' the
mouth of the Yalu River. Several
other acts convinced Japan that Russia had decided upon a policy which
was a menace to her interests if not
to her very existence. In July, 1903,
she began negotiations with Russia concerning the maintenance of the policy
of the Open Door and the territorial
integrity of China, but having met with
no success whatever she resorted to
war on February 10, 1904. China remained neutral.
Russia was defeated. On September
3, 1905, she concluded the Treaty of
Portsmouth, whereby she relinquished
her exceptional rights in South Manchuria in favor of Japan. The leasi!d.
territory and all rights connected with
the lease were transferred to Japan.
ar.d also the railway betw~en Port Arthur and Changchun, with ii• branches,
as well as all coal mines in that region
belonging to or worked for. lhe benefit of the railway. Both parties agreed
to restor.e to the exclusive adminh,tration of China all portions of Manchuria occupied or under the control
of their respective troops, with the
exception of the leased territory. Both
reserved the right to maintain (under
certain specified conditions) guards to
protect their respective railway 1h.€s
in Manchuria, the number of su:'h
guards not to exceed fifteen per kilometer.
Russia had lost half of her sphere
of influence, which was henceforth to
be restricted to North Manchuria. She
retained her position there and increased her influence in the following
years, but, when· the Russian revolution broke out in 1917, qiina decided
to reassert her sovereignty in this area.
At first her action was restricted
to participation in the Allied intervention (1918-20) which, in connection
with the chaotic conditions rapidly
developing, after the Russian Revolution, in Siberia and North Manchuria,
bad been proposed by the United
States of America for the double purpose of protecting the vast stores of
mar material and supplies accumulated
at Vladivostok and of assj.sting the
evacuation of some 50,000 Czech.o-

Slovak troops, who were retreating
from the eastern front across Siberia.
This proposal was accepted and it was
arranged that ~ach country should send
an expeditionary force of 7,000 meri
to be assigned to its own special sec.:.
tion of the Trans-Siberian line, the
C. E. R. being confided to the sole
charge of the Chinese. To ensure the
working of the railways in co-operation with the Allied forces, a special
Inter-Al.lied Railway Committee wa
formed in 1919 with the technical and
transportation Boards under it. In 1920,
the intervention came to an end and
the Allied forces were withdrawn from
Siberia, except the Japanese, who had
become involved in open hostilities with
the Bolsheviks. The fighting dragged
on for nearly two years. In 1922, after
the Washington Conference, the Japanese troops were also withdrawn and,
simultaneously, the Inter-Allied Com 7
mittee with its technical board ceased
to exist.
Meanwhi}e China, after an abortive
attempt of General Horvath, the head
of the C.E.R., to set up an independent: regime in the railway area, assumed responsibility for the preservation of order in that area (1920). In
the same year she concluded an agreement with the reorganized RussoAsiatic Bank, and announced her intention of assuming temporarily supreme control of the railway, pending the conclusion of an agreement
with a new Russian Government. China
also announced her intention of resuming the advantages conferred on
her by the contract of 1896 and the ori-,
ginal statutes of the Company. Thenceforth the President and four members
of the Board of directors of the Company, and two members of the Audit
Committee, were , to be nominated by
the Chinese Government.
Russian
predominance was also weakened by
other measures which followed. The
Russian armed forces in the railway
area were dfsarmed and replaced by
Chinese soldiers. The extraterritorial
status of Russians was abolished. Their
courts were forcibly entere i and closed. Russians were made amendable.
to Chinese law, justice and taxation.
They could be arrested by the Chinese police and · held by them indefinitely, as the poli'ce had large pow·-

ers and were insufficiently controlled.
In 1922, the railway area which so
far had been under the administration
of the Company was transformed into
a Special District of the Three Eastern
Provinces under a Chi('f Administrator
directly responsible to Mukden. The
administration of the lands belonging to
the railways was also interferred with.
Marshal Chang Tso-lin had practically
Jjquidated the Russian sphere before
Rm-sia's new government had been recognized, and private inteTests had suffered heavily in the process. When the
Soviet Government succeeded to the
Manchurian inheritance of its predecessor the railway had been shorn of most
of its privileges.
The declarations of policy made in
1919 and 1920 by the Soviet Government
with regard to China implied a complete
relinquishment of the special rights
which the Imperial GoveTnment had
acquired in China, notably those acquired in North Manchuria.
In accordance with this policy, the
Soviet Government agreed to the regularisation of the fait accompli by a
new agreement. By the Sino-Russian
agreement of May 31, 1924, the Chinese
Eastern Railway became a purely commercial concern under joint management, in which China also acquired a
financial interest. The Government of
the U.S.S.R. had however, the right
of appointing the General Manager,
who exercises extensive and ill-define'.l
powers, and. under the Agreement, the
Government of the U.S.S.R. exercised
a preponderant influence in the affairs of the railway and was able to
retain the essential !?arts of its economic interests in North Manchuria.
As mentioned above, the Agreement of
May, 1924, concluded with the Chinese Government at Peking, was not
accepted by Marshal Chang Tso-lin,
who insisted on a separate Agreement
being concluded with himself. This
Agreement, signed in September, 1924.
was almost identical in its terms, but
by it the lease of the railway was
shortene-d from eighty to sixty years.
This Agreement did not inaugurate
a period of friendly relations between
the U.S.S.R. and the administration of
Marshal Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria.
The convening of the Conference
which was to deal with the many questions left unsettled in the two Agree-

ments of 1924 was postponed on various·
pretexts. On two occasions in 1925 and
1926 the General Manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway refused to transport troops of the Marshal on the railway. The second incident led to the
arrest of the General Manager and to
an ultimatum from the U. S. S. R.
(January 23, 1926). Nor were these
isolated incidents.
Nevertheless the
Chinese authorities persisted in a policy
which was directed against Russian
intere!)ts and which was resented both
by the Government of the U. S. S. R.
and by the White Russians.
After the adherence of Manchuria to
the Nanking Government, nationalist
spirit increased in strength, and the
efforts of the U. S. S. R. to maintain
predominating control over the railway
were, more than ever before, resented.
In May, 1929, an attempt was made to.
liquidate the last remnants of the Rus-·
sian sphere of interest. The attack
started with a raid on the Soviet consulates at various places by the Chinese
police, who made many arrests and
claimed to have found evidence proving :
that a communist revolution was being
plotted by employees of the Soviet Government and of the Chinese Eastern
Railway. In July, the telegraph and
telephone systems of the railway were
seized, and many important Soviet organizations and enterprises were for- •
cibly closed down. Finally, the Soviet
Manager of the railway was requested
to hand over the management to a
Chinese appointee. He refused to do
so, and was thereupon forbidden to
carry on his duties. The Chinese au•thorities replaced freely members of the
Soviet staff by their own nominees, ,
many Soviet citize-ns w·e re arrested, and
some were deported.
The Chinese ,
justified the violent action taken on the
ground that the Soviet Government had,
broken its pledge not to engage in propaganda directed against the political
and social systems of China.
The,
Soviet Government, in its note of May
30, denied the charge.
In consequence of the forcible liqui- .
dation of the remaining Russian rights
and interests the Soviet Government
decided to take action. After the exchange of several notes, it rc:?called
from China its diplomatic and com~
mercial representatives, and all its
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nominees to posts in the Chinese Easte,;n Railway, a.nd severed all railway
communications between its territory
and China. China, likewise, broke off
relations with the U. S. S. R. and withdrew all Chinese diplomatic officers
from Soviet territory. Raids by Soviet troops across the Manchurian
border began, and developed into a
military invasion in November, 1929.
After having suffered defeat and severe loss of prestige, the Manchurian
authorities to whom the Nanking Government entrusted the settlement: of
the dispute were forced to accept the
demands of the U.S.S.R. On December 22, 1929, a protocol was signed at
Habarovsk whereby the status quo was
re-established. During the dispute the
Soviet Government had always taken
the position, in answer to various Memoranda from third Power signatories
to the Pact of Paris, that her action
had been taken in legitimate self defence and could in no way be interpreted as a breach of that agreement.
Before describing the interests of
Japan in Manchuria, which are dealt
with at length in the next chapter, a
brief reference must be made in this
account of the nosition of Russia in
Manchuria, to the relations between
that country and Japan since 1905.
It is an interesting fact that the war
between Russia and Japan was followed almost immediately by a policy
of close co-operation, and when peace
was concluded they were able to
strike a satisfactory balance between
their respective spheres of interest in
North and South Manchuria. Such
traces of the conflict as might have
remained behind were rapidly effaced
by controversies with other Powers
who wanted to engage actively in the
development of Manchuria. The fear
of other rivals hastened the process
which was reconciling the two countries. The Treaties of 1907. 1910. 1912.
1916, brought the• two countries progressively closer together.
The Russian revolution of 1917, followed by the declarations of the Soviet Government of July 25, 1919 and
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of October 27, 1920, regarding its policy towards the Chinese people and,
later, by the Sino-Soviet agreements
of M.ay 31, 1924 and September 20,
1924. shattered the basis of RussoJapanese understanding and co-operation in Manchuria. This fundamental
reversal of policy radically changed
the !'elations of the three Powers in
the Far East. Moreover, the Allied
intervention (1918-20) with its aftermath of friction between the Japanese
and Sov1et forces in Siberia (1920-22)
had accentuated the change in the r~lations between Japan and Russia.
The attitude of the Soviet Government gave a strong impetus to China'<;
nationalistic aspirations. As the Soviet Government and the Third International had adopted a policy opposed to all imperialist Powers which
maintained relations with China or.
the basis of the existing treaties, it
seemed that probable they would support China in the struggle for the
recovery of sovereign rights. This development revived all the old amcieties and suspicions of Japan towards
her Russian neighbcr. This country,
with which she had once been at war,
had, during the years which followed
that war, become a friend and ally.
Now this relationship was changed,
and the possibility of a danger from
across the North Manchurian border
again became a matter of concern to
Japan. The likelihood of an alliance
between the Communist doctrines in
the north and the anti-Japanese pro- ·
paganda of the Kuomintang in the
south made the desire to impose between the two a Manchuria which
should be free from both increasingly
felt in Japan. Japanese misgivings
have been still further increased in
the last few years by the predon,inant
influence acquired by the U.S.S.R. in
Outer Mongolia and the growth of
communism in China.
The Convention concluded between
~npan and the U.S.S R. in January.
1925, served to establish regular relations, but did not revive the close cooperation of the pre-revolution period.

CHAPTER III
in
d

Manchurian Issu·es Between China and Japan
I. Japan's Interest in China
(Before September 18, 1931)
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·D\uling the quarter of a century before
September, 1931, the ties which bound
Manchuria to the rest of China were
growing stronger and at the same time
the interests of Japan in Manchuria
were increasing. Manchuria was admittedly a part of China, but it was
a part i.n which Japan had acquired
or claimed such exceptional rights, so
restricting the exercise of China's sovereign rights, that a conflict between
the two countries was a natural result.

By the Treaty of Peking of December, 1905, China gave her consent to
the transfer to Japan of the K wantung
Leased Territory which was formerly leased to Russia, and of the southern branch of the Russian-controlled
Chinese Eastern Railway as far north
as Changchun. In an additional agreement China granted to Japan a concession to improve the military railway line between Antung and Mukden, and to operate it for fifteen years.
fn August, 1906, the South Mam:huria
Railway Company was organized by Imperial Decree to take over and administer the former Russian railway, as
well as the Antung-Mukden Railway.
The Japanese Government acquired
control of the company by taking half
of the shares in exchange for the railway, its properties, and the valilable
coal mines at Fushun and Yentai. The
company was entrusted, in the railway
area, with the functions of administratiOllj and was allowed to levy taxes: it
was also authorized to engaged in minim:g; electrical enterprises, warehousing,
and many other branches of business.
m 1910 Japan annexed Korea. This
annexation indirectly increased Japanese rights in Manchuria, since Korean
sett~n,; · became Japanese subjects over

whom Japanese officials exercised jurisdiction.

Leases Extended
In 1915, as a result of the group of
exceptional demands made by the Japanese and generally known as the
".T wenty-one Demands," Japan and
Ghina. signed a treaty and exchanged
notes on May 25th, regarding South
Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. By these agreements the lease
of the Kwantung Territory, including
Port Arthur and Dalny (now Dairen),
which was originally for a period of
25 years and the concessions for the
South Manchuria and the AntungMukden railways, were all extended to
99 years. Furthermore, Japanese subjects in South Manchuria acquired the
right to travel and reside, to engage
in, business of any kind, and to lease
land· necessary for trade, industry and
agriculture. Japan also obtained rights
of priority for railway and certain
other loans in South Manchuria and
Eastern · Inner Mongolia, and preferential rights regarding the appointment
of advisers in South Manchuria. At the
Washington conference, 1921-1922, however, Japan relinquished her rights regarding the loans and the advisers.
These treaties and other agreements
gave to Japan an important and unusual position in Manchuria.
She
governed the leased territory with
practically full rights of sovereignty.
Through the South Manchuria Railway she administered the railway
areas, including several town and
large sections of such populous cities
as Mukden and Changchun; and in
these areas she controlled the police,
taxation, education and public utilities.
She maintained armed forces in
many parts of the country; the Kwantung army in the Leased Territory,
r ailway Guards in the railway- areas,
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and consular police throughout the
various districts.
This summary of the long list of
Japan's rights in Manchuria shows
clearly the exceptional character of the
political, economic and legal relations
created between that country and
China in Manchuria. There is probably nowhere in the world an exact
parallel to this situation. no example
of a country enjoying in the territory
of a neighboring state such extensive
economic and administrative privileges.
A situation of this kind could possibly
be maintained without leading to incessant complications and disputes if
it were freely desired or accepted on
both sides, and if it were the sign and
embodiment of a weil-considered policy
of close collaboration in the economic
and in the political sphere. But in the
absence of those conditions it could
only lead to friction and conflict.
II. Conflict Between the Fundamental
interests of Japan and China
in Manchuria
The Chinese people regard Manchuria
as an integral part of China, and deeply
resent any attempt to separate it from
the rest of their country. Hitherto these
Three Eastern Provinces have always
been considered both by China and by
foreign Powers as a part of China, and
the de jure authority of the Chinese
Government there has been unqu~stioned. This is evidenced in many SinoJapanese treaties and agreements, as
well as in other international conventions, and has been reiterated in nwnerous statements issued officially by foreign offices, including that of Japan.
. The Chinese regard Manchuria as
their "first line of defence." As Chinese territory, it is looked upon as a
sort of buffer against the adjoining territories of Japan , and Russia, a region
which constitutes an outpost against the
penetration of Japanese and Russian
influences from these regions into the
other parts of China. The facility with
which China, south of the Great Wall,
including the city of Peiping, can be
invaded from Manchuria has been demonstrated to the Chinese from historical experience. This fear of foreign
invasion from the northeast has been
increased in recent years by the development of railway communication,
and has been intensified during the
events of the past year.
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Manchuria is also regarded by the
Chinese as important to them for economic reasons. For decades they have
called it the "granary of China,'' and
more recently have regarded it as a
region which furnishes seasonal employment to Chinese farmers and laborers from neighboring Chinese provinces.
Whether China as a whole can be
said to be over-populated may be open
to question, but that certain regions
and provinces, as, for example, Shantung, are now peopled in such numbers as to require emigration is generally accepted by the most competent authorities on this subject. The
Chinese, therefore, regard Manchuria
as a frontier region, capable of affording ' relief for the present and future
population problems of other parts of
China. They deny the statement that
the Japanese are principally responsible for the economic development of
Manchuria, and point to their own
colonization enterprises, especially since
1925, to their railway development and
other enterprises in refutation of these
claims.
Japanese interests in Manchuria differ both in character and degree from
those of any other foreign country.
Deep in the mind of every Japanese
is the memory of their country's great
struggle with Russia in 1904-5, fought
on the plains of Manchuria, at Mukden and Liaoyang, along the line of
the South Manchuria Railway, at the
Yalu River, and in the Liaot'ung Peninsula. To the Japanese the war with
Russia will ever be remembered as a
life and death struggle fought in selfdefense against the menace of Russian encroachments. The fact that a
hundred thousand Japanese soldiers
died in this war, and that two billion
gold Yen were expended, has created
in Japanese minds a determination that
these sacrifices shall not have been
made in vain.

Interest Date Earlier
Japanese interest in Manchuria, however, began ten years before that war.
The war with China, in 1894-5, principally over Korea, was largely fought
at Port Arthur and on the plains of
Manchuria; and the treaty of peace
signed at Shimonoseki, ceded to Japan
in full sovereignty the Liaotung Pen-

insula. To · the Japanese, the fact that
Russia, France and Germany forced
them to renounce this cession does not
affect their conviction that Japan obtained this part of Manchuria as the
result of a successful war, and thereby
acquired a moral right to it which still
exists.
Manchuria has been frequently referred to as the "life line" of Japan.
Manchuria adjoins Korea, now Japanese territory. The vision of a China,
unified, strong and hostile, a nation of
four hundred millions, dominant in
Manchuria and in Eastern Asia, is disturbing to many Japanese. But to the
greater number, when they speak of
menace to their national existence and
of the necessity of self-defense, they
have in mind Russia rather than China.
Fundamental, therefore, among the interests of Japan in Manchuria is the
strategic importance of this territory.
There are those in Japan who think
that she should entrench herself firmly •i n Manchuria against the possibility of attack from the U.S.S.R. They
have an ever-present anxiety lest Korean malcontents in league with Russian Communists in the nearby Maritime Province might in future invite,
or co-operate with, some new military
advance from the north. They regard
Manchuria as a buffer region against
both the U.S.S.R. and the rest of
China. Especially in the minds :>f
Japanese military men, the right
claimed, under agreements with Russia and China, to station a few thou••
sand railway guards along the South
Manchuria Railway is small recompense
for the enormous sacrifices of their
country in the Russo-Japanese War,
and a meagre security against the
possibility of attack from that direc •
tion.
Patriotic sentiment, the paramount
need of military defence, and the exceptional treaty rights, all combine to
create the claim to a "special position"
in Manchuria. The Japanese conception of this special position is not
limited to what is legally defined in
treaties and agreements either with
China or with other States. Feelings
and historical association, which are
the heritage of the Russo-Japanese
War, and pride in the achievements of
Japanese enterprise in Manchuria for

the last quarter century, are an indefinable but real part of the Japanese
claim to a "special position." It is
only natural. therefore, that the Japanese use of this expression in dip1omatic language should be obscure.
and that other States should have
found it difficult, if not impossible to
recognize it by international instruments.
The Japanese Government, since the
Russo-Japanese War, has at various
times sought to obtain from Russia,
France, Great Britain and the United
States recognition of their country's
"special position," "special influence
and interest,''' or "paramount interests"
in Manchuria. These efforts have only
met with partial success, and where
recognition of such claims has been
accorded, in more or less definite terms
the inte-rnational agreements or under~
standings containing them have largely
disappeared with the passage of time,
either by formal abrogation or otherw~e, as, for example, the RussoJapanese secret conventions of 1907,
1910, 1912 and 1916, made with the
ormer Tsarist Government of Russia:
the Anglo-Japanese conventions of
alliance, guarantee and declaration of
policies; and the Lansing-Ishii exchange
of notes of 1917.
Spedal Position Challenged
The Signatories of the Nine-Power
Treaty of the Washington conference
of February 6, 1922, by agreeing "to
respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity" of China, to
maintain "equality of opportunity in
China for the trade and industry of all
nations," by refraining from taking
advantage of conditions in China" in
order to seek special rights or privileges" there, and by providing "the
fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable
government, challenged to a large
extent the claims of any signatory
State to a "special position," or to
"special rights and interests" in any
part of China, including Manchuria.
But the provisions of the Nine-Power
Treaty and the abandonment, by abrogation or otherwise, of such agreem~ts
as those mentioned above, have led to
33

no change in the attitude Qf the Japanese. Viscount Ishii doubtless well expressed the general view of his countrymen in his recent Memoirs (Gaiko Yoruku), when he said:
"Even if the Lansing-Ishii agreement
is abolished, Japan's special interests
unshakenly exist there. The special interests which Japan possesses in China
neither were created by an interna.tional agreement, nor can they become
the objects of abolition."
T4is Japanese claim with respect to
Manchuria conflicts with the sovereign
rights of China, and is irreconcilable
with the aspirations of the National
Government, which seeks to curtaH exist.i ng exceptional rights and privileges
of foreign States throughout China, and
to prevent, their further extension in
the future. The development of this
<;onflict will be clear from a consideration of the respective policies pursued
by Japan and China iµ Manchuria.
' Until the events of September, 1931,
the various Japanese Cabinets, since
1905, appeared to have the same general aims in Manchuria, but they differed as to the policies best suited to
achieve those aims. They also differed somewhat as to the extent of the
respo.nsibility which Japan should assume for the maintenance of peace
and order.
The general aims for which they
worked in Manchuria were to maintain and develop Japan's vested in~erests, to foster the expansion of
.Japanese enterprise, and to obtain adequate protection for Japanese lives and
prop.erty. In the policies adopted for
realizing these aims there was one
<;ardinal feature which may be said
to have been common to them all.
This feature has been the tendency
~o regard Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia as distinct from the rest
China. It resulted naturally from
the Japanese conception of their country's "special position" in Manchuria.
Whatever differences may have been
obs~able between the specific ~olici~ advocated by the various cabinets in Japan, as, for example, between
the so-called "friepdship policy" of
Baron Shidehara and the so-called
1
'p'o siti~e policy" of' the late General
Bar,on · Tanaka, tq.ey,· have always· had
his feature in common.

of
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Two Policies Alternate
The "friel)dship policy" developed
from about the time of the WashingtQn
conference and was maintained until
April, 1927; it was then supplanted by
the "positive policy," which was followed until July, 1929; finally, the
"friendship policy" was again adopted
and continued the official policy of the
Foreign Office until September, 1931.
In the spirit which actuated the two
policies there was a marked difference:
the "friendship policy" rested, in Baron
Shidehara's words, "on the basis • of
good will and neighborliness": the
"positive policy" rested upon military
force. But in regard to the concrete
measures which should be adopted in
Manchuria, these two policies differed
largely on the question as to the lengths
to which Japan should go to maintain
peace and order in Manchuria and to
protect Japanese interests.
The "positive policy" of the Tanaka
Ministry placed greater emphasis UJ?On
the necessity of regarding Manchuria as
distinct from the rest of China: its
positive character was made clear by
the frank declaration that "if disturbances spread to Manchuria and Mongolia, and, as a result, peace and order
are disrupted, thereby menacing our
special position and rights and interests
in those regions," Japan would "defend them, no matter whence the
menace comes." The Tanaka policy definitely asserted that Japan would take
upon herself the task · of preserving
''peace and order" in Manchuria-in
contrast to previous policies which
limited their objectives to protecting
Japanese interests there.
The Japanese Government has generally pursued a firmer policy in Manchuria than elsewhere in China, in,
order to preserve and develop these
vested interests which are peculiar to
that region. Certain of the Cabinets
have tended to place great reliance on
the use of interventionist methods, accompanied by a threat of force. This
was true especially at the time of the
presentation of the "Twenty-one Demands" on China in 1915, but as . to
the wisdom of the "Twenty-one Demands," as well as to other methods
Qf intervention and force. there has
always been. a marked difference of
opinion in Japan.

The Washington conference, although
it had a marked effect upon the situation i~ the rest of Chin~, 'm ade lit-

tle actual change in Manchuria. The
Nine-Power Treaty of February 6, 1922,
in spite of its provisions with respect
to the integrity of China and the
policy of the Open Door, has had but
qualified application to Manchuria in
view of the character and extent of
Japan's vested interests there; although textually the treaty is applicaiA~ to that region. The Nine-Power
Treaty did not materially d~inish
the claims based on these vested interests~ although, as alreadiy stlated,
Japan formally relinquished her special rights regarding loans and advisers which had been granted in the
Treaty of 1915.
During the period from the Washington conference until the death of
Marshal Chang Tso-lin in 1928, the
policy of Japan in Manchuria was
chiefly concerned with the relations
with the de facto ruler of the Three
Eastern Provinces. Japan gave him
a measure of support, notably during
the Kuo Sung-lin mutiny mentioned in
the last chap ter. Marshal Chang Tsolin, in return, although opposed to
man of the Japanese demands, felt it
necessary to give due recognition to
Japan's desires, since these might at
any time be enforced byl superior military power. He also wished to be
able, upon occasion to obtain Japanese support against Russian opposition in the north. Upon the, whole,
Japanese
relations
with
Marshal
Chang Tso-lin were reasonably satisfactory from her point of view, although they became increasingly disturbed toward the end of his life in
consequence of his failure to fulfill
some of his alleged promises and agreements. Some evidence even of a revulsion ofi Japanese feeling against him
became apparent in the months preceding his defeat and final retreat to
Mukden in June, 1928.

f

Right to Keep Peaee Claimed
ln the spring of 1928, when the Nationalist armies of China were march••
fug on Peking in an effort to drive
out the forces of Chang Tso-lin, the
J apanese 'Government, under the premiership of Baron Tanaka, issued a

declaration that, on account of her
"special position" 'in Manchuria, Japan
would maintain peace and order in 'that
region. When it seemed possible that
the Nationalist arm~es might ·carry the
civil war north of- the Great Wall,
the Japanese Government, on May .28,
sent to the leading :Chinese generals
a communication 'which said:
"The Japanese Government attache-;
1he utmost importance to the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria, and is prepared to do all lt
can to prevent the occurrence of any
such state of affairs as may disturb
that peace and order, or constitute the
probable cause of such a disturbance
"In these circumstances, should disturbances develop further in the direction of Peking and Tientsin, and
the situation become so menacing as
to threaten the peace and order of
Manchuria, Japan may possibly be constrained to take appropriate effective
steps for the maintenance of peace and
order in Manchuria."
At the same time, Baron Tanaka issued a more definite statement, tha't
the Japanese Government would prevent "defeated troops of those in pursuit of them" from entering Manchuria.
The announcement of this farreaching policy brought protests from
both the Peking and the Nanking
Governments, the Nanking note stating that such meas~res as Japan proposed would be not only "an interference with Chinese domestic a.ffa:rs,
but also a flagrant violation of the
principle of mutual respect for territorial sovereignty."
In Japan itself this "positive policy''
of the Tanaka Government, while it
received strong support from one
party, was vigorously criticized by
another, especially by the Shidehara
group, on the ground that the preservation of peace and order over all
Manchuria was not the responsibilit}
of Japan.
Japan's relations with Marshal C'nangHsueh-liang, who succeeded his father
in 1928, were increasingly strained from
the outset. Japan wished Mahchuria
to remain separate from the newlyestablished National Government at
Nanking, while Marshal Chang Hsueliliang was in favor of recognizing the
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· authority of that Government. Reference has already been made to the
. urgent advice given by Japanese offici~ that allegimce should not be
· pledged t.o the Central Government.
When, however, the Mukden Government raised the Nationalist flag over
government buildings in Mukden in
December, 1928, the Japanese Government made no attempt to interfere.
Japanese relations with Marshal
Chang Hsueh-liang continued to be
strained, and acute friction developed
in the months immediately preceding
September, 1931.

Ill. Sino-Japanese Railway Issues
in Manchuria
The international politics of Manchuria for a quarter of a century have
been largely railway politics. Considerations of a purely economic and
railway-operating character have been
overshadowed by the dictates of state
policies, with the result that Manchurian railways cannot be said to have
contributed their maximum to the economic development of the region. Our
_study of Manchurian railway questions,
has revealed that in Manchuria there
has been little or no co-operation between the Chin~se and Japanese railway builders and authorities directed
to achieving a comprehensive and mutually beneficial railway plan. In contrast with railway development in such
regions as Western Canada and Argentina, where economic considerations
have in large measure determined railway. expansion, railway development in
Manchuria has been largely a matter
of rivalry between China and Japan.
No railway of any importance has ever
been constructed in Manchuria without
causing an interchange of notes between China and Japan or other interested foreign States.
Manchurian railway construction began with the Russian-financed and
directed Chinese Eastern Railway under
circumstances which, after the Rus&QJ apanese War was replaced in the south
. by a Japanese-controlled system, the
,S~uth Manchuria Ra,ilway, thus making inevitable future rivalry between
· China and Japan. The South Manchuria Railway, although nominally a
private corporation, is, in fact, a Japanese Government enterprise. Its functions include not only the management
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of it$ railw,.y lines, but also exceptional rights of political administration. From the time of its incorporation the Japanese have never regarded
it as a purely economic enterprise. The
late Viscount Goto, first President of
the company, laid down a fundamental
principle that the South Manchuria
Railway should serve Japan's "special
mission" in Manchuria.
The South Manchuria Railway system
has developed into an efficient and
well-managed railway enterprise, and
· has contributed much to the economic
development of Manchuria, serving at
the same time as an example for the
Chinese in its numerous services of a
non.:.railway character, such as its
schools, laboratories, libraries and agricultural experiment stations. But this
has been accompanied by limitations
and positive hindrances arising out of
the political character of the company,
its connection with party politics in
Japan, and certain large expenditures
from which no commensurate financial
returns can have been expected. Since
its formation, the policy of the railway
company has been to finance the construction of only such Chinese lines as
would be connected with its own system, thus, by means of through-traffic
agreements, to divert the major part o.f
the freight to the South Manchuria
Railway for seaboard export at l)airen
in the Japanese leased territory. Very
large sums have been expended in financing these lines and it is doubtful
if their construction, in certain cases,
was justified on purely economic
grounds, especially in view of the large
capital advances made and the loan
considerations involved.

Rights Often Questioned
The very existence of such a foreigncontrolled institutio,n as the South
Manchuria Railway on Chinese soil
was naturally looked upon with disfavor by the Chinese authorities, and
questions concerning its rights and privileges under treaties and agreements
have constantly arisen since the RussoJapanese War. More particularly, after
1924, when the Chinese authorities ih
Manchuria, having come to recognize
the importance of railway development, sought to develop their own railways independent of Japanese capi-

tal, did these pr.o blems become more
critical. Both economic and stragetic
considerations were involved. The Tahushan-Tungliao line, for example,
was projected to develop new territory and to increase the revenues of
the Peking-Mukden Railway, while, on
the other hand, the Kuo Sung-lin
mutiny in December, 1925, demonstrated the possible strategic and political
value of independently owned and
operated Chinese lines. The Chinese
attempt to overcome the Japanese monopoly, and to place obstacles in the
way of its future development, anteceded the period of political influence of
the Tahushan-Tungliao, Mukden-Hailungcheng and Hulan-Hailun railways,
for example, having been constructed
while Marshal Chang Tso-lin was in
power. The policy of Marshal Chang
Hsueh-liang after his assumption of
authority in 1928, re-enforced by the
widespread movement for "rights recovery" sponsored by the Central Government and the Kuomintang, came
into collision with Japan's monopolistic and expansionist policies, centered,
as they were, around the South Manchuria Railway Company.
In the Japanese justification of their
resort to forceful means in Manchuria,
on and after September 18, 1931, they
have alleged violation of Japan's
"treaty rights," and have emphasized
China's failure to carry out an engagement made by the Chinese Government
during the Sino-Japanese conference
held at Peking in November-December,
1905, which was to the following
effect:
"The Chinese Government engage,
for the purpose of protecting the interests of the South Manchuria Railway, not to construct, prior to the recovery by them of the said railway,
any main line in the neighborhood of
and parallel to that railway, or any
branch line which might be prejudicial to the interests of the abovementioned railway."
This dispute over the question of socalled "parallel railways" in Manchuria is of long standing importance.
The issue first arose in 1907-1908, when
the Japanese Government, asserting
this claim of right, prevented the
Chinese from constructing, under contract with a British firm, the Hsinmintung-Fakumen
Railway.
Since

1924, when the Chinese in Manchuria
undertook with 11enewed vigor to
develop their own railways, independent of Japanese financial interest, the
Japanese Government has protested
against the construction by the Chinese of the Tahushan-Tungliao and the
Kirin-Hailungcheng
lines,
although
both these lines were completed and
opened to traffic in spite of Japanese
protests.
Prior to the arrival of the commission in the Far East, there had been
much doubt as to the actual existence
of any such engagement as was claimed by Japan. In view of the longstanding importance of this disputP.
the commission took special pains to
obtain information on the essentfal
facts. In Tokyo, mmking and Peiping,
all the relevant documents were examined, and we are now able to state
that the alleged engagement of the
Chinese plenipotentiaries of the Peking conference of November-December, 1905, regarding so-called "parallel
railways" is not contained in any
formal treaty; that the alleged engagement in question is to be found in the
minutes of the eleventh day of the
Peking Conference, December 4, 1905.
We have obtained agreement from the
Japanese and Chinese assessors that
no other document containing such
alleged engagement exists beyond this
entry in the minutes of the Peking
conference.
Real Question at Issue
The real question at issue, therefore,
is not whether there exists a "treaty
right" whereby Japan is entitled to
claim that certain railways in Man••
churia have been constructed by the
Chinese in violation of such an engagement, but whether this entry in
the minutes of the Peking conference
of 1905, whether called a "protocol" or
not, is a binding commitment on the
part of China, having the force of a .
formal agreement and without limitation as to the period or circumstances of its application.
The determination of the question
whether this entry into the minutes of
the Peking conference constituted, from
an international legal point of view, a
binding agreement, and whether, if so,
there is but one interpretation which
may r easonably be placed upon it,· was
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properly a matter for judgment by an
impartial judicial tribunal.
The Chinese and Japanese official
translations of this entry inlo the
minutes of the conference leave no
doubt that the disputed passage cortcerning "parallel railways" is u declaration or statement of intention on
the part of the Chinese plenipotentiaries.
That there was a statement c,f intention has not been disput-ed ,by the
Chinese, but there has throughout •t he
controversy been a difference of op-inion
between the two parties as to the ,nature
of the intention expressed. Japan has
claimed that the words employed preclude China from building •or allowing
to be built any railway which, in the
opinion of the South Manchuria Railway Company, was in competition with
its system. The Chinese, on the other
hand, contend that the only commitment involved in the disputed passage
was a statement of intention no! to
build lines with the deliberate object
of unduly impairing the commercial
usefulness and value of the South Manchuria Railway. During the exchange
of notes of 1907 concerning the Hsinmintun - Fakumen Railway project,
Prince Ching, representing the Chinese
Government, stated to Baron Hayashi,
the Japanese Minister, in a communication dated April 7, 1907, that the Japanese plenipotentiaries in the Peking
conference, while refusing to agree to
a definition of the term "parallel line"
in terms of specific mileage from the
South Manchuria Railway, declared
that Japan "would do nothing to prevent China from any steps she might
take in the future for the development
of Manchuria." It would seem, therefore, that the Chinese Government
during this period admitted in practice
that there was, on their part, an obligation not to construct railways
patently and unreasonably prejudidal
to the interests of the South Manchuria
Railway, though they have always
denied that Japan had any valid claim
to a right to monopolize railway construction in southern Manchuria.
There has never been a definition as
to what would constitute a parallel
railway, although the Chinese desired
one. When the Japane~ Government
opposed . the ~onstruction of the Hsinmintun-Fakumen Railway in 1906-1908,
the impression was created that Japan
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considered a "parallel" railway one
within approximately thirty-five ,miles
of the South Manchuria Railway, ,but
in 1926 the Japanese Government ,pretested against the construction of ,t he
Tahushan-Tungliao Railway as a "competitive parallel line," noting that the
distance between the proposed railway
and ihe South Manchuria Railway
would be "no more than seventy miles
on the average." It would be difficult
to make a thoroughly satisfactory definition.
Interpretation Difficult
From a railway-operating point of
view, a "parallel" line ~an be considered a "competing line"; one which ·d eprives another railway of some part of
the traffic which naturally would have
gravitated to it. Competitive traffic ,i ncludes both local and through-traffic,
and, especially when the latter is considered, it is not difficult to see how
a stipulation against the construction of
"parallel" lines is capable of very broad
interpretation. Nor is there any agreement between China and Japan as to
what constitutes a "main line" ·or a
"branch line." These terms, from a
railway operating point of view, are
subject to change. The Peldng-M•1kden
Railway line from Tahushan extending
north was originally considered by that
administration as a "branch line," but
after the line had been complet~ from
Tahushan to Tungliao it was possible
to regard this as a "main line."
It was only natural that the interpretation of the undertaking in 11egard to parallel railways should lead
to bitter co,ntroversy between China
and Japan. The Chinese attempted
to build their own railways in South
Manchuria, but in almost every case
met with a protest from Japan.
A second group of railway issues
which increased the tension between
China and Japan before the events of
September last, were those which arose
from the agreements under which the
Japanese advanced money for the construction of various; Chinese Government railways in Man<!huria. Japanese
capital to the present value, including
arrears and interest, of Yen 150,000,000
had been expended in the building of
the following Chinese lines: the KirinChangchun, the Kirin-Tunhua, the
Ssupingkai-Taonan, and the Taonan-

Angangchi railways and certain narrow gauge lines.
The Japanese complained that the
Chinese would not pay these loans,
nor make adequate provision for them,
nor carry out various stipulations in
the agreements, such as those respecting the appointment of Japanese railway advisers. They made repeated
demands that the Chinese should fulfill the alleged promises made by their
Government that Japanese interests
should be permitted to participate in
the construction of the Kirin-Kwainei
Railway. This projected line would
extend the Kirin-Tunhua Railway to
the Korean border, and would make
available for Japan a new short sea
and rail route from her seaports
to the center of Manchuria, and, in
conjunction with the other railways,
~horten the communications with the
interior.
In defence of the failure to repay
their loans, the Chinese pointed out
that these were not normal financi~l
transactions. They claimed that the
loans were made largely by the South
Manchuria RaiJway in order to mono polize railway construction in South
Mahchuria; that t!,e 0bject was pcintarily strategic and political: and
that in any case, the new lines had
oeeb. so heav1iy over-capitalized That
they were, at. least for the time lbein~.
financially unable to earn the ·neces- ,
sary money to repay the construction
expenses and loans. They contended
that in each instance of alleged failure
to fulfil obligations. an impartial e:,ramination would show adequate justification for their conduct. As for
the Kirin-K wainei Railway, they denied the moral, and even the legal,
validity o! the alleged agreements.
s
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Branch Lines Desired
There were certain conditions which
existed in connection with these railway agreements which make it m .. ·
tural for the loan controversy to arise.
The South Manchuria Railway had
practically no branches, and wished to
develop a system of feeder lines ir.
order to increase its freight and pas~enger traffic.
The companv wor1s
thetefore willing to advance money
for the building of such new lines,
even though there was little likeli
hood that the loans would be repaid

in the near future; it was, also, willing to continue to make further advances, when earlier loans were still
outstanding.
In these ::ircumstances, and so long
as the newly-constructed Chinese lines
functioned as feeders to the South
Manchuria system, and were operated
in some measure under its influence,
the South Manchuria Railway appea'red
to make no special effort to force payment of the loans, and the Chinese
lines operated with ever-increasing
debt obligations. But when certain of
these lines were connected with a new
Chinese Railway System, and in 1930:u started a serious competition with
the South Manchuria Railway, the
nonpayment .of the loans at once became a :-ubjed of complaint.
Another complicating factor, in the
case of certain of these loan agreements, was their political character. It
was as a result of the "Twenty-one
Demands" that the Kirin-Changchun
Railway was placed under the direction · of the South Manchuria Railway
Company, and the outstanding indehtedness of the line converted into
a long-term loan, maturing in 1947.
The advance of Yen 20 000,000 made in
1918 in consequence of the so-called
"Four Manchuria-Mongolia Railway
Agreement," was one of the so-call~
"Nishihara Loans," made to the military government of the "Anfu clique,''
without any restrictioin as to the purpose for which it might be used.
Similarly, it was from a Nishihara
loan that an advance was made of
Yen 10,000,000 to this clique in connection with the preliminary loan .contract
a~reement of 1918 for the construction
of the Kirin-Kwainei Railway. Chinese
r.ational sentiment has been greatly
aroused over the subject of the "Nishihara Loans" ever since their negotiation· but in spite of this the Chinese
Gov~rnment has never repudiated
them. In the~e .£.!rcutnstances, the Chinese felt little moral obligation to
fulfill the conditions of the loan contracts.
Especially important in Sino-Japanese
relations were the issues over the
Kirin-Kwainei Railway project. '11le
first set of issues related to the section
of the line from Kirin to Tunhua, the
construction of which was completed
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in 1928. From that time on, the Japan.e se complained because the Chinese
. would not convert the Japanese ad~ances for construction purposes into
a formal loan secured by the earnings
'of the railway and maintained that the
Chinese were violating the contract by
their refusal to appoint a Japanese ac. countant for the line.
The Chinese in turn claimed that the
construction costs submitted were not
·only much higher than the estimates
of the Japanese engineers, but were
greatly in excess of the amount for
which vouchers were presented. They
refused to take over the line formally
until the construction costs should bt::
settled; and contended that until they
should do so, they wer~ under no obligation to appoint a Japanese accoun
tant.
These issues, definite and technical,
involving no problems, of principle or
policy, were obviously suited for arbitration or judicial discrimination, but
they remained unsettled and served to
intensify the mutual resentment of Chinese and Japanese.
4

Line to Korea Important
Of much greater importance, and far
more complicated, was the issue over
the construction of the railway from
· Tunhua to K wainei. This section would
complete the railway from Changchun
to the Korean border, where it would
connect with a Japanese railway running to a nearby Korean port. Such
a line, giving direct entrance to cen. tral Manchuria and opening a region
rich in timber and mineral resources,
would be of economic value as well
as of great strategic importance to
Japan.
The Japanese were insistent that this
line should be built and that -they
should participate in ·its financing. They
claimed that China had given treaty
assurances to tr.is effect. The Chiese Government promised, they pointed out, in the Chientao Agreement of
September 4, 1909, to build the line
"upon consultation with the Government of Japan," the promise being
given in part as a consideration fu
Japan's relinquishing the old claims
of Korea to the Chientao region in
Manchuria. Later, in 1918, the Chinese Government and the Japanese
banks signed a preliminary agreement
0
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for a loan for the construction of this
line, and in accordance with the agreement, the banks advanced to the Chinese Government the sum of Yen 10,000,000. This, however, was one of the
Nishihara loans, a fact which in the
view of the Chinese, affected the validity of the engagement.
Neither of them, however, was a de•
finitive loan contract agreement, obligating China, without condition and
before a specific date, to permit Japanese financiers to participate in the
construction of such a line.
It was alleged that formal, definitive
contracts for the construction of this
Urie were signed in Peking in May,
1928, but there was much uncertainty
regarding their validity. Such contracts
were doubtless signed, under very irregular circumstances, on May ·13-15 by
a representative of the Ministry of
Communications of the Government at
Peking, then under Marshal Chang
Tso-lin. But the Chinese contend that
the Marshal who was then hard pressed by the Nationalist Armies and was
about to evacuate Peking, gave his
consent that this official should sign,
under "a duress of compulsion,·• due to
lthteats of the Jaipanese that if he
should not sanction the contracts his
retreat to Mukden would be endangered. Whether Marshal Cli:mg Tso-Jin
himself also signed the contracts has
been a matter of dispute. After the
death of the Marshal, the1 Northeastern
Political Council at Mukden and Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang both refused
to approve the contracts on the ground
that they were faulty in form and negotiated unde: duress and had never been
ratified by the Peking Cabinet er the
North-eastern Political Council.
The underlying reason for the opposition of the Chinese to the construction of the Tunhua-Kwainei line was
their fear of Japan's military and strategic purposes, and their belief that their
sovereign rights and interest would be
threatened by this new Japanese approach to Manchuria from the Japan
Sea.
This particular railway issue was not
primarily a financial or commercial
problem, but involved a conflict between the state policies of Japan and
China.

I~ues Over Traffic
There were -additional issues over
through-traffic arrangements between
the Chinese and Japanese lines, rate
' questions and rivalries between the
seaport of Dairen and such Chinese
ports as Yingkow (Newchwang).
By September, 1931, the Chinese had
built unaided and were owning and
operating railways with a total length
of nearly a thousand kilometers, of
which the most important were: the
Mukden-Hailung, the Hailung-Kirin,
the 'rsitsihar-Koshan, the Hulan-Hailun and the Tahushan-Tungliao (a
branch of the Peiping-Mukden system)
lines; and they owned the PeipingMukden Railway and the following
Japanese-financed lines: the KirinChangchur'. , the Kirin-Tunhua, Ssupingkai-Taonan and
Taonan-Angangchi
lines. During the two years preceding
the outbreak of the present conflict
the Chinese attempted to operate
these various lines as a great Chines<?
railway system, and made efforts to
route all freight, if possible, e;xclnsively over the Chinese-operated lines,
with a seaboard at the Chinese port
of Yingkow (Newchwang)-potentially
at Hulutao. As a result the Chinese
made through-traffic arrangements for
all ports of their railway system, and
refused in important sections to make
similar traffic agreements between
their lines and the South Manchur1a
system. The Japanese claimer\ that
this discrimination deprived the South
Manchuria Railway of much freight
from North Manchuria which would
normally pass over at least a part of
its line and would find an outlet at
Dairen.
Associated with these through-traffic
controversies a bitter rate war sprang
up between the Japanese and Chinese
lines, which began in 1929-30, when
the Chinese reduced their rates after
the opening of the Tahushan-Tungliao
and the K.irin-Hailung lines. The Chinese lines appeared to have a natural
advantage at that time due to the fall in
the value of the Chinese silver currency, which made tlie silver rates on
these lines cheaper than the gold-yen
rates on the South Manchuria Railway. The Japanese claimed that the
Chinese rates were so low that they

constituted unfair competition, but the
Chinese replied that their aim was not
primarily to make profits, as was the
case with the South Manchuria, but to
develop the country and to enable the
rural population to reach the markets
as cheaply as possible.
Incidental to this rivalry in rate cutting, allegations were made by each
side that the other indulged in rate
discrimination or secret rebates in favor
of its own nationals. The Japanese
complained that the Chinese made railway classifications which enabled Chinese products to be carried over Chinese lines more cheaply than foreign
goods, and that they gave lower rates
than normal for native goods and for
freight shipped over Chinese lines to
a Chinese controlled seaport. The Chinese on their side charged the South
Manchuria Railway with granting ·secret rebates, pointing out particularly
that a Japanese forwarding agency was
quoting rntes for freight consigned
through them which were lower than
the regular scheduled rates of the
South Manchuria line.
These issues were highly technical
and involved, and it was difficult to
determine the justice of the charges
which each side was making against
the other. It is obvious that such ques. tions as these should normally be settled by a Railroad Commission or by
regular judicial determination.
Hulutao Being Developed
The railway policies of the Chinese
authorities in Manchuria were f-opused upon the new port development at
Hulutao; Yingkow was to be the secondary port, and pending the completion of Hulutao, the principal one.
Many new railways were projected
which would ~rve practically all parts
of Manchuria. The Japanese claimed
that the through-traffic arrangements
and the low rates put into effect by
the Chinese deprived the port of Dairen of much cargo that would normally have moved to it, and that this situation was particularly evident in 1930.
They stated that the export freight
carried to Dairen by the South .Man_c huria Railway fell off over a million metric tons in 1930, while the port
of Yingkow actually showed an in~rease over the previous year. The
Chinese, however, pointed out that the
41

falling off in freight at Dairen wa.s
due principally to the general deptession and to the especially severe slump
in soya beans, which constituted a
large part of the freight normally carried over the South Manchuria line.
They claimed also that the increase at
Yingkow was the result of traffic from
regions recently opened by the •n ew
Chinese railway lines.
The Japanese appeared to be especially concerned over the potential competition of the Chinese lines and the
port of Hulutao, and complail'led that
the purpose of the Chinese in planning
to construct many new railways and
in developing Hulutao harbor was to
make "the port of Dairen as well as
the South Manchuria Railway itself as
good as valueless."
Viewing these many railroad issues
as a whole, it is evident that a i.umber
of them were technical in character and
were quite capable of settlement by
ordinary arbitral or judicial process,
but that others of them were due to
intense rivalry between China and
Japan which resulted from a deepseated conflict in national policies.
Practically all these railway questions
were still outstanding at the opening
of the year 1931. Beginning in January, and continuing sporadica1ly into
the summer, a final but futile effort was
made by both Japan and China to hold
a conference i'n order to reco'ncile their
policies with respect to these outstanding railway questions. These Kirrn.u-aKao negotiations, as they were called,
achieved no result. There was evidence of sincerity on both sides when
the negotiations began in January, but
various delays occurred for which both
Chinese and Japanese were responsible,
with the result that the formal conference, for which extended preparations had been made, had not yet met
when the present conflict started.
IV. The Sino-Japanese Treaty and Notes
of 1915 and related issues
With the exception of the railway
controversies the Sino-Japanese issues
of greatest importance which were out~tanding in September, 1931, were those
which arose from the Sino-Japanese
treaties and notes of 1915, which in
tum were a result of the so-called
"Twenty-one Demands." These issues
mainly concerned South Manchuria and
Eastern Inner Mongolia, since with the

exception of the question of the Hanyohping Mine (near Hankow) the other
agreements negotiated in 1915 had either
been Teplaced by hew ones, 'or had been
voluntarily given up by Japan. The
controversies in Manchuria were over
the following provisions:
(1) the extension of the term of Japanese possession of the Kwantung Leased Territory to ninety-nine years (1997);
(2) the prolongation of the period of
Japanese possession of the South Manchuria Railway and the Mukden-Antung Railway to ninety-nine years (2002
and 2007 respectively);
(3) the grant to Japanese subjects of
the right to lease land in the interior
of "South Manchuria, i.e., outside those
areas opened by treaty or otherwise to
foreign residence and trade;
(4) the grant to Japanese subjects of
the right to travel, reside and ~onduct
business in the interior of South Manchuria and to participate in joint SinoJapanese agricultural enterprises in
Eastern Inner Mongolia.
The legal right of the Japanese to
enjoy these grants and concessions depended entirely upon the validity of
the treaty and notes of 1915, and the
Chinese continuously
denied that
these were binding upon them. No
amount of technical explanation or
argument could divest the minds of
the Chinese people, officials or laymen of their conviction that the term
"Twenty-one Demands" was practically synonymous with the "Treaties and
Notes of 1916" •and that China's aim
should be to free herself from them.
At the Paris conference, 1919, China demanded their abrogation on the ground
that they had been concluded "under
coercion of a Japanese ultimetum
threatening war." At the Washington
conference, 1921-22, the Chinese delegation raised the questiou "as to the
equity and justice of these agreements and therefore as to their fun.dam<.>ntal validity," and i.n March, 1~~3,
shortly before the expiration of the
origi:!al twenty-fivP. year lease of the
Liaotung (Kwantung) territory which
China granted in 1898 to Russia, the
Chinese Government comnnmicated to
Japan a further request for the 'a brogation of the provisions of 1915, anJ
stated \hat "The Treaties and Notes of
1915 have been consistently condemn-

ed b~ public opinion in China.'' Sir.cl'?
the Chinese maintained that the a$reements of 1915 lacked "fundamental
valiclity," they declined to carry out
the provisions relating to Manchuria
except in so far as circumstances made
it expedient to do so.
The Japanese complained bitterly of
the consequent violations of their
treaty rights by the Chinese. They
contended that the treaties and notes
of, 1915 were duly signed and ratified
and were in full force. To be sure,
there was a considerable body of public opinion in Japan which from the
first did not agree with the "Twentyone. Demands''; and more recently it
has, been common for Japanese spe'ak~
ers and publicists to criticize this policy. But the Japanese Government and
people appeared unanimous in insisting
upon the validity of these provisions
which related to Manchuria.
Lease Extensions bnportant
Two important prov1s1on in the
treaty and notes of 1915 were those for
the extension of the lease of the
Kwantung Territory from 25 to 99 years,
and of the concessions of the South
Manchuria and the Mukden-Antung
railways to a similar period of 99
years. For the dual reasons that these
extensions were a result of the 1915
agreements and that recovery of the
territories originally leased by former Governments was included in the
Nationalist "Rights Recovery" movement, directed against foreign interests in China, the Kwantung Leased
Territory and the South Manchuria
Railway were made objects, at various
times, of agitation and even diplomatic
representation on the part of the Chinese. The policy of Marshal Chang
Hsueh-Hang of declaring Manchuria's
clllegiance to the Central Government
and of permitting the spread of Kuomintang influence in Manchuria made
these issues acute after 1928, although
they remained in the background of
practical politics.
Associated also with the treaty and
notes of 1915 was the agitation for the
recovery of the South Manchuria
Railway, or for stripping that• institution of its political, character in ordex: to
:reduce it to a purely economic enter,p:dse. As the e rliest date fixed for
th«t recovecy Qf, this r,a ilway Qn r;e~y-

ment of the capital and interest outlay
was 1939, the mere abrogation of the
1915 treaties would not in itself have
r~overed the South Manchuria Railway for China. It was extremely
doul;>tful whether China, in any. case,
would have been able to obtain the
capital for this purpose. The occ~sion-,
al utterances of Chinese Nationalist
spokesmen, urging recovery of the
South Manchuria Railway, served as
an irritant to the Japanese, whose
legitimate rights and interests were
thereby threatened.
The disagreement between the Japanese and Chinese as to the proper
functions of the South Manchuria Railways continued from the time of the
railway company's organization in 1906.
Technically, of course the railway company is organized under Japanese law
as a private joint stock enterprise, and
~ quite beyond the pale of Chinese
jurisdiction in practice. Particularly
since 1927, there had been an agitation
among Chinese groups in Manchuria
for divesting the South Manchuria Railway of its political and administrative
functions and converting it into a "pu.rely commercial enterprise.'' No concrete
plan for achieving this end seems to
have been proposed by the Chinese.
The railway company was in fact a
political enterprise. It was a Japanese
Goyernment agency, the Government
controlling a majority ·of its shares:
its administrative policy was so closely
controlled by the Government that the
company's higher officials were almost
invariably changed when a new Cabinet came into power in Japan. Moreover, the company had always been
charged, under Japanese law, with
broad political administrative functions,
including police, taxation and education. To have divested the company
of these functions would have been to
abandon the entire "special mission" of
the South Manchuria Railway, as originally conceived and subsequently
developed.
Numerous issues arose in regard to
the administrative rights of the Japanese within the South Manchuria Railway area, especially as to the acquisition of land, the levying of taxes
and, the
maintenance of railway
guards.

15 Municipalities Included
The railway area includes, in addition to a few yards on each side of
the railway tracks, fifteen municipalities, termed Japanese "railway towns,"
situated along the entire system of th~
South Manchuria Railway from Dairen
to Changchun and from Antung ti:;
Mukden.
Some of these railway
towns, such as those at Mukden,
Changchun and Antung, comprise large
sections of populous Chinese cities.
The right of the South Manchuria
Railway to maintain practically complete municipal governments in the
railway area rested legally upon a
clause in the original Russo-Chinese
Railway Agreement of 1896, which
gave the railway company "absolute
and exclusive administration of its
lands."
The Russian Government,
until the Sino-Soviet Agreement of
1924, and later the Japanese Government, which acquired the original
rights of the Chinese Eastern Railway
so far as concerned the South Manchuria Railway, interpreted this provision as granting political control of
the railway area. The Chinese always
denied this interpretation, insisting
that other provisions in the treaty of
1896 made it clear that this clause was
not intended to grant such broad administrative rights as control of police, taxation, education and public
utilities.
Disputes regarding the acquisition of
land by the railway company were
common. By virtue of one of the
clauses of the original agreement of
1896, the railway company had the right
to acquire by purchase or lease private
lands "actually necessary for the construction, operation and protection of
the line." But the Chinese contended
that the Japanese attempted to make
improper use of this right, in order to
obtain
additional
territory.
The
result was almost continuous controversy between the South Manchuria
Railway Company and the Chinese local
authorities.
Conflicting claims as to the right to
levy taxes within the railway area led
to frequent controversy. The Japanese based their claim upon the original
grant to the railw~y company of the
"absolute and exclusive administration
of its lands"; the Chinese, upon the
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rights of the sovereign state. Speaking generally, the de facto situation
was that the railway company levied
and collected taxes from Japanese, Chinese and foreigners residing in the
railway areas, and that the Chinese authorities did not exercise such authority, although they claimed the legal
right to do so.
A type of controversy which was
frequently arising was where the Chinese attempted to tax produce (such as
soya bean shipments), which was being
carted to the South Manchuria Railway
towns for transport by rail to Dairen
over the Japanese line. This was described by the Chinese as a uniform
tax, necessarily to be coilected at the
boundaries of the J apa.nese "railway
towns," since to refrain from doing
so would have been to discriminate in
favor of produce carried by the South
Manchuria Railway.
The issues as to Japanese railway
guards led to almost continuous difficulty. Th~y v. ere aiso indicative of
a fundamental conflict of state policies
in Manchuria already referred to and
were the cause of a series of incidents,
resulting in considerable loss of life.
The legal basis of Japan's alleged right
to maintain these guards was the oftquoted clause in the original Agreement of 1896 which granted to the
Chinese Eastern Railway "the absolut.?
and exclusive right of administration
of its lands." Russia maintained, and
China denied, that this gave the right
to guard the railway line by Russian
troops.
In the Portsmouth Treaty,
1905, Russia and Japan, as between
themselves, reserved the right to maintained railway guards "not to exceed
15 men per kilometer." But in the
subsequent Treaty of Peking, signed
by China and Japan later in the same
year, the Chinese Government did not
give its assent to this particular provision of the agreement between Japan
and Russia. China and Japan, however, did include the following provision in Article II of the Additional
Agreement ')f December 22. 1905, which
is an annP.x to the Sino-Japanese
Treaty of Peking of that date:
"In view of the earnest desire expressed by the Imperial Chinese Government to have the Japanese and Russian
troops and railway guards in Manchuria

withdrawn as soon as possible, and ~n
order to meet this desire, the Imperial
Japanese Government, in the event of
Russia agreeing to the withdrawal of
her railway guards, or in case other
proper measures are agreed to between
China and Russia, consent to take similar steps accordingly. When tranquillity
shall have been re-established in Manchuria and China shall have become
herself capable of affording full protection to the lives and property of
foreigners, Japan will withdraw her
railway guards simultaneously with
Russia."
Tranquillity Denied
It is this article upon which Japan
based her treaty rights. Russia, however, long since withdrew her guards
and she relinquished her rights to keep
them by the Sino-Soviet Agreements
of 1924. But Japan contended that
tranquillity had not been established
in Manchuria, and that China was not
herself capable of affording full protection to foreigners; therefore, she claimed that she still retained a valid treaty
right to maintain railway guards.
Japan has appeared increasingly inclined to defend her use of these guards
less upon treaty right than upon the
ground of "absolute necessity under
the existing state of affairs in Manchuria."
The Chinese Government consistently
controverted .the contention of Japan.
It insisted that the stationing of Japanese railway guards in Manchuria was
not justified either in law or in fact,
and that it impaired the territorial and
administrative integrity of China. As
to the stipulation in the Sino-Japanese
Treaty of Peking, already quoted, the
Chinese Government contended that
this was merely declaratory of a de
facto situation of a provisional character, and that it could not be said to
confer a right, especially of a permanent character. Moreover, it claimed
that Japan was legally obliged to withdraw her guards, since Russia had
withdrawn hers, tranquillity had been
re-established in Manchuria, and the
Chinese authorities were able to give
adequate protection to the South Manchuria Railway, as they were doing
for other railway lines in Manchuria,
provided the Japanese guards would
permit them to do so.

The controversies which arose regarding the Japanese railway guards were ·
not limited to their presence and activities within the railway area. These
guards were regular Japanese soldiers,
and they frequently carried their police
function into adjoining districts or conducted maneuvers outside the railway
areas, with or without the permission
of, and with or without notification to,
the Chinese authorities. · These acts
were particularly obnoxious to the Chinese, officials and public alike, and were
regarded as unjustifiable in law and
provocative of unfortunate incidents.
Frequent misunderstandings and considerable damage to Chinese farm crops
resulted from the maneuvers, and
material remuneration failed to alleviate the hostile feelings thus aroused.
Closely associated with the question
of the Japanese railway guards was
that of the Japanese Consular Police.
Such police were attached to the
Japanese Consulates and branch Consuiates in all the Japanese consular
districts in Manchuria, not only along
the South Manchµria Railway, but .in
such cities as Harbin, Tsitsihar an<l
Manchuli, as well as in the so-called
"Chientao District,'' the area in which
liv~d a large number of the Koreans
resident in Manchuria.
The Japanese claimed that the right
to maintain consular police was a
corollary to the right of extraterritoriality; that it was merely an extension of the judicial functions of the
consui.ar courts, these police being
necessary to protect and discipline
Japanese sub2ects. In fact, Japanese
consular police, in smaller numbers,
have also be-en attached to Japanese
consulates iu other parts of China, contrary to the general practice of countries having extraterritorial treaties.
Japan Considers Necessity
As a practical matter, the Japanese

Government apparently believed that
the stationing of consular police in
Manchuria was a ne·c essity under the
conditions which prevailed there, especially in view of the importance of the
Japanese interests involved, and the
large number of resident Japanese subjects, including Koreans.
· The Chinese Government, however,
always contested this position advanced
by Japan as justification for stationing
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Japanese c~nsular police in Manchuria,
and· sent frequent protests to Japan oo
the subject. She claimed that there
was no necessity to station Japanese
police officers anywhere in Manchuria,
that the- question of police could not be
associated- with extraterritoriality, and
that their presence was without treaty
basis and a vioiation of China's sovereignty.
Whether justified or not, the presence of consular police led in a number
of cases to serious conflicts between
members of their force and those of
the local Chinese authorities.
The Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915,
provided that "Japanese subjects shall
be free to. reside and travel in South
Manchuria and to engage in business
and manufacture of any kind whatsoever." This was an important right,
but one which was objectionable to the
Chinese since in no other part of China
were foreigners as a class permitted to
reside and to engage in business outside the treaty ports. It was the policy
Qf the Chinese Government to withhold this privilege until extra-territoriality should be abolished and foreigners should be subject to Chinese
laws and jurisdiction.
In South Manchuria, however, this
right had certain limitations: the Japanese were required to carry passports
and· observe Chinese laws and· regulations while in the interior of South
Manchuria; but the Chinese regulations
applicable to Japanese were not to be
enforced until the Chinese authorities
had first "come to an understanding
with, the Japanese Consul."
On many occasions the action of the
Chinese authorities was inconsistent
with the terms of this agreement, the
validity of which they always contested. The fact that restrictions were
placed upon the residence, travel and
businei:;s activities of Japanese subjects
in the interior of South Manchuria,
nnd that .>rdtrs and regulations were
issued by various Chinese officials
prohibiting J;ipanese or other foreigners
from residing outside the treaty porti:;
from renewing leases of buildings
is• ~ot: cqntested in the documents
officiaily pre~ented to the commissio!l
by the- Chinf:?Se assessor. Official pressure,. sometimes supported bY, severe
police mea5ures, was exert~• upon
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the Japanese to force them to with·
draw. from many cities and towns in
South Manchuria and eastern JnnerM()ngolia, :lnd upon Chinese property
owners to pre-vent them from renting
Houses to Japanese. It was stated by
the Japanese that the Chinese authorities also refused to issue passports to
:c>panese-, harassed them by illegal
taxes, and for some years before
September, rn31, failed to carry out
the stipulation in the agreement by
which they had undertaken to submit
to the Japanese Consul the regulations
which were to be binding upon the
Japanese.
Chinese Intended Restriction
That object of the Chine.se was the
execution of their national policy of
restricting the exceptional privileges of
Japanese in Manchuria and thus
strengthening the control of China over
these Three Eastern Provinces. They
justified their actions on the ground
that they regarded the Treaty of 1915
as without "fundamental validity
They pointed out, moreover, that the
Japanese attempted to reside and conduct business in all parts of Manchuria,
although the treaty provision was limited to South Manchuria.
In view of the conflicting national
policies and aims of China and Japan it
was almost inevitable that continuous
and bitter controversies should arise
over this treaty provision. Both countries admit that the situation was a
growing irritant in their mutual rela-tions up to the events of September,
1931.
Closely associated with the right to
reside and to do business in the interior of South Manchuria was the
right to lease land, which was granted
to Japanese by the Treaty of 1915 in
the following terms: "Japanese subjects in South Manchuria may, bi
negotiation. lease land necessary for
erecting suitable buildings for trade
and manufacture Or for prosecuting
agricultural enterprises." An exchange
of notes betw.een the two Governments
at the time of t:p.e treaty defined the
expression "lease by negotiation" tQ
imply, according to the Chinese version, "a long-term lease of. not more
than, thirty y;ears and also the possi..
bili.ty, of. its; unconditional renewal";
the Japanese version simply provided

for "leases for a long term up to
thirty years and unconditionally renewable."
Disputes naturally arose
over the question whether the Japanese land leases were, at the sole option of the Japanese, "unconditionally
r enewable."
The Chinese interpreted the desire
of the Japanese to obtain lands in
Manchuria, whether by lease, purchase
or mortgage as evidence of a Japanese national policy to " buy Manchuria." Their authorities therefore
very generai.ly attempted to obstruct
efforts of the Japanese to this end, and
became increasingly active in the three
or four years preceding September,
1931, a period during which the Chinese "Rights Recovery Movement" was
at its height.
In making strict regulations against
the purchase of land by the Japanese,
their ownership of it in freehold, or
their acquisition of a lien through
mortgage, the Chinese authorities appeared to be within their legal rights
since the treaty granted only the privilege of leasing land. The Japanese,
however, complained that it was not
in conformity with the spirit of the
treaty to forbid mortgages upon land .

Every Obstacle Offered
Chinese officials, however, did not
accept the validity of the treaty and
consequently put every obstacle in the
way of Japanese leasing land, by orders,
provincial and local, calculated to make
the leasing of lands to Japanese punishable under the criminal laws; by
imposition of special fees and taxes
payable in advance on such leases;
and by instructions to local officials
prohibiting them under threat of punishment, from approving such transfers
to Japanese.
In spite of these obstacles, great tracts
of land have, as a matter of fact, not
only been leased by the Japanese, but
actually obtained in freehold-although
the titles might not be recognized in a
Chinese court-through outright purchase, or by the more usual means of
foreclosing a mortgage. These mortgages on land have been obtained by
Japanese loan operators, especially
la~ge loan associations, certain of which
have been o.rganized especially for the
purpose of acquiring land tracts. The

total area of lands leased to Japanese
in the whole of Manchuria, and in
Jehol, according to Japanese official
sources, increased from about 80,000
acres in 1922-1923 to over 500,000 acres
in 1931. A small proportion of this
total was in North Manchuria where
the Japanese had no legal right under
Chinese law and international treaty
to acquire land leases.
Due to the importance of this land
lease issue there were at least three
attempts during the decade preceding
1931, to reach some agreement by direct
Sino-Japanese negotiation. A possible
solution which there is reason to believe was under consideration would
have treated together the two subjects
of land leasing and the abolition of extraterritoriality: in Manchuria the Japanese were to surrender extraterritoriality and the Chinese were to permit the
Japanese to lease land freely. But the
negotiations were unsuccessful.
This long-standing Sino-Japanese controversy over the right of Japanese to
lease land arose like the other issues
already mentioned out of the fundamental conflict between rival state
policies, the allegations and counter
statements concerning violation of international agreements being less consequential in themselves than the underlying objectives of each policy.
V. The Korean Problem in Manchuria
The presence of about 800,000 Koreans
in Manchuria, who possess Japanese
nationaltiy under Japanese law, served
to accentuate the conflict of policies
of China and of Japan. Out of this
situation theTe arose various controversies, in consequence of which the
Korean themselves were victimized,
being subjected to suffering and brutalities.
Chinese opposition to Korean acquisition, by purchase or lease, of land in
Mc!nchuria, was resented by the Japanese, who claimed that the Koreans
werie entitled, as Japanese subjec;.s,
to the privii.eges of land leasing acquired by Japan in the Treaty and
Notes of 1915. The problem of dual
nationality also arose, as the Japar.ese refused to recognize the naturalization of Koreans as Chinese subjects.
The use of Japanese consular police to
invigilate and protect the Koreans was
resented by the Chinese and resui.ted
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in innumerable clashes . between 1Chinese and Japanese police.
~pecfal
problems arose in . the Chientao District. just north of the Korean border,
where the 400,000 Korean residents
outnumber the Chinese by three to
one. By 1927 these questions led the
Chinese to J1ursue a policy of restricting the free residence of Koreans in
Manchuria, n policy which the Japanese characterized as one of unjustifiable oppression.
The status and rights of Koreans in
Manchuria are determined largely, i.r:
three Sino-Japanese agreements, viz.,
the Agreem~r.t relating to the Chientao
Region, September 4, 1909, the Treaty
and Notes of May 25, 1915, concerning
South Manchuria and Eastern lnn~r
Mongolia, and the so-called "Mitsuya
Agreement" of July 8, 1925. The delicate question of dual nationality in
the case of the Koreans has never
been regularized by Sino-Japanese
agreement.
By 1927 the Chinese authorities in
Manchuria generally came to believe
that the Koreans had become, in fact,
"a vanguard of Japanese penetration
and absorption" of Manchuria. In
this view, so long as the Japanese refused to recognize the naturalization of
Koreans as Chinese subjects, and
especially since the Japanese consular
police constantly exercised surveillance.
over Koreans, whether by purchase or
lease, was an economic and political
danger "which threatened the very
existence of Chinese people in Manchuria."
•
The view was prevalent among the
Chinese that the Koreans were being
compelled to migrate from their
homeland in consequence of the studi~
ed policy of the Japanese Government
to displace Koreans with Japanese immigrants from Japan, or to make life
so miserable for them, politically and
.economically, especially by forcing
them to dispose of their land holdings,
that emigration to Manchuria wou.}d
naturally follow. According to the
Chinese view, the Koreans, being an
"oppressed race" ruled by an alien
Government in their own land, where
the Japanese monopolized all the important official posts, were forced 1:o
migrate to Manchuria to ·seek political
freedom , ~n~ ilI1 · economic liy_e lihood,.

·4-8

The.,. Korean immigrants, ninety ~
cent ,of whom are farmers, and aJ,mpst
all of whom cultivators of rice-fields,
were thus at first welcomed by t}.it1
Chinese as an economic asset and
favored out of a natural sympathy for
their supposed oppression. They con-.
tended that, but for the Japanese refusal to permit Koreans to becom~
naturalized Chinese subjects and .the
Japanese policy of pursuing them into
Manchuria on the pretext of offering
them necessary police protection, this
Korean colonization in Manchuria
would have created no major political and economic problems. The
Chinese deny that the efforts admittedly made by their officials in Manchuria, especially after 1927, to restrict the free settlement of Koreans
on the land in Manchuria except ".iS
mere tenants or la borers, can be regarded as instances of "oppression."
Japan Denies Accusations
The Japanese admit that the Chinese
suspicion was the principal cause of
Chinese "oppression" of the Koreans.
but vigorously deny the allegation ~ t
they pursued any definite policy of
encouraging Korean migration to Manchuria, stating that "Japan having
neither encouraged nor restricted it,
the Korean emigration to Manchuria
must be regarded as the outcome of ,a
natural tendency," a phenomenon uninfluenced by any poiitical or diplomatic motives. They therefore declare
that "the fear on the par,t of China
that Japan is plotting the absorption of
the two regions by making · use of
Korean immigrants is entirely groundless."
These irreconcilable views intensified,
such problems a's those related to the
leasing of land, questions. of jurisdiction and the Japanese consular police,
these having created, a ·mo~t unfortunate
situ~tion for the Koreans and embittered Sino-Japanese relations. ·
There exist no Sino-Japanese agreements which specifically grant or deuy
the right of Koreans to settle, reside and
conduct occupations outside the Treaty
Ports, or to lease ·o r otherwise acquire
land in Manchuria, exc~t in the
.called Chientao District. Probably, however, over 400,000 Koreans do : live :in
·Manchuria outside Chieyi.taoi · They·,~,e

so-

wi'dely distributed. especiaHy in the
eastern half of Manchuria, and are
numerrous in the regions lying 'north
of Korea, in Kirin Province, and have
penetrated in large numbers into the
region of the eastern section of the
Chinese Eastern Railway the lower
Sungari valley and along the SinoRussian border from northeastern
Korea to the Ussuri and the Amur
river valleys, their migration and
settlement having overflown into the
adjoining territories of the U.S.S.R.
Moreover, partly because a very considerable group -0f the Koreans are natives of Manchuria, their ancestors having immigrated· generations ago, and
partly because others have renounced
their allegiance to Japan and have become naturalized Chinese subjects a
great many Koreans today actually
possess agricultural lands in Manchuria,
outside of Chientao, both by virtue of
freehold title and leasehold. The vast
majority, however, cultivate paddy
fields simply as tenant farmers under
rental contracts, on a crop division
basis, with the Chinese landlords, these
contracts usually being limited to
periods fr-om one to three years, renewable at the discretion of the landlord.
·
The Chinese deny that the Koreans
have the right to purchase or lease
agricultural lands in Manchuria outside the Chientao District, since the
only Sino-Japanese agreement . ·on the
point is the Chientao Agreement of
1909, which is restricted in its application to that area. Oniy Koreans who
· are Chinese subjects, therefore, are
. entitled to purchase land, or, for th::it
matter, to reside and lease land in the
interior of Manchuria. In denying the
claim of right of the Koreans to
lease land freely in Manchuria, the
Chines
Government has contended
that the Chientao Agreement of 1909,
which granted Koreans the right of
residence with special landholding
privileges in the ·Chientao District
alone, and specified that the Koreans
were to be subject to Chinese jurisdiction is, in itself, a self-contained instrument "purporting to settle, by
mutual concessions, local issues then
pending between China "and· Japan -i n
that area." The · Chienta6 -Agreement
contained a quid · quo, Japan waiving
the · olaim of jurisdiction• over: •. the

Koreans, China -granting them ', the
special ·privilege· of · possessing' agri1
cultural lands; ·:

China Denie Alteration
Both countries continued to observe
the agreement after the annexation of
Korea by Japan in 1910, China contending that the Treaty and Notes of
1915 could not alter the stipulations of
the Chientao Agreement, especially as
the new treaty contained a clause
specifying that "all existing treaties be-tween China and Japan, relating to
Manchuria, shall, except as otherwise
provided for, by this treaty1 remain in
force." No exception was made for
the Chientao Agreement. The Chinese
Government further cohtends that the
Treaty and Notes of 1915 do not apply
to the Chientao District, since the latter
is not geographically a part of· "South
Manchuria," a term which is ill-defined
both geographically and politically.
This Chinese contentibn has ' been
contested by the Japanese since 1915,
their position being that, inasmuch as
the Koreans became Japanese subjects
by virtue of the annexation of Korea
in 1910, the provisions of the Sino-Japanese Treaty and Notes of 1915 concerning South Manchuria and Eastern Inne,r
Mongolia, which grant Japanese · subjects the right to reside' and lease lands
in South Manchuria and to participate
in joint agricultural enterprises in Eastern Inner Mongolia, apply equally to
the Koreans. The Japanese Government has contended that the Chientao
Agreement was superseded by these
provisions of the 1915 agreements in
conflict therewith, that the Chinese contention that the Chientao Agreement
is a self-contained instrument is untenable, since the right secured by the
Koreans in Chientao was actually in
consequence of Japan's agreement to
recognize that region as a part of Chinese territory. They assert that it
would be discriminatory on their part
to refrain from seeking for the Koieans
in Manchuria rights and privileges
granted to other' Japanese subjects.
The Japanese reason for favoring the
acquisition .o f land by Koreans in Manchuria is partly due to their desire to
obtain rice ~xports for Japan, a deslre
. which, so far: has' . been I but partly
satisfied, since :pro'Mbly htilf of the ri~e

production of over seven million
bushels in 1930 is consumed locally,
and the export of the balance has
been restricted. The Japanese assert
that the Koreans tenants, after having reclaimed waste lands and making them profitable for the Chine,;e
owners, have been unjustly ejected.
The Chinese, on the other hand, while
equally desirous of having the cultivable lowlands producing rice, have
generally employed the Koreans as
tenants or laborers to prevent the land
itself from falling into Japanese hands.
Many Koreans have therefore become
naturalized Chinese subjects in order
to possess land, some of them, however, having acquired such titles,
transferring them to Japanese land
mortgage associations. This suggests
one reason why there has been a difference of opinion among the Japanese themselves as to whether naturalization of Koreans as Chinese subjects should be recognized by the
Japanese Government.
Under a Chinese Nationality Law of
1914 only aiiens who, under the law of
their own country, were permitted to
become naturalized in another were
capable of being naturalized Chinese
subjects. The Chinese revised Nationality Law of February 5, 1929, however, contained no provision by which
an alien was required to lose his
original nationai.ity in order to acquire
Chinese nationality.
Koreans were,
therefore, naturalized as Chinese regardless of the Japanese insistence
that such naturaliz9tion could not be
recognized under Japanese law. The
Japanese nationality laws have never
permitted Koreans to lose their Japanese · nationality, and although a revised Nationality Law of 1924 con•·
tained an article to the effect that ''a
person who Hcquires foreign nationality voiuntarily loses Japanese
nationality," this general law has never
been made applicable to the Koreans
by special Imperial Ordinance. Nevertheiess, many Koreans in Manchuria,
varying from five to tw~nty per cent
of the total Korean population in certain districts, especially where they
. &re relatively inaccessible by .the Japan~e ~onsufar officiais, have becoll\e
• naturalized as Chinese. Others, incirlen\ally, when migrating beyond the
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Manchur4m borders into Soviet territory, have become citizens of the
U.S.S.R.
Dual Nationality Opposed
This problem of dual nationality of
the Koreans influenced the National
Government of China and the provincial authorities in Manchuria generally
to iook with disfavor upon indiscrimrnate naturalization of Koreans, fearing
that they might, by temporarily acquiring Chinese nationality, become
potential instruments of a Japanese
policy of acquiring agricultural lands.
In regulations issued by the Kirin Provincial Government, September 1930
governing the purchase and sale of
land throughout the province, it was
provided that "when a naturalized
Korean purchasses land, investigation
must be made in order to discover
whether he wants to purchase it. as a
means of residing as a permanently
naturalized citizen, or on behalf of
some Japanese." The local district officials, however, seem to have wavered
in their attitude, at times enforcing
the orders of the higher authorities but
frequently issuing temporary naturalization certificates in lieu of formal
certificates requiring the approval of
the provincial government and the Ministry of Interior at N anking. These
local officials, especially in areas far
removed from Japanese consulates,
often readily consented to th~ issuing
of such certificates to the Koreans who
applied for them, and on occasion, no ·
doubt actually compelled the Koreans
to become naturalized or leave the
country, their actions being influenced
both by the policy of the Japanese and
by the revenue derivable from the
naturalization fees. The Chine~e have
asserted, moreiover, that some Japanese
themselves actually connived at this
business of naturalizing Koreans in
order to use them as dummy landowners or to acquire lands by transfer
from such naturalized Koreans. Generally speaking, however, the Japanese
authoritiPS discountenanced naturali7ation of Koreans and assumed jurh:diction over them wherever poss:ble.
The Japanese claim of right to maintain consular police in Manchuria as
a corollary of extraterritoriality became
a source of constant conflict where the
Koreans were involved. Whether the
Koreans desired such Japanese intel'-

ference, ostensibly in their behalf, c,r
not, the Japanese consular police, especially in the Chientao District, undertook not only protective functions but
freely assumed the right to conduct
searches and seizures of Korean premises, especially where the Koreans
were suspected of being involved in
the Independence Movement, or in communist or anti-Japanese activities. The
Chinese police, for their part, frequently came into collision with the Japanese police in their efforts to enforce
Chinese laws, preserve the peace, or
suppress the activities of "undesirable''
Koreans. Although the Chinese and
Japanese police did co-operate on many
occasions, as provided for in the socalled "Mitsuya Agreement" of 1925,
in which it was agreed that in eastern
Fengtien Province the Chinese would
suppress "the Korean societies" and
tum over "Koreans of bad character"
to the Japanese on the latter's request,
the actual state of affairs was really
one of constant controversy and friction. Such a situation was bound to
cause trouble.
The Korean problems and the resulting Sino-Japanese relations over the
Chientao District had attained a peculiarly complicated and serious character. Chientao (called "Kanto" in
Japanese and "Kando" in Korean)
comprises the three districts of Yenchi, Holung and Wangching in Liaoning (Fengtien) Province, and, in practice, as evidenced by the attitude of
the Japanese Government, includes
also the district of Hunchun, which
four districts adjoin the northeast
corner of Korea just across the Tumen River.
Regarded Korean Sphere
The Japanese, describing the traditional attitude of the Koreans toward
the Chientao area, have been disinclined to admit that the Chientao Agreel')'lent of 1909 closed once and for all
the issue whether this territory should
oelong to China or to Korea, the idea
being that, since the district is predominantly Korean, over half of the
arable land being cultivated by them,
"they have so firmly established
themselves in the focality that it may
practically be regarded as a Korean
sphere." In Chientao, more than else-

where in Manchuria, the Japanese
Government has been insistent on exercising jurisdiction and surveillance
over the Koreans, over 400 Japanese
consular police having been maintained there for years. The Japanese consular service, in co-operation with
Japanese functionaries assigned by
the Government-General of Chosen.
exercise broad powers of an administrative character in the region, their
functions including maintenance of
Japanese schools, hospitals and government-subsidized financing media
for the Koreans. The area is regard ed as a natural outlet for Korean
emigrants who cultivate rice fields,
while politically it has special importance since Chientao has long been
a refuge of Korean independence advocates, communist groups and other
disaffected anti-Japanese partisans, :,
region where, as evidenced by the
H unchun Rising of Koreans against
the Japanese in 1920, after the Independence Outbreak in Korea, the Japanese have had serious political problems intimately associated with the
general problem of governance of Korea. The military importance of this
region is obvious from the fact that
the lower reaches of the Tumen River form the boundary between Japanese, Chinese and Soviet territory.
The Chientao Agreement provided
that "the residence of Korean subjects,
as heretofore, agricultural lands ly'i ng
north of the River Tumen," should be
permitted by China; that Korean -subjects residing on such lands should
henceforth "be amenable to the jurisdiction of the Chinese local officials";
that they should be given equal treatment with the Chinese; and that, although all civil and criminal cases involving such Koreans should be "heard
and decided by the Chinese authorities," a Japanese consular official
should be permitted to attend the court,
especially in capital cases, with the
right to "apply to the Chinese authorities for a new trial" under special Chinese judicial procedure.
The Japanese, however, have taken
the position that the Sino-Japanese
Treaty and Notes of 1915 override the
Chientao Agreement in so far as jurisdictional questions are concerned, and
that, since 1915, Koreans, as Japanese51

subjects, are entitled to all the rights
and privileges of •extraterritorial status
under the Japanese treaties with China.
This contention has never been admitted by the Chinese Government, the
Chjn'ese insisting that the Chientao
Agreement, if applicable in so far as
the right granted to Koreans to reside
on agricultural lands is concerned, is
also applicable in those articles where
it is provided that the Koreans should
submit to Chinese jurisdiction. The
Japanese have interpreted the article
permitting Korean residence on agricultural lands to mean the right to
purchase and lease such lands in Chientao; the Chinese, contesting this interpretation, take the position that the
article must be interpreted literally
and that only Koreans who have become ' naturalized Chinese subjects are
t;ntitled to purchase land there.
Actual Situation Anomalous
The actu:il situation is, therefore,
anomalous, since, as a matter of fact,
there are non-naturalized Koreans in
Chientao who have acquired lands in
freehold title, with the' connivance of
the' local Chinese officials, aithough as
a general rule the Koreans themselves
recognize ·.he acquisition of Chinese
nationality as a necessary condition· o.f
obtaining -the right to purchase land in
Qhientao. Japan.ese official figures repnsent over half the arable land of
Chientao (including Munchun)
as
''.owned' by Koreans, their figures admitting that over 15 per cent of the
Koreans there have become naturalized as Chinese subjects. Whethe!'
it is these naturalized Koreans who
"own" these lands is impossible to say.
Such a situation naturally gave rise
to numerous irregularities and cons.tant differences, often manifested by
open clashes betweeii the Chinese and
Japanese police.
·
· The Japanese assert that about the
~nd of 19?7 a move'Illent for persecuting
Korean 'immigrants in Manchuria broke
out, under Chinese official instigation,
as an aftermath of a general anti-Japanese ,agitation, and state that this oppression was intensififd after the Mani!htµ-ian provinces declated their allegiance to the' National Government at
~anking.
Numerous · translations of
order~ issued by the· 'central and local
Chinese authorities in Manchuria liave
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been submitted as evidence to the corn~
mission of a definite Chinese policy of
oppressing the Koreans by forcing them
to become naturalized as Chinese, driving them from their rice fields, compelling them to re-migrate, subjecting
them to arbitrary levies and exorbitant
taxation, preventing them from entering into contracts of lease or rental for
houses and lands, and inflicting upon
them many brutalities. It is stated
that this campaign of cruelty was particularly directed against the "pro-Japanese" Koreans, that Korean Residents'
Associations, which are subsidized by
the Japanese Government, were the objects of persecution, that non-Chinese
schools maintained by or for the Koreans were closed, that "undesirable
Koreans" were permitted to levy blackmail and perpetrate atrocities upon
Korean farmers, and that Koreans were
compelled to wear Chinese clothing and
renounce any claim of reliance upon
Japanese protection or assistance in
their miserable plight.
The fact that the Manchurian authorities did issue orders discrirninatori
against non-naturalized Koreans is not
denied by the Chinese, the number and
character of these orders and instructions, especialJy since 1927, establishi.ng beyond a goubt that the Chinese
authorities in Manchuria generally regarded the Korean infiltration, in so
far as it was accompanied by Japanese
jurisdiction, as a menace which deserved to be opposed.
Because of the seriousness of the
Japanese allegations, and the pitiable
plight of the Korean population . of
Manchuria, the commission gave special
attention to this subject, and, without
accepting all these accusations as adequately . descriptive of the facts, or
concluding, that certain of these restrictive measures applied to the
Koreans were entirely unjustified, w~
are in a po~ition to confirm this gen-·
eral descriotion of the Chinese actions
toward the Koreans in certain parts
of Manchuria. While in Manchuria,
the comrn1ss1on received numerous
delegations, who represented themselves as spokesmen of Korean comniunities.
Cop~versies Complicated
, It is '. obvious that the presence of
this. large· minority of- Koreans in Man:.·

churia served · to complicate the Sino.:
Japanese· controversies over land leas-·
ihg;, jurisdiction and police, and the
economic rivalries which formed a prelude to the events of September, 1931.
While the great majority of the Koreans
only , wanted to be left alone to earn
their livelihood, there were among
them groups which were branded by
the Chinese or Japanese, or both, as
''.undesirable Koreans," including the
advocates and partisans of the inde,
pendence of Korea from Japanese rule,
Communists, professional law breakers, including smugglers and drug traders, and those who, in league with Chinese bandits, levied black mail or extorted money from those of their own
blood. Even the Korean farmer himself . frequently invited oppression by
lµs ignorance, .improvidence and williqgness to incur indebtedness to his
more agile-minded landlord.
. Aside from the involvement of the
Koreans, however unwittingly, in the
controversies which, in the Chinese
v,i ew, were the inevitable results of the
general Japanese policies with respect
to Manchuria, the Chinese submit that
Ip.uch of what has been termed "oppression" of the Koreans should not
properly be so called, and that certain
of the measures taken against the
~-0reans by the Chinese were actually
either approved or connived at by the
japanese .authorities themselves. They
assert that it should not be forgotten
that the great majority of the Koreans
ltre · bitterly anti-Japanese, and unre~bnciled to the Japanese annexation oi'
their native land, and that the Korean
emigrants, who would never have left
their homeland but for the political
and economic difficulties under which
they have suffered, generally desire to
be free from Japanese surveillance in
Manchuria.
The Chinese, while admitting a certain sympathy with the Koreans, draw
~ttention to the existence of the "Mitsuya Agreement" of June-July, 1925,
.is evidence both of a willingness on
t,lie part of the Chinese authorities to
curb the activities of Koreans whom
the Japanese consider "bad characters"
and a menace to their position in Korea, and ' of · official sanction on the
part of the J~panese themselves for
certain of those ·very acts which the
Jtipanese would·liave -others believe are

instances of Chinese "oppression" of
the Koreans. This agreement, which
has never been widely known abroad,
was negotiated by the Japanese Police
Commissioner of the Government-General of Chosen and the Chinese Police
Commissioner of Fengtien Province.
It provided for co-operation betweer.
the Chinese and Japanese police in
suppressing "Korean Societies" (presumably of an anti-Japanese character)
in eastern Fengtien Province, stipulating that "the Chinese authorities shall
immediately arrest and extradite those
leaders of the Korean societies whose
names had been designated by the authorities of Korea," and that Koreans
of "bad character" should be arrested
by the Chinese police and turned over
to the Japanese for trial and punishment. The Chinese assert, therefore.
that "it is largely for the purpose of
giving practical effect to this agreement that cert.ain restrictive measures
have been put into force governing the
treatment of Koreans. If they are
faken as evidence .proving the oppression of Koreans by Chinese authorities, then such measures of oppression, if indeed they are, have been
resorted to principally in the interest of Japan." Furthermore, the Chinese ·submit that "in view of the keen
eco:domic competition with native farmers, it is but natural that the .Chinese authorities should exercise their
inherent right to take measures to
protect the inter<:!sts of their ovn1
countrymen."

VI. The Wanpaoshan ~ and the
anti-Chinese riots in Korea
·The Wanpaoshan affair, together with
the case of Captain Nakamura, have·
been widely regarded as the causes immediately contributing to the SinoJ"apanese crisis in Manchuria. The intrinsic importance of the former, how- .
ever, was greatly exaggerated. The
sensational accounts of what occurred
at Wanpaoshan, where there were no
casualties, led to a feeling of bitter.:.
ness between Chinese · and Japanese,
and, in Korea, to the serious attacks
by Ko~eans upon Chinese residents. ·
These anti-Chinese tiots, in turn, revivea the anti-Japan°ese 'boycott in·
China. Judged by itself,• ~e Wanpao- ·
sl1aii 'affair was no more serious than· ·
0
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~veral other incidents involving clashes
between Chinese and Japanese troops
·or police which had occurred during
the past few years in Manchuria.
. Wanpaoshan is a small village located some 18 miles (30 kilometers) north
of Changchun, adjoining a low marshy
area alongside the !tung River. It was
here that one Hao Yung-teh, a Chinese
broker, leased on behalf of the Chang
Nung Agricultural Company, from the
Chinese owners, a large tract of land
by a contract dated April 16th, 1931.
It was stipulated in the contract. that
it should be null and void in case the
District Magistrate refused to approve
its terms.
Shortly after this, the lessee subleased . this entire plot of land to a group
of Koreans. This second contract contained no provision requiring official
approval for enforcement and took for
granted that the Koreans would construct an irrigation canal with tributary
ditches. Hao Yung-teh had subleased
this land to the Korean farmers without
first having obtained Chinese formal
approval of the original lease contract
with the Chinese owners.
Immediately after the conclusion of
the second lease the Koreans began
digging an irrigation ditch or canal,
several miles long, in order to divert
the water of the Itung River and distribute it over this low marshy area
for the purpose of making it suitable
for paddy cultivation.
This ditch
traversed large areas of land cultivated
by· Chinese who were not parties to
either lease transaction since their
lands lay between the river and that
leased by the Koreans. In order to
provide ample water supply to be deflected through this ditch to their holdings, the Koreans undertook to construct a dam across the ltung River.
After a considerable length of the
irrigation ditch had been completed,
the Chinese farmers whose lands were
cut by the canal rose up en masse
~nd protested to the Wanpaoshan authorities, begging them to intervene in
their behalf. As a result the Chinese
local authorities, dispatched police to
the spot and ordered the Koreans to
stop excavation work at once and to
vacate the area. At the same time the
Japanese Consul at Changchun sent
consular police to protect the Koreans.
Local negotiations . between the JapaM

nese and Chinese representatives failed
to solve the problem. Somewhat later
hoth sides sent additional police, with
resulting pratesc:;, counter-statements
and attempted negotiations.
Investigation Arranged
On June 8, both sides agreed to
withdraw their police forces and to
conduct a joint investigation of the
situation at Wanpaoshan. This investigation revealed the fact that the
original lease contained a clause providing that the entire contract would
be "null and void" if it should not
be approved by the Chinese District
Magistrate, and that this approval was-never given.
The joint investigators, however, apparently failed to agree upon their
findings, the Chinese maintaining that
the digging of the irrigation ditch
could not fail to violate the rights of
the Chinese farmus whose lands were
cut by it; 1nd the Japanese insisting
that the Koreans should be permitted
to continue their work since it would
be unfair to eject them on account of
the error in the lease procedure for
which they were in no way at fault.
Shortly thereafter, the Koreans, assisted
by Japanese consular police, continued
to dig the ditch.
Out of this train of circumstances
came the incident of July 1st, when a
party of 400 Chinese farmers whose
lands were cut by the ·i rrigation ditch.
armed with agricultural implements
and pikes, drove the Koreans away and
filled in much of the ditch. The Japanese consular police thereupon opened
rifle fire to disperse the mob and to
protect the Koreans, but there were
no casualties. The Chinese farmers
withdrew and the Japanese police remained on the spot until the Koreans
completed the ditch and the dam across
the ltung River.
After the incident of July 1st, the
Chinese municipal authorities continued
to protest to the Japanese Consul at
Changchun against the action of the
Japanese consular police and of tfie
Koreans.
Far more serious than the Wanpaoshan affair was the reaction to this dispute in Chosen (Korea). In consequence of sensational accounts of the
situation at Wanpaoshan, especially of

the events of July 1st, which were
printed in the Japanese and Korean
press, a series of anti-Chinese riots
occurred throughout Korea. These riots
began at Jinsen on July 3, and spread
· rapidly to other cities.
The Chinese state, on the basis of
their official reports, that 127 Chinese
were massacred and 393 wounded, and
that Chinese property to the value of
¥2,500,000 was destroyed. They claim,
moreover, that the Japanese authorities
in Korea were in large measure responsible for the results of these riots, since
it was alleged, they took no adequate
steps to prevent them and did not suppr&s them until great loss of Chinese
life and property had resulted. The
JapaneSe and Korean newspapers were
not prevented from publishing sensational and incorrect accounts of the
Wanpaoshan incident of July 1, which
we.re of a character to arouse the
hatred of the Korean populace against
the Chinese residents.
Spontaneity Claimed
The Japanese claim, however, that
these riots were due to the spontaneous outburst of racial feelings, and
that the Japanese authorities suppressed them as soon as possible.
A result of importance was the fact
that these outbreaks in Korea served
directly to revive the anti-Japanese
boycott throughout China.
Shortly after the anti-Chinese riots
in Korea, and while the Wanpaoshar:
affair was still unsettled, the Chinese
Government made a protest to Japan,
on account of the riots. charginJit Japan
with full responsibility for failure to
suppress them. The Japanese Government, in reply, on July 15, expressed
regret at the occurrence of these riots
and offered compensation for the' families of the dead.
From July 22 until September la,
there were negotiations and exchanges
of notes bet ween the Chinese and
Japanese local and central authorities
over the Wanpaofhan affair. The Chinese maintained that the difficulties
llt Wanpaoshan were due to the fact
that the Koreans were living where
they had no right to be, since their
privileges of residing and leasing of
land did not extend outside the Chientao District, in accordance with the
Chientao Ag!"eem nt of September 4,

l!JO?.

·The Chinese Government protes'-te<l
agains the stationing of Japanese consular polfce in China and asserted that
the dispatch of a large force of these
police to Wanpaoshan was responsible
for the incident of July 1.
·
The Japanese, on the other hand, iu-·
sisted that ~he Koreans had a treaty
· right to reside and lease land at Wanpaoshan, since their privileges were not
limited to those specified in the Chientao Agreement. but included the rights
granted to Japanese subjects in geueral, of residing and leasing land
throughout South Manchuria.
The
status of the Koreans, it was claimed,
was identical with that of other Japanese subjects. The Japanese aiso urged
that the Koreans had undertaken their
rice cultivation project in good faith
and that the Japanese authorities
could not assume responsibility for
the irregulal•lties
the Chinese broker
who arranged the lease. The Japanese Government consented to the
withdrawal of the consular police from
Wanpaoshan, but the Korean tenants
remained and continued to cuitivate
their rice lands.
A complete solution of the Wanpaushan affair had not been reached by
September 1931.
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The Case of Captain Nakamura
The case of Captain Nakamura was
viewed by the Japanese as the culminating incident of a long series of
events which showed the utter disregard of the Chinese for Japanese
rights and interests in Manchuria. Captain Nakamura was killed by Chines~
soldiers in an out-of-the-way regic111
in Manchuria during the mid-summer
of 1931.
Captain Shintaro Nakamura wa., a
Japanese military officer on active duty,
and, as was admitted by the Japanese
Government, was on a mission un4er
the orders of the Japanese Army.
While passing through Harbin, where
his passport was examined by the Chinese authorities, he repr~ented himself
as an agricultural expert. He was at
that time warned that the region in
which he intended to travel was a
bandit-ridden area, and this fact was
noted on his passport. He was armed.
and carried patent medicine whkh, according to the Chinese, included narcotic drugs fot non-mediCAl purposes.

: On June .9, . accompanied by three
u1~rpi;-eters · and assistants, Captain
N~~mura left Ilikotu Station on the
western. section of the Chinese Eastern
Ra,iJ:~a.y. W~n he ~ad reached a
point some distance in the interior, in
the direction of Taonan, he and the
other µiembers ,of his party were placed
under detention by Chinese soldiers
under Kuan Yu-heng, the Commander
of the Third Regiment of the Reclamation Army. Several days later, about
Juhe 27, he and his companions were
shot by Chinese soldiers, and their
1:bdies were cremated to conceal the
evidence of the deed.
The Japanese insisted that the killing
of Captain Nakamura and his com-panions was unjustified and showed arro~t disrespect for the Japanese army
a'.nd nation; they asserted that the Chiauthorities in Manchuria delayed
t.o institute official inquiries into the
circumstances, were reluctant to asresponsibility for the occurrence,
and were insincere in their claim that
they · were making every effort to as<:,ei:tain the facts in the case.
The Chinese declared, at first, that
Captain Nakamura and his party were
detained pending an examination of
their permits, which, according to custom, were required of foreigners travelufg in the interior; that they had been
treated well; and that Captain Nakamura was shot by a sentry while endeavoring to make his escape. Docu-merits, including a Japanese military
JllaP, ,and two diaries, they stated, were
fdund on his person, which proved
that he was either a military spy or
.th officer on special military mission.
On July 17 a report of the death of
Captain Nakamura reached the Japanese Consul-General at Tsitsihar. and
at the end of the , month Japanese officials in Mukden informed the 'local
Chinese authorities that they had defi~ite evidence that Captain • Nakamurr,.
had been killed by Chinese soldiers.
On August 17 the Japanese military authorit!es in Mukden released for publication the first account of his death
(See Manchuria Daily News, August 17,
1931). On the same day," Consul-General Hayashi, ·and also Major Mori,
who had been sent by the Japanese
General Staff from Tokyo to Manchuria
to imrest~gat~ . the • circumstances, ~had ·
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interviews with Governor Tsang Shihyi of Liaoning Province. Governor
Tsang promised to investigate it at
once.

Investigators Appointed
Immediately
thereafter
Governor
Tsang Shih-yi communicated with
Marshal Clwng Hsueh-Hang, who was
then ill in a hospital in Peiping, and
·with the Minister for Foreign affairs
in Nanking, and, also, appointed two
Chinese investigators who proceeded
at once to the scene of the alleged
murder. These two men returned to
Mukden on September 3, Major Mori,
who had been conducting an independent investigation on behalf of the
Japanese General Staff, returned to
Mukden on September 4. On that d;iy
Consul-General Hayashi called on General Yung Chen, the Chinese Chief-ofStaff, and was informed that the findings of the Chinese investigators were
indecisive and unsatisfactory, and that
it would therefore be necessary to
conduct a second inquiry. General
Yµng Chen left for Peiping on September 4 ·' to consult with Marshal Chang'
Hsu~h-liang on the new developments
in · the · Manchurian situation, r eturning .to., Mukden on September 7.
Having been informed of the seriousness of the situation in Manchuria.
l\,farshal Chang Hsueh-Hang instructed
Governor Tsang Shih-yi and General
Yung Chen to conduct, without delay
~nd on the spot, a second inquiry into
the Nakamura case. Learning from his
Japanese military advisers of the dee~
concern of !he Japanese military over
this affa,ir, · he sent Major Shibayama
to Tokyo to make it clear that he
,·d shed to, settle the case amicably.
Major Shiba :raina arrived in Tokyo on
September 12, r,nd stated, according to
subsequent press reports, that Marshal
Chang Hsueh -liang was sincerely des- ·
irous of securing an early and equita ble terminatfon of the Nakamura issue.
In the m eant ime Marshal Chang had
sent Mr. Tang Er-ho, a high official,
on a special mission to Tokyo to consult with the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Baron Shidehara, in order to
ascertain .vhat common gr·o und might
be 'found for a solution of various pend-ing !Sino-Japanese questions concerning
Manchuria:, · ' Mr. Tang Er-ho : had
conversations with Baron Shidehar-i,:

General Minami and other high , military officials. On· September 16 Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang gave put an
interview to the press which reported
him as saying that the Nakamura case,
in accordance with the wish of the
Japanese, ·would be handled by Governor Tsang Shih-yi and the Manchurian authorities, and not by the
For~i~ Office at Nanking.
The second Chinese commission of investigation, after visiting the scene of
the killing of Captain Nakamura, returned to Mukden on the morning of
September 16. On the afternoon of the
18th the: Japanese Consul called upon
General Yung Chen, when the latter
sta~d that Commander Kuan Yu-heng
had been brought to Mukden on September 16 charged with responsibility
for the · murder of Captain Nakamura.
and would be immediately tried by a
military court-martial. Later it was
made known by the Japanese, after
their -o ccupation of Mukden, that Commander Kuan had been detained by the
Chinese in a military prison. '
Consul-General Optlmistic
: Consul-General Hayashi, Mukden, was
reported on September 12-13 to have
reported to the Japanese Foreign Office
that "an amicable settlement would
probably be made after the return of
the investigators to Mukden," especially
as General Yung Chen had definitely
admitted that Chinese soldiers had
been responsible for the death of Captain Nakamura. The Mukden correspondent of the Nippon Dempo Service
telegraphed a dispatch on September
12 stating that "an amicable settlement
of the alleged murder case of Captain
Shintaro Nakamura of the Japanese
General Staff Office by soldiers of the
Chinese Reclamation Army Corps is in
sight.'' Numerous statements of Japanese military officers, however, especi.ally those of Colonel K. Doihara,
continued to question the sincerity of
the Chinese· efforts to arrive at a satis. factory solution of the Nakamura case,
in view of the fact that Commander
Kuan, alleged to have been responsible
for the death of Captain Nakamura,
had been taken into custody in Mukden
by the Chinese authorities, the date of
his court-martial having been announced as to occur within a week. Since
the Chinese authorities admitted to
.Japanese consular officials in Mukden,

in a formal conference held on the
afternoon of September 18, that Chinese
soldiers were responsible for the death
of Captain Nakamura, expressing also
a desire to secure a settlement of the
case diplomatically without delay, it
would seem that diplomatic negotiations
for attaining a solution of the Nakamura case were actually progressing
fav-0rably up to the night of September
18.
The Nakamura case, more than any
other single incident, greatly aggravated the resentment of the Japanese and
their agitation in favor of forceful
means to effect a solution of outstanding Sino-Japanese difficulties in regard to Manchuria. The inherent seriousness of the case was aggravated by
the fact that Sino-Japanese relations
just at this time were strained on account of the Wanpaoshan affair, the
anti-Chinese riots in Korea, the Japanese military maneuvers across the
Tumen River on the ManchurianKorean frontier and the Chinese mob
violence committed at Tsingtao, in protest_ against the activities of the- local
Japanese patriotic ~ocieties.
Captain Nakamura was' an army of-r
:fleer on active service, a fact which
was pointed to by the Japanese as a
justification for strong and swift military action. Mass meetings were held
in Manchuria and in Japan for the purpose of crystallizing public sentiment in
favor of such action.. During the first
two weeks of September the Japanese
press repeatedly declared that the army
had decided that the "solution ought to
be by force," since there was no other
alternative.
The Chinese claimed that the importance of the case was greatly exaggerated and that it was made a pretext for the Japanese military occupation of Manchuria. They denied the
contention of the Japanese that there
was insincerity or delay on the part
of the Chinese officials in dealing with
the case.

Peaceful Methods Not Exhausted
By the end of August, 1931, therefore, Sino-Japanese relations over Manchuria were severely strained in consequence of the many controversies and
incidents described in this chapter . .
The claim that there were 300 cases

outstanding between the two countries,
and· that peaceful methods for settling
each of them had been progressively exhausted by one of the parties,
cannot be substantiated.
These socalled "cases'' were rather situations
arising out of broader issues, which
were rooted in fundamentally irreconcilable policies. Each side accuses
the other of having violated, unilaterally interpreted, or ignored the stipulations of the Sino-Japanese agreements. Each side had legitimate grievances µgainst the other.
The account here given of the, efforts made by one side or the other
to secure a settlement of these questions at issue between them shows that
some efforts were being made to dispose of these questions by the normal
procedure of diplomatic negotiation and
peaceful means, and these means had
not yet been exhausted. But the long
delays put a severe strain on the patience of the Japanese. Army circles in
particular were insisting .o n the immediate settlement of the Nakamura
<!ase, and demanded satisfactory reparation. The Imperial Ex-Soldiers' Association, among t>thers, was inst'rumental in rousing public opinion.

,.

In the course of September public
sentiment regarding the Chinese quest ions, with the Nakamura case as the
focal point, became very strong. Time
and again the opinion was expressed
that the policy of leaving so many issues in Manchuria unsettled had caused the Chinese authorities to make
light of Japan. Settlement of all pending issues, if necessary by force; became a popular slogan. Reference was
freely made in the press to a deci&ion
to resort to armed force, to conferences between the Ministry of War, the
General Staff and other authorities for
the discussion of a plan with this object, to definite instructions regarding
the execution, in case of necessity, of
that plan to the Commander-in-Chief
of the Kwantung Army, and to Colonel
Doihara, Resident Officer at Mukden,
who had been summoned to Tokyo
early in Septtmber and who was quoted
by the press as the advocate of a solution of all pending issues, if necessary
by force, and as soon as possible. The
reports of the press regarding the sentiments <expressed by these circles and
some other groups point to a growing
and dangerous tension.

CHAPTER IV
Narrative of Events in Manchuria on and Subsequent to
September 18, 1931
In the preceding chapter the growing
tension between the Japanese and Chinese interests •in Manchuria was discussed and its effect on the attitudes of
the military forces of the two nations
described. Certain internal, economic
and political factors had undoubtedly
for some time been preparing the Japanese people for a resumption of the
"positive policy" in Manchuria. The
dissatisfaction of the army; the financia,l
policy of the Government; the appearance of a new political force emanating
from the army, the country districts
and the nationalist youth, which expressed dissatisfaction with all political
parties, which despised the compromise
methods of Western civilization and
relied on the virtues of Old Japan and
which included in its condemnation the
self-seeking methods whether of financiers or politicians; the fall in commodity prices which inclined the primary producer to look to an adventurous foreign policy for the alleviation of his lot; the trade depressi:m
which caused the industrial and commercial community to be'lieve that better businers would result from a more
vigorous foreign policy-all these factors were preparing the way for the
abandonment of the Shidehara "policy
of conciliation" with China which
seemed to have achie>ved such meagre
results. This impatience in Japan was
even greater am:mg the Japanese in
Manchuria, where the tension throughout the summer was increiasing. As
September wore on, this tension reached such a point that it was apparent
to all careful observers that a breaking
point must soon be reached. The public press of both countries tertded
rather to in.flame than to calm public
opinion.
Vigorous ~peeches of the
Japanese War Minister in Tokyo, counseling direct action by their army in
Manchuria wer reported. Protracted

delay by the Chinese authorities in
making satisfactory investigation of and
redress for the murder of Captain
Nakamura had particularly incensed the
young officers of the Japanese army in
Manchuria, who clearly showed their
sensitiveness to irresponsible remarks
and slurs made by equally irresponsible
ChineEe officers on the streets or in
restaurants and other places of close
contact. And so the stage was set for
the events which followed.
'
On the morning of Saturday, September 19, the population of Mukden
woke to find their city in the hands of
Japanese troops. During the night
sounds of firing had been heard, but
there was nothing unusual in this; it
had been a nightly expe'rience throughout the week, as the Japanese h~d been
carrying out night maneuvers involving vigorous rifle and machine-gun
firing. True, that on the night of September 18, the booming of guns and the
sound of shells caused some alarm to
the few that distinguished them, but
th~ majority of the population considered the · firing to be merely another
repetition of Japanese maneuvers, perhaps rather noisier than usual

Military Leaders Interviewed
Appreciating the great importance of
this occurrence which, as will be-shown,
was the first step of a movement which
resulted in the military occupation of
practically the whole of Manchuria, the
commission conducted an extensive inquiry into the events of that night.
Of great value and interest, of coutse,
were the official accounts of the Japanese and Chinese military leaders involved. The Japanese case was presented by Lieutenant Kawamoto, who
is the earliest witness in the story, by
Lieutenant-Colonel Shimamoto,
the
Commanding Officer of the battalion
· which carried ·out the attack on the
North Barracks at Peitaying, and by
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Colonel Hirata, who captured the walled city. We also heard evidence from
Lieutenant-General Honjo, the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung
Army, and from several members of
his staff. The Chinese case was presented by General Wang I-Cheh, the
officer in command of the Chinese
troops in the North Barracks, snpplemented by the personal narratives of
his Chief-of-Staff and of other officers
who were present during the operations.
We also heard the evidence of Marshal
Chang Hsueh-liang and of his Chief.of-Staff General Yung Chen.
According to the Japanese version~,
Lieutenant kawamoto, with six men
under his command, was on patrol duty
on the night of September 18, practicing
defense exercises along the track of the
South Manchuria Railway to th€:' north
of Mukden. They were proceeding
southwards in the direction of Mukden.
The night was dark but clear, and the
field of vision was not wide. When they
reached a point at which a small road
cr-osses the line, they heard the noise
of a loud explosion a little way behind
them. They turned and ran back, and
after going about 200 yards they discovered that a portion of one of the
rails on the down track had been blown
out. ·The explosion took place at ·the
point of junction of two rails; the end
of each rail had been cleanly severed.
creating a gap in the line of 31 inches.
On arrival at the site of the explosion.
the patrol was fired upon from the
fields on the east side of the line.
Lieutenant
Kawamoto
immediately
ordered his men to deploy and return
the fire. The attacking body, estimated
at about five or six, then stopped firing
and retreated northwards. The Japanese patrol at once started in pursuit,
and, having gone about 200 yards, they
were again fired upon by a larger body,
estimated at between three and four
hundred. Finding himself in danger of
being surrounde<i by this large force,
Lieutenant Kawamoto then ordered one
of his men to report to the Commander
of No. 3 Company, who was also engaged in night maneuvers some 1.500
yards to the north; at the same time he
ordered another of his men to telephone
(by means of a box telephone. near the
spot) to Battalion Headquarters at Muk1 den for re-enforcement., .:
·
At this · · moment·, the southb6und
train from Charlgchun·· ~as~ neaira ap. 60

proaching. F earing that the train
might be wrecked when it reached 1:he
damaged line. the Japanese patrol interrupted their engagement and placed detonators on the line in the hope
of warning the train in time. The
train,' · however, proceeded at full
speed. · 'when it reached the site of
the explosion it was seen to swav
and heel over to one side, but it recovered and passed on without stopping. As the train was due at MuJrden at 10:30. where it arrived punctually, it must have been about 10:!)j)
o'clock, according to Lieutenant Kaw3moto, when he first heard the explosion .
Fighting was then resumed. Captain
Kawashima, with No. 3 Company,
having heard the explosion, was already proceeding southwards when he
met Lieutenant Kawamoto's messeru!er, who guided them to the spot. ThPy
arrived at about •10:50. Meanwhile.
Lieutenant-Colonel Shimamoto, the
Battalion Commander,' on receiot o.f a
telephone message, at once ordered the
1st and 4th Companies that were with
him at Mukden to proceed to the soot.
He also sent orders to the 2nd , Company. which was at Fushun-an'. hour
and a half away- to join them as soon
as possible. The two companies proceeded by rail from Mukden to Liutiaohu, and then on foot to the scene
of action, where they arrived a little
after midnight.
Lieutenant Kawamoto's patrol. reenforced by Captain Kawashima's companv, was still sustaining the fire nf
the Chinese troops concealed in the tall
kaoliang grass, when the two companieJ.
arrived from Mukden. Although his
force was then only 500, and he believed the Chinese army in the North Bat racks numbered 10,000, LieutenantColonel Shimamoto at once ordered an
attack on the barracks, believin~, as
he told us, that "offence is ·tlie bei:1t
defence." The ground between ·the· railway and the North Barracks-'-a distance of about· 250 yards- was chffictiJt
to cross irl mass formation because ·· of
' p~tches ·of water, and while the Chinese
troops rwere being driven back over· this
· ground Lieutenant Noda .was . sent 11 1;>
• .the rFlilway with · a section, of the 3rd
, Campany to ,intercept their retreat.
J, When .the J:ap;mese reached ·the' · N octh

Barracks, which were desc::ribed as glittering with electric liglo.t; an attack was
made by the 3rd Company, which sueceded in occupying a corner of the left
wing. The attack was vigorously contested by the Chinese troops within,
and there was fierce fighting for some
hours. The 1st Company attacked on
lhe ,right, and the 4th Company in the
center. At 5:00 o'clock· the south gate
of the barracks was blown in by two
shells from a small cannon left in an
outhouse immediately opposite to it by
the Chinese, and by 6 o'clock the entire
barracks were captured at the cost of
two Japanese privates killed and
twenty-two wounded. Some of the
barracks caught fire during the fight ing; the remainder were burned out by
the Japanese on the morning of the
19th. The Japanese stated that they
buried 320 Chinese but only
found
about 20 wounded.
· Walled City Taken
In the meantime operations in ot}:ler
places were being carried · out with
equal
rapidity
and
thoroughness.
Colonel Hirata received a telephone
message
from
Lieuten·a nt-Colonel
Shimamoto about 10:40 o'clock to tlie
effect that the South Manchuria Railway track had been destroyed by Chinese troops and that he was about to
start t o· attack I the enemy. Colonel
Hirata approved his action- and himself decided to attack the walled city.
The concentration of his troops was
complete by 11:30 o'clock, and his
attack commenced. No resistance was
offered, only occasional fighting on th ':?
streets, mostly with the Chinese police,
of whom 75 were killed. At 2:15
o'clock the wall of the city was scaled.
By 3:40 o'clock he had captured it.
At 4:50 o'clock, he receiv ed information
that the staff of the 2nd Division and
a part of the 16th Regiment had left
Liaoyang at 3:30 o'clock. These troops
arrived sh3r~ly after 5:00 o'clock. At
'6:00 o'clock the occupation of the
e:,stern wall was completed; the ar, senal and aerodrome were captured at
7:30 o'clock. The East Barracks were
then attacked and by 1:00 o'clock were
occupied without fighting. The total
casualities in those operations were
seven Japanese wounded and 30 Chinese killed.
Lieutenant -General Hot11.fo, who had
0

only returned from- his tour of , inspec-...
tion that very day,- received • the · first
news of what was happe:n'ing -. at :Muk.:.
den by telephone from a · new.spapet"
agent at about 11:00 o'clock. The Chief..:
of-Staff received a telegraphic report
at 11:46 o'clock from the Special Ser ...
vice Station at Mukden, giving details
of the attack, and orders were ,i mmediately sent to the troops at Lia~~
yang, Yinkow and Fengsheng to proceed to Mukden. • ~e fleet was ordered
to leave Port- Arthur and procee<l: tp
Yingkow and the Commander-in-Chief
of the Japanese Garrison Army . in
Korea was asked :to send re-inforcements. Li~utenant-General Honjo left
Port Arthur at 3:30 o'ciock and .arrived at Mukden at noon.
According to tl)e Chinese version, the
J apanese attack on the barracks ,at
Peitaying was entirely unprovoked and
came as a complete surprise. On the
night of September 18th all the ~oldiers
of the 7th Brigade, numbering' a"bout
10,000, were in the North Barracks. As
inst;u~tions bad been ~~c.e iyed from
Marshall Chang Hsueh-liang on ..September 6th (*) that special care.was to b e
taken to avoid any clash with tqe
Japanese troops in the tense state' of
feeling existing at the time, the sep:
tJ ies at the walls of the Barracks ·were
only armed with dummy rifles. For
the same reason the west gate . m tlw
mud wall surrounding , the camp which
gave access to the railway had b~n
closed. The Japanese h ad been carry;
ing out night maneuvers around thf
barracks on the nights of .September
14th, 15th, 16th and 17th. At 7:QO o'<:l9c~
on the Pvening of the 18th, they were
maneuvering at a village called Wenkuantun. At 9 o'clock officer Liu re:
ported that a train composed of three
or four coaches, but witho~t t4e. usual
type of locomotive. had stopped there.
(*) The text of the telegram sqoWI.1 tp
the commission at Peiping was as follows':
"Our relations with Japan have hecqme
very delicate. We must be particularly
cautious in our intercourlle with them-. No
matter how they· may challenge· u);, we
must be extremely patient and nevn rPsort to force, so as to avoid any -conflict
whatever. You are . insti;ucted to issue
, secretly and im"mecU11tely, order.s ' · tq' 'all
the officers. calling their attention to' ttils
1

point.'J
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At 10 o'clock the sound of a loud explosion was heard, immediately followed by rifle fire. This was reported
over the telephone by the Chief-ofStaff to the Commanding Officer. General Wang 1-cheh, who was at his private house situated near the railway,
about six or seven miles from the barracks, to the south. While the Chiefof-Staff was still at the telephone,
news was brought to him that the
Japanese were attacking the barracks
and that two sentries had been wounded. At about 11 o'clock a general attack on the southwest corner of the
barracks began. and at 11:30 o'clock the
Japanese had effected an entry through
a hole in the wall. As soon as the
attack began the Chief-of-Staff gave
oTders for the lights to be extinguished, and ag.ain reported to General
Wang I-cheh by telephone. The latter
replied that no resistance was to be
offered. Distant artillery fire was heard
at 10:30 o'clock from the southwest and
noiihwest. At midnight live shells began to, f.all inside the barracks. On
reaching the south gate, the retreating
troops of the 621st Regiment found that
the Japanese were attacking that gate,
and that the guard was withdrawing.
They accordingly took shelter in some
trenches and earthworks until after
the Japanese soldiers had passed
through into the interior, when they
were able to make their escape through
the south gate and reached the village of Erhtaitze, to the east of the
barracks, abot1t 2 o'clock. Other troops
made their escape throu~h the east
gate and the emuty barracks just outside the east w.a 11, finally reaching thP
same village between 3 and 4 o'clock.

One Regiment Resists
The only Tesistance was offered by
the 620th Regiment, quartered in the
northeast rorner building and th&
second building south of it. The commander of this Regiment stated that
when the Japanese troops entered
,th-rough the south gate at 1 o'clockthe Chinese troops withdrew from one
building to another, leaving the Japa. nese to attack emt>tY buildings. After
.the main body of the Chinese troops
hl\d withdrawn, the Japanese turned
· eastwal"ds and occupied the el\step1
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exit. The 620th Regiment thus found
themselves cut off, and had no option
but to fight their way through. They
started to break through at 5 o'clock.
but did not get completely clear until
7 o'clock; This was the only actual
fighting that took place in the barracks, and was Tesponsible for most of
the casualties. This regiment was the
last to reach the village of Erhtaitze.
As soon as they were all assembled,
the Chinese troops left the village in
the early morning of the 19th for
Tungling. From here they made their
way to a village near Kirin, where
they obtained a supply of winter clothing. Colonel Wang was sent to obtain
permission from General Hsi Hsia for
the troops to enter Kirin city. The
Japanese residents at KiTin were so
alarmed at the 9 pproach of the Chi:nese soldiers that re-enforcements
were at once sent from Changchun.
Ssupingkai and Mukden to Kirin. Consequently the Chinese turned back toward Mukden. They left their trains
thirteen miles outside Mukden, separated into nine groups, and marched
round Mukden by night. To escape
detection by the Japanese, General
Wang I-cheh himself rode through the
town disguised as a peasant. In the
morning the Japanese obtained news
of their presence and sent air planes
to bomb them. They were obli~ed to
lie hidden by day, but continued their
march at night. Eventually they reached a station on the Peiping-Mukden
Railway, and here they were able to
order seven trains, which brou~ht
them to Shanhaikwan by October
4th.
Such are the two stories of the socalled incident of September 18 as they
were told to the commission by the
participants on both sides. Clearly, and
not unnaturally in the circums~ances,
they are different and contradictory.
Appreciating the tense situation and
high feeling which had preceded this
incident, and realizing the discrepancies
which are bound to occur in accounts
of interested persons, espec:ally with
regard to an event which took place at
night, we, during our stay in the Far
East, interviewed as many as possihle
of the repre:entative foreigners wl\•:>
had been in Mukden at the time of

the occurrences or soon after, including
newspaper correspondents and other
persons who had visited the scene of
conflict shortly after the event, and to
whom the first official Japanese account
had been given. After a thorough consideration of such opinions, as well as
of the accounts of the interested parties,
and afte:r a mature study of the considerable quantity of written material
and a careful weighing of the great
mass of evidence which was presented
or collected, the commission has come
to the following conclusions:

Conclusions Offered
Tense feeling undoubtedly existed
between the Japanese and Chinese military forces. The Japanese, as was explained to the commission in evidence,
had a carefully prepared plan to meet
the case of possible hostilities betwe?n
themselves and the Chinese, On the
night of SeptE'mber 18th-19th this plan
was put into operation with swiftness
and precision. The Cl:ir.ese in accordance with the instructions previously
referred to had no plan of attacking
the Japan-?3e troops, or of endang~ring
the lives or property of Japanese nationals at this particular time or place.
'!'hey made no concerned or autho:. ized
;.ttack on •he Japanese forces, and
were surprised by the Japanese attack
and subsequent operations. An explosion undoubtedly occurred on or
near the railroad between 10 o'clock
and 10:30 o'clol!k e,n September 18, but
the damage, if any, to the railroad did
not in fact prevent the punctual arrival
of the southbound train from Changchun, and was not in itself sufficient
to justify military action. The military operations of the Japanese troops
during this night, which have been
e:f'Scribed above, -~annot be regard~ as
measures of legitimate self-defens?.
In saying this the commission does
not exclude the hypothesis that the
officers on the spot ma have thought
they were acting in self-defense. Thi?
narrative of the subsequent events must
r.ow be resumed. .
On the night of September 18 the
Japanese troops in Manchuria were
distributed as follows: In addition to
the four companies of the Battalion of
Railway Guards, which took nart in
fhe attack on the North Barracks, and
the 29th Regiment •of the 2nd Division

un~ Colonel ~rata, which captured,
the Walled City_ of Mukden, already
de.scribed, the rest of the 2nd Division was distributed in various places:
the Headquarters of the 4th Regiment
was at Changchun, of the 16th at
Liaoyang, of the 30th at Port Arthur;
other parts of these regiments were
stationed at Antung, Yingkow and at
many smaller places on the Changchun-Mukden branch and the MukdenAntung branch of the South Manchuria·
Railway. Another battalion of Railway
Guards was at Changchun, and units
of the Railway Guards and Gendarmerie were distributed with the 2nd
Division in the smaller p:aces already
mentioned.
Lastly, there were the
Garrison troops of Korea.
All the forces in Manchuria, and some
of those in Korea, were brought into
action almost simultaneously on the
night of September 18th over the whole
area of the South Manchuria Railway
from Changchun to Port Arthur. Their
total strength was as follows: 2nd Division, 5,400 men and 16 field guns, Rail•
way Guards about 5,000 men, Gendarmerie about 500. The Chinese troops
at Antung, Yingkow, Liaoyang and
other smaller towns were overcome
and disarmed without resistance. The
Railway Guards and Gendarmerie remained in those places while the units
of the 2nd Division at once concentrated at Mukden to take part in the
more serious operations. The 16th and
30th Regiments arrived in time to join.
Colonel Hirata and assisted in the capture of the East Barracks. The 39th
Mixed Brigade of the 20th Division
(4,000 men and artillery) concentrated at 10 o'clock on the 19th at Shingishu on the Korean frontier, crossed
the Yalu River on the 21st and arrived at Mukden at midnight. From
here detachments were sent to Chengchiatun and Hsinmin, which they occupied on the 22nd.

Changchun Occupied
The Chinese Garrisons of Kuanchengtze and Nanling at Changchun,
with an estimated strength of 10,000
m en and 40 guns, were attacked on the
night of the 18th of September by the
4~h Reg~ment of the 2nd Division and
1st Railway Guard Battalion stationed
there (under Major-General Hasebe).
Here, however, some re, istance was
shown by the Chinese. Fighting began
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a"t -midnight. ·' ·Nanl.i~ ' barracks werel
captured by' 11 'o 'clock in the morning:
on the 19th, those of Kuanchengtze by
3 o'clock that day. The · total· Japanese
casualties involved were 3 officers and
64 men killed and 3 officers and 85 men
wounded. As soon as the fighting at
Mukden' was · over, -the Regiments of
the 2nd Division were concentrated at
Changchun, the staff, with General
Tamon, the 30th Regiment and one Battalion of Field Artillery arriving on the
20th, and the 15th Brigade under General Amano arriving on the 22nd . . Kirin
was occupied on the 21st without the
firing of a shot, ·and the Chinese troops
were removed to a distance of about
.eight miles.
The Herald of Asia, a semi-official
Japanese publication of that time, states
that all military operations were then
regarded as completed, and that no
further movements of troops were anticipated. The military operations which
in fact ensued are attributed to Chinese provocation; an anti-Japanese
demonstration at Chientao on the 20th:
the. destruction of a railway station at
Lungsingtsun; and the explosion of
some bombs which did no damage on
Japanese premises at Harbin on September 23rd, are m~ntio~ed as examples
of such provocation. Complaint" is also
made of growing banditry and of the
activities of disbanded soldiers. All
of these things, · it is claimed, finally
forced the Japanese to new military
operations agai~t their will.
The first of these operations was the
bombing, on Octo})er 8th, of Chinchow,
to which place the Proyincial Government of Liaoyang Province had been
transferred by Marshal Chang Hsuehliang at the end of September. According to the 'Japanese account, the
bombing was chiefly directed ~gainst
the military barracks and the Communications University, where ' the offices
of the Civil Governm:ent had b~n esta-·
blished. 'Tlie · bombing of a civil administration -b-y mil~tary forces cannot
be justified and there is· some doubt
whether the area- bombed ;was in fact
as restricted as the -Japanese allege.
Mr. Lewis, an American honorary adviser of the Chinese Government. arrived at Chinchow oh Ocfober 12th and
wrote an ' account of what' he found
there to Dr. · Koo; who passed · on th~
information later · to · the commission, ih
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his ·capacity or assessor.

Accorclini to1

Mr: Lewis, the military barracks w~re,
in fact not touched at all and a ·multi-i
tude of bombs fell everywhere in · the,
town, even on the hospital, as , well -as·
on the university buildings. The com-1
mander of the bombing planes inform- :
ed a Japanese newspaper shortly after- •
wards that four planes from Chang- :
chun 'were ordered to Mukden a·t 8:30 o'clock on the morning of the 8th. There:
they joined Qther planes and ~ squad'
of six scouting and five bombing planes'
were immediately dispatched to Chin-:
chow heavily loaded with bombs and
fuel. They arrived at about 1 o'clock,
within ten to fifteen· ·minutes dropped
eighty bombs and immediately 'returned to Mukden. The Chinese, acc,ording
to Mr. Lewis, did not return the fire. ,
Operations at N onni

The next ci:eration was that of the .
Konni River Bridges, which started in~
the middle of October and ended .on .
the 19th of ~ovember with the oc.
cupation of Tsitsihar by the Japanese _
troops.
The justification for this
given by the Japanese was that they
were : attacked while repairing the
bridge over the Nonni River w_hich,
had been des1royed by General Ma_
Chan-shan. But the story must be·
begun earlier and an explanation given:
of the destruction of -the bridges,
;
At the ·beginning of October ,Genenl,
Chang Hai-peng, the Garrison <::om-,
mander at Taonan, who -in former•
times had held the same rank as · Ma,
Chan-shan and Wang Fu-lin, and had
tried to become Governor of- Heiiungkiang in their place, started an ad-•
vance · movement along the Taonan-'
Angangchi Railway with the · obvious.
object of seizing the Provincial Gov~,
ermnerit by ·force. It is alleged in th~
Chinese assessor's docuil'l.ent No. 3,
an'd this view is supported · by infor-:
mation from neutral sources,. that thisoffensive was instigated by the Japa~'
nese.· · h1 order to prevent the advaneer
of Chang Hai-peng's troops, General
Ma Chan-shan ordered the destruction of the bridges over the Nonni
River and .both armies faced each.
other across the large and swam,pyvalley. of that river.
1 The Taona'n-Angangchi Railway· had
been built with capital supplied · by the

South Manchuria Railway and the line,
was pledged as security for the loan. •
Accordingly, the South Manchuria -Rail- ,
way authorities felt that the interrup- ·
tion to . the traffic on this line <;ould
not be allowed to continue at a season
when the transportation of crops from ,
the north of Manchuria was particularly needed. The Japanese Consul-General at Tsitsihar, on instructions from
his Government, requested General Ma
Chan-shan, who had arrived at Tsitsihar on October 20, to have the bridges
repaired as soon as possible, but no
time limit accompanied this request.
The Japane e authorities believed that
General Ma Chan-shan would delay
as long as possible the repairing of the
bridges, as this interruption helped him
to keep General Chang Hai-peng's
troops at a distance. On October 20
a small party of employes of the Taonan-Angangchi Railway and the South
Manchuria Railway, without military
escort, attempted to inspect the damage
to the bridges, and was fired upon by
Chinese troops in spite of explanations
previously given to an officer of the
Heilungkiang Provincial forces. This
aggravated the situation, and accordingly on October 28th Major Hayashi, the
representative of General Honjo at
Tsitsihar, demanded the completion of
the repairs by noon of November 3rd,
stating that if they were not carried
out by that date, engineers of the South
Manchuria Railway, under the protection of Japanese troops, would take
over the work. The Chinese authorities asked for an extension of the time
limit, but no answer was returned to
this request and Japanese troops were ·
dispatched from Ssupingkai for the
purpose of protecting the execution of
the repair work.

Negotiations Indecisive
By November 2nd the negotiations .
had not progressed and no decision had •
been reached. On that day Major
Hayashi delivered an ultimatum. to •
Generals Ma Chan-shan and Chang
Hai-peng, demanding that neither of
them should use the railway for tactical purposes and that both should
withdraw their forces to a distance of
10 kilomet~r-s • from each side of the
river. It was intimated ·that if. the
troops of either of these generals obstructed the repair of the bridges , by .

the. ,engine~ of the South ,Mp.ncliuri~,,
Railway, the Jana.pese, .would • regard.,
them as enemies~ The ulti.inatu~ vJ~~ ;
to take effect as from- noon . of N ovem;- ,
ber 3rd, and the .Japanese protective,:
detachment was . under orders to .' ad- ·,
vance to Tahsing, on the nO'Ith side of .
the valley, by noon of November 4th. '
The Chinese assessor (document -No. '
3), the Japanese Consul-General at
Tsitsihar and various officers of the ,
2nd Division all concur that General.
Ma Chan-shan replied that pending instructions from the Central Govern- ·
ment he provisionally accepted, on · his ,
own authority, the Japanese demands.
But the Japanese witnesses, on · the
other hand, added that they did not '
believe in the sincerity of General Ma,
who obviously did not intend to permit the damaged bridges to be quickly or effectively repaired. . Twice on
the 4th of November a joint commission, including Major Hayashi,
representative of the Japanese Consul-.
General and Chinese officers and civi
offici~ls, went to the bridges in O'I"der 1
to avoid an outbreak of hostilities, and l
the Chinese delegates asked for a ,p{>st- ·;
ponement of the Japanese advance.
The demand was not complied with,
and Colonel . Ham2moto. the . ,com- '
mander of the 16th Infantry Regiment, ,
in compliance with his orders, advanc- .
ed to the bridges with one battalion. of
his regiment, two companies . of field '
artillery and one company of engineers
to begin the repair work in acco:rd,mce '
with the terms of the japanese ulti- :
matum. The engineers, under the com- ·
mand of Captain Hanai, st~rted work .'
on the morning of November 4th, and .
one infantry company, with two Ja:p~-:-.;
nese flags, began its advance to _T ahsµig ~
Station by noon of that day.
·
Hostilities actually began during the second attempt Qf the above-mention-':
ed mixed commission which went to
the spot earlv in the afternoon of
4th in order to make a last attempt to
secure the withd'Iawal of the ·Chinese
troops. . As ~oon as firing began Colonel Hamamoto realised that his men
were jn a very difficult pqs_ition and ,
went immediately to their support
with whatever troops .he had available. .
A ·rapjd reco,nnaissanc~ c,onvipced him
that . a frontal attack was imp9ssible
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on account of the swampy ground, and
that nothing but an encircling movement against the left wing of the opposing force would help him out of
this difficult situation. Accordingly he
dispatched his reserve companies to
attack the hill on which the left wing
of the opposing forces rested, but the
small number of Ms forces and the
impossibility of bringing his guns near
enough for action pTevented him from
gaining the position before nightfall.
The hill was captured by 8:30 o'clock,
but no further advance was possible
on that day.
The Kwantung Army Headquarters,
on Teceiving a report of the position,
immediately dispatched strong re-enforcements, and another battalion of infantry arrived during the night, enabling the Colonel to re-o~en his attack
at dawn of November 5th. Even then,
after a couple of hours and reaching
the first Chinese position, he found
himself confronted with a strong line
of trenches defended, according to his
own statement to the commission, with
about 70 automatic and machine guns.
His attack was he]d up, and h ;s troops
suffered )leavy losses, as a result of a
Chinese encircling counter-attack executed by infantry and cavalrymen.
The Japanese troops were forced to
retire, and for the second time they
could do nothing but hold their position until nightfall. During the night
of November 5-6, two fresh battalions
arrived. This relieved the situation,
.;.nd a renewed attack on the morning
of the 6th rolled up the entire Chinese
front, and brought Tahsing Station into the hands of the Japanese troops
by noon. As Colonel Hamamoto's mission was only to occupy Tahsing Station, in orde-r to cover the repair work
of the bridges, no pursuit of the retreating Chinese troops was m 3de, but
the Japanese troops remained in the
vicinity of the station.

New Requests Alleged
The Chinese assessor, in the same
document No. 3, alleges that Major
Hayashi, on Novem">er 6. m 3de a new
request to the Heilungkiang Government, asking (1) that General Ma
Chan-shan should resign from the
Governa:ship in favor of General
6G

Chang Hai-peng, and (2) that a public safety committee should be organized. A photograph of Major Hayashi's
letter containing these requests was
shown to the commission. This document further states that on the following day, without wa iting for a Teply, the Japanese troops began a new
attack on the provincial forces now
stationed at Sanchienfang; about 20
miles north of Tahsing, and that on
November 8 Major Hayashi sent another letter Tepeating the demand for
General Ma Chanshan's retirement
from the governorship of the province
in favor of General Chang Hai-peng,
and for a reply before midnight of that
day. On November 11, the Chinese
account continues, General Hcmjo himself asked by telegram for Ceneral Ma
Chan-shan's retirement, the evacuation
of Tsitsihar and the right for the
Japanese troops to advance to Angangchi Station, again requiring a reply
before nightfall of that day.
Vn
November 13 Major Hayashi increased
the third demand to one for the Japanese troops to occupy not only Angangchi Station but Tsitsihar Station
as well. General Ma Chan-shan point•
ed out in reply that Tsitsihar Station
had nothing to do with the TaonanAngangchi Railway.
On November 14 and 15 the Japanese combined forces renewed their
attack with the support of four airplanes.
On November 16 General
Honjo demanded that retreat of General Ma Chan-shan to the north of
Tsitsiha1", the withdrawal of Chinese
troops to the north of the Chinese
Eastern Railway, and an undertaking
not to interfere in any way with the
traffic and operation of the Taonan•
Angangchi Railway, these demands to
be carried out within 10 days from
November 15, 2nd a reply to be sent
to the Jananese Special Bureau at
Harbin. When General Ma Chan-shan
declined to accept these terms, General
Tamon began a new genera1 attack
on November 18. General Ma Chanshan's troops retreated, first to Tsitllihar, which was taken by the Jananese on November 19, and then to Hailtut, to whirh ph ce the administrativ
offices of the Government were :removed.

Ma Gathers Troops
According to the evidence of Japanese generals commanding on the spot,
the new operations did not begin before November 12. General Ma Chanshan a.t that time had gathered about
20,000 of his troops to the west of
Sanchienfang and even sent for the
land colonization troops in Heilungkiang Province and the forces of General Ting Chao. Against these lax-ge
forces, which showed an increasingly
threatening attitude, the Japanese
could oppose only the now concentrated division of General Tamon, consisting of two bridgades under Generals
Amano and Hasebe. In arder to relieve this tense situation General Honjo demanded, on November 12, that all
Heilungkiang troops should retire to
the north of Tsitsihar and that his
troops should be allowed to proceed
northward for the protection of th~
Taonan-Angangchi Railway. The advance did not begin before November
17. when the Chinese sent cavalry
troops around the right flank of the
Japanese and attacked them. General
Tamon informed the commission that
in spite of his small strength of 3,000
infantrymen and 24 field guns he ventured to attack the Chinese forces. and
completely defeated them on November 18, with the result that Tsitsihar
was occupied on the morning of the
19. One week later the 2nd Division
returned to its original quarters, leaving General Amano with one infantry
regiment and one battery of artillery
at Tsitsihar to hold the place against
General Ma Chan-shan's troops. This
small Japanese force was subsequently re-enforced by the newly-formed
"Manchukuo" troops, but these new
troops at the time of our visit to
Tsitsihar in May, 1932, were not yet
considered capable of fighting the
forces of General Ma Chan-shan.
The attached Military Situation
Chart No. 2 shows the distribution of regular troops of both sides
at the time of the first !resolution of
the Council. No account is taken of
disbanded soldiers and bandit groups
which, at that time, specially infested
the areas east and west of the Liao
River and the Chientao District. Both
the parties have accused each other

of purposely instigating banditry,-the
Japanese attributing to the Chinese
the motive of wishing to create
disorder
in
the
lost
parts
of
Manchuria, and the Chinese suspecting the Japanese of wishing to
find
pretexts for
occupying the
country and still further extending
their military o,;>erations. The strength
and military value of these gangs is
so vague and changeable that it would
not be possible to insert an accurate
estimate uf their significance into the
picture of the milita:ry situation. The
chart shuws that the command of the
N ortheastem troops had succeeded in
orgamzmg a force of considerable
strength in the southwestern part of
Liaoning Province. These troops had
been able to construct a strongly entrenched position on the right bank of
the Taling River very close to the
fo:remost Japanese outposts. Such a
situation may well have caused the
Japanese military authorities some
anxiety as they estimated the total
strength of these regular troops at 35, 000 men, or about double the total admitted strength of their own forces in
Manchuria at that moment.

The Tlentsln Incident
This situation was relieved by action taken in consequence of certain
events which occurred at Tientsin during the month of November. Reports
as to the origin of the trouble differ
widely. There were two outbreaks,
on the 8th, and the 26th, of November
respectively, but the whole .affair is
extremely obscure. According to the
Japanese account in the Herald of
Asia, the Chinese population at Tientsin was divided between those who
supported and those who opposed ,Marshal Chang Hsueh-Hang, and the latter
organized farces to create a political
demonstration in the Chmese city by
attacking the guardians of public order on November 8. In this dispute
between two Chinese factions the commander of the J·apanese garrison observed strict neutrality from the beginning but was forced to open fire when
Chinese guards In the vicinity of the
Japanese Concession began to shoot
indiscriminately into his district. His
demand that the combating Chinese
forces should keep at 300 yards' dis-
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: tance, the f>order of the Concession,
<Jid' 'not :relieve the situation' which
grew so tense that on November 11 or
·1~, all foreign garrisons mounted guard.
1,; T4e account given by the Municipal
Giovernment of Tientsin is very dif ··
ferent. They assert that the Japanese
, employed Chinese ruffians and Japanese
plain-clothes men, who were formed
.into ,1operating gangs within the Japa•nese Concession in order to start
'trouble in the Chinese city. Their
police authorities being timely infonn.e4 by agents of this situation, were
:able to repulse the disorderly bands
emergin~ from the Japanese Concession. They say that from the con_fession of arrested. members of these
gangs they are able to prove that the
riot was organized by the Japanese
.and that the men were armed with
guns and ammunition of Japanese
make. They admit that the Japanese
garrison commander complained on the
morning of the 9th that some of hls
men had been wounded by stray bullets and that he had asked for a withdrawal to a distance of 300 yards, but
they · assert that in spite of their acceptance of these conditions the Japanese regular troops attacked the Chinese C!ity with armored cars and
shelled it.
I

Withdrawal Arranged
The account of the Municipal Government further states that on November 17, an agreement was reached
which fixed the details for the withdrawal to a distance of 300 yards, but
it asserts that the Japanese did not
carry out their part of the agreement
and that consequently the situation
grew worse.
On November 26 a terrific explosion
was heard, immediately followed by
firing of cannons, machine-guns and
rifles. The electric lights in the Japanese Concession were put out, and
plain-clothes men emerged from it, attacking the police stations in the
vicinity.
Th.e Japanese account of this later
disturbance as given in the Herald of
Asia is to the effect that on the 26th
the situation had become so much better that their volunteer corps was disbanded and that on the same evening
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the Chinese opened fire on the Jaoanese barracks, and as the fire, in spite
of their protests, did not stop until
noon of the 27th, they had no choice
but to accept the challenge and to
fight the Chinese. The battle went on
until the afternoon of the 27th, when
a peace conference was held. On that
occasion the Japanese demanded the
immediate cessation of hostilities and
the withdTawal of Chinese troops and
police forces to a distance of 20 Chinese
Ii from all places where foreign
troops were stationed. The Chinese
agreed to withdraw their soldiers but
not their police forces, which were
alone responsible for the safety of
foreigners in that district. The Japanese say that on November 29 the
Chinese offered their withdrawal from
the neighborhood of the Concession:
their offer was accepted; the Chinese
.&rmed police withdrew on the morning of the 29th, and the defence work
was removed on the 30th.
The threatening situation at Tientsin
on the 26th caused the staff officers of
the Kwantung Army to propose to the
commander an immediate expedition
of troops via Chinchow and Shanhaikwan to re-enforce the endangerPd
small force at Tientsin. ~s a mere
transport problem it would have been
easier and quicker to dispatch re-enforcements by sea via Dairen. But
considered strategically, the suggested
route had this advantage, that it
would enable the advancing troops to
dispose en route of the very inconvenient Chinese concentration around
Chinchow. It was assumed that the
delay in taking this route would not
be long, as little or no :resistance from
the Chinese was anticipated. The su2gestion was approved, and one armored train, one troop train, and a couple
of air planes crossed the Liao Rive-:
on November 27 and thP.ir attack on
the first Chinese outposts was sufficient to initiate a retreat of the Chinese troops from their entrenched
position.
The armoured car corps
also changed its position. A. shade of
resistance led the Japanese to re-enf orce their strength by more armored
trains, infantry trains and artillery.
,They also repeatedly threw bombs on
Chincliow, but news of the improved

. sit~tjqn at 1'i~tsin soon deprived the
expedition of its original objective and
on November 29, to the great surprisP•of ' the Chinese, the Japanese forces
w~e withdrawn to Hsinmm.

· Henry Pu-yi Goes to Port Arthur
'Another consequence of the earlier
disturbances at Tientsin was that the
former Emperor, who had been living
in the Japanese Concession there.
sought a safer refuge at Port Arthur on
November 13, after a talk with Colonel
· Dohihara.
The districts evacuated by the Japanese were re-occupied by the Chinese
· troops, and this fact was widely advertised. Chinese morale was slightly
raised; and the activities of irregular
· foxces and bandits increased: Profiting by the winter season, they crossed
the frozen Liao River at many points
:an4 raided the country round Mukden.
The Japanese military authorities
realized that even to maintain their
existing
positions
re-enforcements
. would be necessary, and with these reenforcements they hoped to be able
to get rid of the menace of the Chinese concentration at Chinchow.
Meanwhile the situation in Manchuria was a subject of further discussion in Geneva. When accepting
the resolution on December 10 the
Japanese delega te stated that his acceptance "was based on the understanding that this paragraph (No. 2)
was not intended to preclude the Japanese forces from taking such action
as might be necessary 'to providP
directly for the protection of the lives
and property of Japanese subjectia;
against the activity of bandits and law.less elements rampant in various paru.
of Manchuria.' Such a ction was ;iclmittedly 'an exceptional measure called for by the special situation prevr1i ling in Manchuria,' and its necessity
would end when normal conditions
should be restored there." To tru:i t the
Chinese representative replied "that
the injunction to the parties not to at:. gravate the situation should not be
violated under the pretext of the e'!('istence of lawlessness caused by the
state of affairs in Manchuria," and
'several Council members taking part
in the discussion admitted that "cir-

cwnstances might arise there causing
da,nger to Japanes~ lives and property
and in such an emergency it might be
i~evitable that Japanese forces in the
nejghborhood should take action."
When this matter has been referred to
by Japanese officers who have given
evidence before the commission it is
usually asserted that the resolution of
December 10 "gave Japan the right to
maintain her troops" in Manchuria, or
made the Japanese army responsible
for the suppression of banditry there.
In describing the subsequent operations they assert that while executitU?.
this right against the bandit forces
near the Liao River, they incidentally
came in conflict with the remaining
Chinese
forces
near
Chinchow
which were in consequence withdrawn
within the Great Wall. The fact rPmains that having made their reservation at Geneva the Japanese continued
to deal with the situation in Manchuria
according to their plans.

Re-enforcements Arrive
The 2nd Division, with the exception
of its garrison at Tsitsihar, was concentrated west of Mukden. Re-enforcements soon bei;!an to arrive; the
4th Brigade of the 8th Division ( *) between the 10th and 15th of December.
On December 27 Imperial sanction
was obtained for the dispatch of the
staff of the 20th Division and another
brigade from Korea. Changchun and
Kirin were for the time being only
protected by Independent Railway
Guards.
As a Japanese advance on Chinchow
was imminent, the Chinese Minister
of Foreign Affairs made an attempt
to prevent further fighting by offerim?
to withdraw the Chinese troops to
within the Great Wall provided that
three or four foreign Powers were
willing to guarantee the maintenance
of a neutral 70ne north and south of
Chinchow. Nothing came of the proposal. Meanwhile conversations were
initiated between Marshal Chang Hsueh-Hang and the Japanese Charge d'Afaires at P eiping, but these too were
(• ) All the statements here given concerning numbers of units and strength of.
the Japanese forces are pased on official
Jap~nese information . .

abortive for diff'erent reasons. The
Chinese aliege in their document No.
3, Annex "E", that at each successive
visit, on December 7, 25 and 29, the
Japanese delegate· increased his demands concerning the Chinese retreat
and his promises with regard to the
restraint of the Japanese troops became more and more vague. The
Japanese, on the other hand, claim
that the Chinese promises to withdraw
were never sincere.
The concentrated attack of the Japanese forces began on December 23 when
the 19th Chinese Brigade was forced to
give up its position. From that the
advance continued with perfect regularity and hardly met with any resistance at all, the Chinese commander
, having given out a general order to retreat. Chinchow was occupied on the
morning of January 3, arid the Japanese forces continued their advanc~
right up to the Great Wall at Sharthajkwan, where they established a permanent contact with the Japanese garrison in that place.
·
The complete evacuation of Manchuria by the trooos of Marshal Chang
Hsueh-Hang, practically without striking a blow, was not unconnected with
th:e internal conditions of China south
of the Wall. Reference has been made
in an earlier chapter to the feuds between rival generals, and it must be
remembered these feuds had not ceased.
The OcclU)ation of Harbin
The comparative ease with which the
offensive down to Shanhaikwan was
carried out enabled the Japanese to
release some of their troops from their
original positions and make them available for advances in other directions.
The main force of the 2nd Division,
which had done nearly all the fighting
so far, returned to their quarters at
Liaoyang, Mukden and Changchun for
a rest. On the other hand, the increas. ed. length of railway line to be protected against possible bandit raids at
. any point necessitated the use of a
lai;ge number of troops the fighting
strength of which was diminished by
their distribution over such wide areas,
The two- brigades under the command
of the staff of the 20th Division ·were
left for this purpose in the newly occupied zone, and the , 4th Brigade of
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the 8th Division joined them more to
the north. The Japanese military authorities assured us that within these
well guarded areas a state of law and
order was soon established and that
banditry was practically extinguished
on both sides of the Liao River during
the following weeks. This statement
was made to us in the month of June,
but at the moment of writing this report we read of vigorous raids from
volunteer troops on Yingkow and Haicheng, with threats even to Mukd~
and Chinchow.
The district which at the beginning
of this year gave more tro-uble than
any other was that north and east of
Harbin, to which the remaining followers of the two former Provincial
Governments of Kirin and Heilune;kiang had withdrawn. The Chinese
generals in this northern sector seemed
to have maintained some contact with
Headquarters at Peiping, whence they
received some support from time· to
time. The advance on Harbin began,
as that on Tsitsihar had done, by an
encounter between two Chinese forces.
General Hsi Hsia at the beginning of.
January prepared for an expedition to
the North with the view to occupying
Harbin. Between him and that citv
were Generals Ting Chao and Li Tu.
with what are described as antiKirin forces. According to information provided by the Japanese asses.5or,
when our preliminary report was under
consideration, satisfactory tenns would
have been arranged by negotiation between the parties had it not been for
the influence of the authorities at Peiping. Negotiations were in fact initiated and while they were being carried
on General Hsi Hsia advanced with his
troops as far as Shuangcheng, which
they reached on January 25, but when
it came to serious fighting on the following morning in the immediate neigh'"
borhood south df the city, the advance was at once checked. The situation thus created was felt by the Japanese to be full of danger for the large
Japanese and Korean colonies at Harbin. Fighting between two more or
less irregular Chinese forces in the
immediate neighborhood would have
resulted in the retreat on the town of
a defeated army, the horrors of which
the recent history of China prcwidas
so many examples. Urgent appeals were

· therefore Eent th the Kwantung Army
even Chinese merchants. so the· Japa~
nese assert, joining in the appeal from
fear that their property might be looted.

Anxiety for Residents
Colonel Dohihara (now General). who
in this emergency, was sent to Harbi~
on the 26th in ,o rder to take over the
office of the special Japanese service
there, told the commission that the
fighting between the two Chinese forces
around Harbin continued for about 10
days, and that there was e;reat anxiety
for the 4,000 Japanese residents who
mostly )ived in a menaced area,' together with 1,600 Koreans in the Chinese suburb of Fuchiatien. who were
exposed to the danger of massacre. In
spite of the fact that the anti-Kirin
forces held the town during 10 days
of continual fighting, the casualties
among the Korean and Japanese residents were comparatively few. The
latter organized themselves into armed
volunteer bands and helped their na. tionals to escape from the Chinese suburb. One Japanese and three Koreans
are said to have been killed while trying to escape. In addition, one of the
Japanese airplanes, sent to reconnoitre
the threatening situation, was forced to
land owing to engine trouble, and its
occunants are said to have been killed
by Ting Chao's troops.
These two incidents decided the
Japanese military authorities to intervene. Again the 2nd Division was called upon to help its endangered countrymen. But this time the problem
was not so much one of fighting as of
transportation, the railway north of
Changchun being a joint Sino-Russian
widertaking. As the roJling stock of
the southern branch of the Chinese
Eastern Railway was greatly depleted,
the commander of the 2nd Division decided to send, in the first instance,
only General Hasebe and two infantry
battalions. Negotiations with the railway authorities were started, but when
these seemed likely to be long drawrout, the Japanese officers decided to
enforce the transport of their troops.
The railway authorities protested and
refused to work the trains, but iri
spite of their opposition the Japauc c
military authorities succeeded on :he
night of January ?.8 in fonning three

military trains, which went as .far
north as the second Sungari ,brid~e
which they found damaged by the Chi~
nese forces. As the repairs were made
on the 29th, Shuangcheng was reached
on the afternoon of January 30. Early
on the following morning, and still
under cover of darkness. the smllll
Japanese force was attacked by Ting
Chao's troops, and severe fighting took
place, resulting in the repulse of th~
Chinese. but no further progress was
possible that day. By that time the
Soviet and Chinese railway authorities
had agreed that the transport of Japanese troops on the Chinese Eastern
Railway would be allowed, on the
understanding that they were proceeding with the sole object of givin"'
protection to the Japanese residents
Harbin. The fares of the troops wer12
paid for in cash. On February 1 the
Japanese troops began to arrive and
the main force of the 2nd Division
was concentrated near Shuangcheng on
the morning of February 3. Re-enforcements were even called upon
from Tsitsihar, where, as will be remembered, a part of the 2nd Divi.c,ion
had remained since November 19. But
many difficulties had still to be overcome, as the line between Harbin and
Tsitsihar was cut by the Chinese who
at the same time attacked detachments
of the Independent Railway Guards on
the southern branch of the Chinese
Eastern Railway at different places..
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Troops Enter City
On February 3 the anti-Kirin troops,
now estimated to have a total strength
of about 13,000 to 14,000 soldiers with
16 guns, had taken up an entrenched
position along the southern boundary
of the city. The 2nd Division began to
advance against this position on the
same day, reaching the Nanchengtze
River, about 20 miles north of Shuangcheng, on the night of February 3-4.
Fighting commenced on the following
morning. On the evening of the 4th the
Chinese position was partly taken by
the Japanese troops and by noon w
the 5th a final decision was reached'.
Harbin was occupied on the afternoon
of the same day, and the Chinese withdrew in the direction of Sanhsing.
The successful attack of the 2nd
Division brought the town of Harbin

into the hands -of the Japanese authorities, but as it was not immediately followed by any pursuit of the retia-ing
· Chinese forces, little change was pro' duced on the situation in northern
Martchuria as a whole. The railways
I north and east of Harbin and the im! portant waterway of the Sungari River
still remained .under the control of the
. anti-Kirin troops and those of Ma
Chan-shan. The arrival of further re. enforcements, repeated expeditions to
· the east and north and six months of
.fighting took place before the occupied
area was extended as far as Hailun in
, the north and the districts of Fangcheng and Hailin in the east. According to Japanese official statements, the
anti-Kirin troops with those of General Ma Chan-sban were completely
routed, but according to official Chi nese sources, they are still in existence.
· Although reduced in their fighting
strength they continually hamper the
Japanese forces, at the same time
avoiding actual encounters in the open
field. According to newspaper information, both the eastern and westent
branches of the Chinese Eastern Railway are still being attacked and damaged at different places between Harbin
and Hailin.

Operations Summarized
• The Japanese operations since the
· beginning of February may be summarized as follows:
Toward the end of March the main
part of the 2nd Division left Harbin
in the direction of Fangcheng in orde1·
' t'l suppress the anti-Kirin troops of
' Generais Ting Chao and Li Tu. The
Division aavanced as far as the region
of Sanhsing and returned to Harbin
· in the ·earlier part of April. By that
time ' the 10th Division had arrived at
Harbin and took over the sector from
the 2nd Division. This unit was engaged lor _about ..a month in constant
fighting against the anti-Kirin troops
with the greater Dart of its forces in
the district near Sanhsing and with
a minor detachment alon,e: the eastern
branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway, in the direction of Hailin.
In the earlier part of May, the Japanese forces in the north of Manchuria
were further re-enforced by the 14th
,Division. A detachment of this unit
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took part in the fighting against the
anti-Kirin forces and advanced as far
as the valley of Mutan River, south
of Sanhsing, forcing the opposing
troops to withdraw to the most eastern corner of Kirin Province. But the
main operations of the 14th Division.
which beg:m in the iatter, part of
May, took place in the region north of
Harbin and were directed against the
troops of General Ma Chan-shan. The
14th Division carried out its main attack to the north of Harbin, along
the Hulan-Hailun Railway, and, with
minor forces to the east from Koshan,
the proposed terminus of the Tsitsihar-Koshan Railway. The Japanese
claim that during the earlier part of
August the troops of General Ma
Chan-cman were again effectively
routed, and that they have strong
evidence that the General himself
v;-as killed. The Chinese assert that
the General is still alive. In this action cavalry, newly arrived from
Japan, likewise took part.
During the month of August, several
minor engagements took place on the
borders of Fengtien and J ehol Provinces, mainly near the ChinchowPeipiao branch line (of the PeipingMukden Railway), which is the only
means of access to Jehol by railway.
There are widespread fears in China
that these events are only a prelude
to larger military operations at an early date, aimed at the occupation of
Jehol by the Japanese. The main lines
of communication which still exist between China Proper and the Chinese
forces in Manchuria run through J ehol, and the fear of a Japanese attack
in this Province, which is already
claimed as part of the territory of
"Manchukuo," is not unreasonable. Its
imminence is freely discussed in the
Japanese press.

Japanese Version Given
The Japanese version of the recent
events submitted to the commission by
the Japanese assessor is as follows:
An official attached to the Kwantung
Army Headquarters named Ishimoto
was kidnapped by Chinese "Volunteers"
on Ju~y 17 from a train traveling between Peipiao and Chi.nchow, within
the boundaries of the Province of J ehol. A small detachment of Japanese
infantry, with light artillery, made .a n

immediate· attempt to rescue him but
in their purpose, and the result
•was the occupation of a village on the
· frontier of J ehol by Japanese troops.
During the latter part of July and
in August, Japanese airplanes demon. strated several times over this part of
J ehol and dropped some bombs, but
"uninhabited areas outside the villages"
· were carefully selected. On August
19 a Japanese staff officer was sent to
' Nan).ing, a small town situated between
Peipiao and the provincial boundary, to
ne,:!otiate for the release of Mr. Ishimoto. On his return journey with a
small infantry detachment he was fired
' upon. In self-defense the fire was returned, and on the arrival of another
infantry detachment, Nanling was occupied but evacuated on the following
1
day.
Through the Chinese assessor extracts
' were submitted to the Commission
. from th~ reports of General Tang Yuling, the Governor of the Province of
Jehol. These reports claim that fighting on a much larger scale took place,
and that a Chinese battalion of railway
guards was in action against a superior
.number of Japanese infantry, supported
by .two armored trains. They ~1a;m
that the bombing referred to bv the
Japanese was directed against Chaoyang, one of the larger towns in thRt
region, and that RS a result 30 casualti~
were caused among both military and
civilians. The Japanese offensive was
resumed on August 19, when an armored train attacked Nanlin2.
· The information given by the Japa. nese assessor concludes by stating that,
although the maintenance of order in
Jehol is "a matter of internal policy
for Manchukuo, Japan cannot be indifferent to the situation in that re~ion
in view of the important role plaved
by Japan in tbe maintenance of pP.ace
and order in Manchuria and Mongolia, and that any disorders in Jeho,
would immediately produce very serious repercussions throu!?hout Manchuria and Mongolia."
1 failed

Tang Reports Measures
· General Tang Yu-lin concludes bis
r eport by stating that' all possible meas. a.res were being taken to offer effectivc
resistance shoU:d the Japanese attacks
' be· : renewed.

·,· From these commurtications it seems
· that an extension of the area ·of conflict in this region is a contingency
which must be reckoned with.
Although the main Chinese army was
withdrawn within the Great Wall at
the end of 1931, the Japanese continued
to meet with opposition of an irregular
kind in different parts of Manchuria.
· There have been no further battles
such as occurred on the Nonni River
but fighting has been constant and widely dispersed. It has been the practice
of the Japanese to describe indiscriminately as "bandits'' all the forces now
opposed to them. There are, in fact,
apart from bandits, two distinct categories of organized resistance to the
Japanese troops or to those of "Manchukuo;" namely, the regular and irregular Chinese troops. It is extremely difficult to estimate the number of
these two, and, as the commission was
not able to meet any of the Chinese generals still in the field, it is necessary
to make reservations with regard to the
reliability of the information given below. Chinese authorities are naturally
reluctant' to give away exact information about such troops as are still offering resistance to the Japanese in
Manchuria. Japanese authorities, on
the other hand, are disposed to minimize the numbers and fighting value
of the forces still opposed to them.
The remnants of the original Northeastern armies are to be found ex~usively in the Provinces of Kirin and
Heilungkiang. The reorganization of
troops which took place around Chinchow late in 1931 was not of long duration, because all those units were subsequently withdrawn inside the Great
Wall. But the regular Chinese troops,
which, before September, 1931, were
stationed in the Sungari region and
along the Chinese Eastern Railway,
have never been seriously engaged with
the Japanese troops and continue to
carry on a ~erilla warfare which has
given, and still gives, much trouble
to the Japanese and "Manchukuo" forces. The Generals Ma Chan-shan, Ting
Chao and Li Tu have acquired great
fame throughout China as leaders of
these troops. All three are former brigade-generals in command of railway
guards or garrison troops in North
Manchuria. Probably the greater part
·of the troops under their command re-:

rilained faithful to their respective
leaders and the cause of China after
the destruction of the Young Marshal's
regime. The strength of General Ma's
troops cannot easi~y be det.ermined, because, as will be remembered, this
general changed his allegiance.
As
Governor of Heilungkiang Province he
was in command of all the provincial
troops, the number of which was given
to us as seven brigades in all. Since
the month of April he has definitely
taken up a position against Japan and
"Manchukuo." The number of troops
at his disposal between Holan River,
Hailun and Taheiho is estimated by
Japanese authorities as six regiments,
or between 7,000 and 8,000 men. Generals Ting Chao and Li Tu control six
old brigades of Chang Hsueh-liang's
army and have since raised in the
country three additional brigades. Their
total strength at the time of our preliminary report was estimated by Japanese authorities as about 30,000. But
it is very probable that the troops of
General Ma Chan-sh;in as well as those
of Generals Ting Chao and Li Tu have
considerab~y diminished in number
since the month of April and are now
below the estimated figure. Both units,
as will be seen later on, have suffered
a great deal from concentrated attacks
of regular Japanese troops since the
occupation of Harbin. At present they
seem unable to hinder any operation
by the Japanese troops and carefully
avoid meeting them in the open field.
The use of airplanes by the Japanese
and the complete absence of this weapon on the other side account for the
great.er part: of such losses as they have
sustained.
Irregulars Distinguished
When considering the irregular fore~
it is necessary to distinguish between
the different volunteer forces in Kirin
Province co-operating with the annie.<:
of Generals Chao and Li. In our preliminary report of April 29, 1932, we
mentioned, on page 5, under the heading "Volunteers," three different volunteer armies and several minor corps.
one of the latter between Tunhua and
Tienpaoshan remaining in touch with
these regular troops of Generals Ting
Chao and Li Tu. Owing to the absence
of railways and other means of com munication in these districts this corps
still keeps the same position. Its Chief,

H

Wang Teh-ling, united different . ..antj_Manch~uo" forces and kept them
f\rmly under his command. Th~ugh
tliis force may 1;>e of small significance
compared with Japanese troops ,(which
hardly exhibit any activity to the. east
of Tunhua), it seems well able to hold
its own against the "Manchukuo" trol.)ps
and maintains its position in a conc:;idErable part of Kirin Province. No
\flclence is available concerning thP
pre:::ent activity of the "Big Sword
Society" which, while keeping in touch
with Wang Teh-ling,, created considerabJe disturbance in the C!lient~~ Dh~trict . One the other hand, no action
of importance has been undertaken
against it by Japanese troops.
,An official Japanese document has
been submitted to the commission enumerating a large number of so-call~
route-armies and other Chinese ,unit.c;,
each containing not more than 2.00. to
~00 men, which form the subdjvisions
of the volunteer armies. Their field
of activity extends to the areas around
Mukden and the Mukden-Antun2 Railway, to Chinchow and the boundary
between J ehol and Fengtien Provinces.
to the western branch of the Chinese
Eastern Railway and to the district
betwe.e n Hsinmin and Mukden. Thus
the area covered by these volunteers
and the anti-Kirin forces combined
comprises the greater part of Manchuria.
In the middle of August, fighting
broke out in the immediate neighborhood of Mukden, at different piaces
of the southern part of the South Manchuria Railway, eEpecially at Haicheng
and at Yingkow. On several occasion.,
the Japanese troops have found themselves in a
difficult position, but
nowhere have the volunteers succeeded
in attaining a victory of any importance. It seems doubtful whether any
change in the general situation in Manchuria is to be anticipated in the n~ar
future, but at the time of the completion of our ireport fighting continues over a wide area.
,

3

Many Bandits Found
As in China, banditry has alway:,
existed in Manchuria. Increasin~ or
diminishing in numbers in relation tn
the activity or the weakness of the
Government, professional bandits are t#)
be found in all parts of the ThreP

Provinces and their services wete often
employed by different parties for political purposes. The Chinese Govet'nment has presented to the commissior•
a document statin.E that durin.e: the
last 20 or 30 years Japanese agen~ to
a great extent instigated bandits I t<>
serve their political interests. A pa!>sage from the Second Report of Progress of Manchuria in 1930, published
by the South Manchuria Railway, is
quote$! in this document to the effect
that within the railway area alone the
aumber of cases of banditry had increased from 9 cases in 1906 to 368 in
1929. According to the Chinese document quoted above, banditry has bet>n
encouraged by the smuggling of arms
and munitions on a large scale from
Dairen .and the Kwantung Leased Territory. It is asserted, for instance, that
the notorious bandit chief, Lin Yin-shih,
was provided in November last with
arms. munitions and other means in
order to establish the so-called Independent Self-Defence Army which was
organized with the help of three Japanese agents and destined to attack
Chinchow. After the failure of thic;
attempt another bandit chief got Japanese help for the same purpose but
tell into the hands of the Chinese authorities with all his material of Ja,.1<1nese origin.

Japanese authorities, of course, see
the state of banditry in Manchuria in
quite a different light. Accordin2 to
them, it~ existence is due exclusively
to the inefficiency of the Chinese Government. They allege also that Chang
Tso-lin to a certain extent favored the
existence of bandit gangs in his ter•
ritory, because he thought that in time
of need they could easily be convert•
ed into soldiers. The Japanese au•
thorities, while adrnitting the fact that
the complete overthrow of Chang
Hsueh-liang's government and army
greatly added to the number of bandits
in the country, claim that the presence
of their troops in the country will enable them to wipe out the principal
bandit units within from two to three
years. They hope that the organiza
tion of "Manchukuo" police and of
self-defense corps in each community
will help to put an end to banditry.
Many of the present bandits are believed to have been peaceful citizens
who on account of the complete loss
of their property were induced to take
up their present occupation. Given the
opportunity of resuming the occupation
of farming, it is hoped that they will
return to their former peaceful mode
of life.
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Shanghai
At the end of January :fighting broke
out . at Shanghai. The story of that
affair has a:ready been told in its broad
outlines down to February' 20 by the
Consular Committee appointed by the
League. The fighting was still in progress when the commission arrived ., at
Tokyo on the 29th, and · several discussions took place with members of the
Japanese Government on the , origin;
motives and consequences of their armed intervention in this place. When
we reached Shanghai, on March 14th, the
fighting was over, but the negotiations
for an armistice were proving difficult.
The arrival of the commission at this
moment was opportune and may I have
helped to create a propitious · atmosphere. We were able to appreciate the
tense feeling which had been createdby the recent hos~ilities and to obtain
an immediate and ,vivid impression .
both of the difficulties and Qf the fssues
involved in this controversy.
The
commission was not instructed to con- ·
tinue the work of the Consular Committee or to make a special study of
the recent events there. In fact, we
were informed by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations that the
Chinese Government had expressed
themselves as opposed to any suggestion
that the comm1Ssion should delay its
journey to Manchuria for the purpose
of studying the situation at Shanghai.
We heard the views of both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments
on the Shanghai affair, and were the
recipients of a large amount of literature from both sides on the subject.
We also visited the devastated area
and heard statements from Japanese
naval and military officers on the recent operations. In an individual capacity, too, we had conversations with
the representatives of many shades of
opinion on matters which were fresh
in the memory of every one living in
Shanghai. But we did not, as a com•
7u

mission, officially investigate the Sluing- '
hai affair and therefore · express . no
opinion upon the disputed points con- 1
nected with it. We shall, however; fo'r'
purposes of record, complete the story·
of the operations from February · 20·
until the final withdrawal of the JaD3·- ·
nese troops.
.... ,

~

No Marked Success
The last report of the Consular Com-.·
mittee endl:!d, it will be remembered, by .
stating that the Japanese, on Fepruary,
20, opened a new attack in the Kiang~
wan and Woosung areas. This . attack'
brought no marked success to ·the·. Ja- '
panese troops, despite the fact that'
it was continued on the following days, ·
but it enablecl them to learn that parts '
of the so-called Chinese Bodygu~d,
Army, viz., the 87th and 88th Divisions,:
were now 'fighting against them ~ .w .eU
as the 19th Route Army. This fact,;
together with the difficulties wliich tliei
nature of the country presented, decid- 1
ed the Japaul:!se to re-enforce their
troops by two more divisions, namely
the 11th and 14th.
On February 28 the Japanese troops
occupied the western part of Kiangwan, which had been evacuated by
the Chinese. On the same day the
Woosung fort and fortifications along
the Yangtze River were again bombed from the air and from the sea,
and bombing planes operate<i over the
whole front, including the airdrome at
Hungjao and the Nanking Railway.
General Shirakawa, who was appointed to the supreme command of the
army, arrived in Shanghai on February 29. From this date onwards the
Japanese Headquarters announced substantial progress. In the rlistrict of
Kiangwan the_y advanced slowly, and
the naval headquarters stated that the
opposing forces at Chapei showed
signs of giving way as a consequence
of the daiiy bombardments. On the
same day the air drome at Hangchow.

which is 100 miles distant , from Sbanghai, was bombed from th~ air, ;
On March 1, as the f,rontal · attack
had advanced but slowly, the .J;apanesttl
army commander initiated a wide enveloping, movement by landing, -the
main force of the 111th -Division : at
some distance on the right bank of
the Yangtze River, in the vicinity of
Tsiyakow, for the purpose Qf making
a surprise attack on the left , flank of
the Chinese Army. The maneuver
was successful in compeiling an immediate retreat of the Chinese forces
beyond the 20 kilometer limit originally asked for in the .Japanese commandder's ultimatum of February 20. Woo.:
sung fort had been evacuated by the
Chinese troops when on March 3, it
was entered by the Japanese troops
after many aerial and na~al °b9JI?.bardments. .On the previous day bombing
operations had been extended as far
as 7 kiiometerr, east of Quinsan Station on the Shanghai-Nanking Railway, with the alleged object of preventing the transportation of re-enforcements to the Chinese .fro11t.
Fighting Is Stopped

On March 4 the Assem.b ly of . the
League, recalling the suggestions of
the Council. (1) called .on both Governments to make the cessation of hostilities effective: (2) reauested other interested Powers to inform th~ Assembly on the execution of the previous
paragraph and .(3) recommended negoti-.
ations, with the assistance of other
PQwers, for the conclusion pf the arrangements in order to render d.e finite
the cessation of hostilities and to re-.
gulate the withdrawal of the Japanes.e
troops, wishing to be informed by the
Powers on the development pf these
negotiations.
Readiness to Negotiate .
On March 9 the Japanese seni a
memorandum to the Chinese , through
the intermetliary of the British 'Minister, in which their readiness to negotiate on the basis of the poirlts laid
down b • the Assembly was expressea.
On March 10 the Chinese · replied
through the same chanriel that they
too were ready , to neg6tiate · ori this
basis, but on condition that the conference should be 'limited: to ·matters
pertaining to the · definite cessation of

hostiiities and , the . complete and tm"'
conditional withdrawal of the _Japanese1
troops. On March 13 the Japanese in,- ,
timated that they were not disposed :
to regard the Chinese 'resewations . •as!
modifying the sense of the resolutions!
of the League of Nations or in any ·
way binding on themselves. They•
thought that both parties should ·. meet :
on the basis of the resolutions. . , 1 , ;
On the afternoon of March' 3 · the '
Japanese Commander gave the order to;
stop fighting. The Chinese Commar,der
issued a similar order on March 4.· A '
strong complaint was made by the Chi- '.
nese that the 14th Japanese Division
w&s landed at Shanghai between the
7th and the 17th of March, ~fter the•
cessation of hostilities, and about a '
month later was transported "to .Man-:
churia in order to re-enforce the Japa-·
nese troops there.
'
In the meantime attempts to secure
a cessation of hostilities th:r;ough · the
good offices of friendly Powers and of
the League of Nations had been con-·
tinued. On February 28 the Br~tish
Admiral, Sir Howard Kelly, received'
on his flagship the delegates of both'
parties. An agreement on the basis
of mutual and · simultaneous withdrawal and of a temporary character was
proposed. The conference was not sµc~e~sful, . owing to the differing opinio~s
of the two parties as to the basis ot
the negotiations.
On February 29 the President of the.
Council of the Leag\le of Nations made:
recommendations which contemplated,
among other things, "a mixed conference in the presence of other interested•
Powers in view of the final conclusion·
of the fighting and for a definite ces-,
sation of hostilities, subject to ,local,
arrangements." Both parties accepted,
but a successful outcome of the nego-:
tiations was rendered impossible by
the conditions of the Japanese delegates;
who demartded that: (1) the Chintsa
troops should first begin to withdraw
and (2) the Japanese, having ascertained that the withdrawal was taking
place, should then retire, not, as formerly stated, to the International Set~le-:
ment and the extra-Settlement streets,
but to an area extending from Shanghai.
to · Woosung.
On M~rch 24 the Sino-Japanese conference, ,,on the cessation of hostilities
1
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was opened. In the meantime the withdrawal of Japanese military and naval
forces had actually begun. On March
2A) naval and air contingents left Shan~hai, . reducing the remaining strength
to "something not far above normal."
The Japanese Headquarters announced
on ,March 27, on the occasion of further withdrawal, that this had nothing
to do with the above-mentioned conference or with the Lea,rue of Nations,
but was simply the outcome of the independent decision of the Headquarter.i;:
of the Imperial Japanese Army to re~ll units no longer required at Shan2hai.
On March 30 the conference announced that on the preceding day an a~reement relative to a definite cessation t1f
b.ostiliti€s had been reached, but fur..
ther difficulties supervened, and it was
not until May 5 that a complete armistice agreement was ready for siin,ature. It provided for a d?fi.nite ces•
sation of hostilities, fixed a line to the
west of Shanghai as a temporary limit
for the advance of Chinese troops, pending further arran2ements upon the reestablishment of normal conditions and
provided for the withdrawal of the
Japanese troops to the International
Settlement and the extra-Settlement
streets as previous to January 28. Cer•
tain areas outside the Settlement had
to be temporarily included, because
the number of Japanese troops was too
large to be quartered within the Settlement alone, but those do not require
to be mentioned as they have since
been evacuated. A Joint Commission,
in whieh the assistant friendly Powers,
the United States of America, Great
Britain, France and Italy and the t,wo
parties were represented, was established to certify the mutual withdrawal.
This corrtmission was also to collabo·
rate in arranging for the transfer from
the Japanese forces to the Chinese
police.
Qualifications Added
The Chinefe added two qualifications
to the agreement. The first declared
that nothing in the agreement was to
irtlply permanent restriction of the
tnovement of Chinese troops in Chi•
nese territory, and the second tl1at it
was to be understood that even i:l
areas temporarily provided for the sta•
tioning of the Japanese troops all municipal function;;, including that of polic-
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ing, would remain with the Chinese
authorities.
The terms of this agreement as ~
whole have in the main since been
carried out. The evacuated areas were
turned over to the Chinese Special
Police Force between May 9 and 30.
The turning over, however, of these
four areas has been somewhat delayed.
It was but natural that when the Chine~e owners of houses and factories.
officials of railways and companies, and
others began to re-enter the evacuated
areas, numerous complaints concerning
looting, willful destruction and carrying away of property should have been
addressed to the Japanese military authorities. In the opinion of the Chine:e, the whole question of reparations
remains for further negotiations. They
estimate the casualties in killed and
wounded and missing as 24,200 officers.
men and civilians, and the btal material loss at approximately 1,500,000.000
Mexican dollars. A draft agreement
dealing with the extra-Settlement roadareas has been initialed by representatives of the Shanghai Munich:l6l
Council and of the Chinese Municipality
of Greater Shanghai. But it hes no1
yet received the approval of either the
Municipal Council or of the city Gov...ernment. The Municipal Council '1as
referred it to the Senior Consul for the
observations of the Consular Body.
The Shanghai affair undoubtedly exercised considerable influence upon the
situation in Manchuria. The ease with
which the Japanese had been able to
occupy the greater part of Manchuria
and the absence of any resistance by
the Chinese troops not only led to a
belief in Japanese naval and military
circles that the fighting quality of the
Chinese anny was negligible but caused
profound depression throughout China.
The stout resistance put up from the
first by the Chinese 19th Route Army,
with the assistance later of the 87tn
and 88th Guard Divisions, was hailed
throughout China with the greatest
enthusiasm, and the fact that the
original 3,000 marines had to be supplemented by three divisions and a
mixed brigade of the Japanese Army
before the Chinese forces were finally
dislodged and driven back after silt
weeks of fiehting creat"'d a profound
irttpression upon the Chinese morale.
The feeling prevailed that China must

he saved by lier <>wn efforts. The SinoJapanese .conflict w.as brought home to
the people throughout China. Ever-ywhe're opinion hardened and the spirit
of" resist.ance increased. Former pessimism ga place to equally exaggerated
<0.Ptimism. In Manchuria the news
from Shanghai put fresh heart into the
.scattered forces still opposing the Japanese troops. It encouraged t,he subsequent resistance of General Ma Chanshan and stimulated the patriotism of
the Chinese all over the world. The
resistance of the Volunteer Armies increased. Expeditions to suppress them
met with indifferent success, and in
some areas the Japanese stood on the
defensive, taking up positions along
certain railway lines which were frequently attacked.
Incident in Nanking
The hostilities at Shanghai were followed by several other incidents, one
of which was the short bombardment
of Nanking. This incident created
much excitement and alarm, even outside China. It happened on the late
evening of February 1, but did not last
for more than one hour. The incident
was probab!y caused by a misunderstanding, but had the important consequence of a temporary removal of
the Chinese Government from Nanking
to Loyang.
Chinese and Japanese versions both
of the origin and of the facts are widely divergent. Two justifications were
given to us from Japanese course. The
first was that since the outbreak of
hostilities at Shanghai the Chinese had
extended the Lion Hill Forts, constructed trenches and established artillery positions at the gates near the
river and on the opposite side of it,
thus making military preparations on
a ~cale sufficient to arouse concern
among the Japanese, who had warships
stationed on the river. The second was
that the vernacular press had spread
untruthful stories of Chinese victories
at Shanghai, which had caused great
excitement among the Chinese population of Nanking. In consequence, Chinese employed by Japanese were, it is
a:leged, forced by threats tn give up
their situations, and Chinese merchants
refused to sell even the necessary food
supplies to Japanese residents, includ-

ing

crews

the Consular staff and tlie
of warships.
The Chinese did · not comment on
these complaints. They assP.rt that
the general uneasiness and tense at;.
mosphere prevailing were caused by
the fact that the Japanese, after -th
Shanghai · outbreak. incrensE?d the
nu.ml>er of their warships from two
to five, · and subsequently to :seven
(the Japa)J.~se authorities give the
number as si~, these being thre.e _old
gunboats ~nd three destroyers); that
the commander of the warships landed a certain number of sailors and
put them on guard duty before the
wharf of the Nisshin Kisen Kaisha,
where the Japanese Consuh:tr Staff
and all the Japanese residents had
U:ken refuge on a hulk. With the
events of Shanghai fresh in their
memories, such measures may well
have fili.ed the minds of the already
excited population at Nanking with
fears of a similar experience.
Landing Is Resented
We know from a report of the Police
Commissioner of Nanking to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the autho:rities at Nanking who wert! solely
responsible for the protection of their
own subjects and of foreign nationals
at that place greatly re~ented the landing of Japanese naval force:i. They
addressed representations to the Japanese Vice-Consul, who replied 1hat he
w.2s unable to do anything in the? matter. At the same time, special instructions were given to the local police
station at Hsiakwan, where the warships were anchored and the abovementioned whar f was situated, to
prevent, if possible, any contact between Chinese and Japanese in this
area, especially at night time. According to the Ja:;>anese official reports,
their refugees were taken on board a
steamer of the same Nisshin Kisen
Kaisha during the <lays following January 29, and a considerable mun'Jer
were transported to Shanghai. On the
late evening of February 1 the Japanese assert that three gunshots were
sudden \v fired aprprentlty from the
Lion Hill Fo-r ts. At the same t:me
Chinese regulars fir€d on the Japan2se
naval guards on the river banks, causing two c:.sualties, of which one was
i'[9

fatal. The fire was returned, but
directed only at the immediate neighborhood of their landing place , and
stopped as soon as the firing from the
shore had ceased. Such is the Japa•nese version. 'l'he Chinest'!, on the ·
other hand, stoutly deny that any firing at all took place, but uUpge that
eight shells in all were fiTPd at the
forts, at Hsiakwan station and at other
places, accompanied by machine-gun
and rifle ftrlng, and that during this
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time searchlights were directed at the
shore. This caused considerable panic
among the inhabitants, who rushed into the interior of the city; but no
casualties were reported and the
material damage was not greot.
It is also possible that the incident
was first started by the firing of
crac.kers by the excited Chinese population, celebrating a supposed victory
at Shanghai.

CHAPTER VI
"Manchukuo"
Part I
1. Stages in the formation of the
"new State"
As a result of the events of September 18, 1931, as described in the last
Chapter, the civil administra~ion of
Mukden city and of the Provmce of
Liaoning (Fengtien) was completely
disorganized and even that of the other
two provinces was affected to a lesser
extent. The suddenness of the attack
on Mukden, which was not only the
political center of all Manchuria but,
next to Dairen, the most important
commercial center of South Mant'huria.
created a panic among the Chinese
population. Most of the prominent officials, and the leading members of the
educational and commercial communities, who could afford to do so, left immediately with th~ir families. During
the days following the 19th of September over 100,000 Chinese residents left
Mukden by the Peiping-Mukden Railway, and many who could not get
away went into hiding. The police,
and even the prison warders, disappeared. The municipal, district and provincial administrations at Mukden completely broke down, the public utility
companies for the supply of electric
light, water, etc., the buses and
tramways, and the telephone and telegraph services, ceased to function.
Banks and shops kept their doors closed.
The immediate necessity was the organization of a municipal government'
and the restoration of the ordinary civic
life of the city. This was undertaken
by the Japanese and carried through
quickly and efficiently. Colonel Dohihara was installed as Mayor of Mukden
and within three days normal civil administration was restored.
Several
hundred police and most of the prison
warders were brought back with the
help of General Tsang Shih-yi, the

Civil Governor of the Province, and
the public utility services were restor•
ed. An Emergency Committee with a
majority of Japanese members helped
Colonel Doihara, who held his post for
one month. On October 20 the reiris
of municipal government were restored to · a qualified Chinese body, with
Dr. Chao Hsin-po (a lawyer who had
studied for 11 years in Japan and was
a Doctor of Law of Tokyo Cniversity)
as Mayor.
·
Provincial Regime Reorganized
The next problem was to reorganize
the provincial administration in each
of the Three Provinces. This task was
more difficult in Liaoning than in either of the other two, because Mukden
was the center of this provincial administration; most of the influential
men had fled, and for a time a Chinese
provincial administration continued to
be carried on at Chinchow. It was
three months, therefore, before the reorganization was completely accomplished.
Lieutenant General Tsang
Shih-yi, the existing President of the
Liaoning Provincial Government, was
first approached on September 20 and
invited to organize a Provincial Government independent of the Chinese
Central 'Government. This he refused
to do. He was then put under arre::.'"t
and released on December 15.
After General Tsang Shih-yi had refused to help in the establishment of
an independent Government, another
influential Chinese official, Mr. Yuan
Chin-kai, was appreached. He was a
former provincial governor and a
Vice-President of the Northeastern
Political Committee. The Japanese
military authorities invited him and
eight other Chinese residents to form
u "Committee for the maintenance of
Peace and Order." This committee
was declared to have been formed on
September 24. The Japanese pres.c; at
once acclaimed it as the first step in
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a separatist movement, but Mr. Yuan
Chin-kai publicly disclaimed any snch
intention on October 5. The committee, he said, had "been brought into
being to pr~ervP. peace and order
after the breakdown of the former
administration. It assisted, moreover,
in re:i.ieving refugees, in restoring the
money market, and it attended tn
some other matters, solely for the
isate of preventing unnecessary hardship. It had, how~ver, no intention
of organizing a Provincial Government
or 'declaring independence "
On Octobei- 19 the committee opened
the Board 'of Finance, and Japanese
advisers were appointed to assist
the Chinese functionaries. The DirP,.~
tor of the Board of Finance had to
obtain the approval of the military
uthorities before giving effect to the
board's decisions. In the districts the
tax col1ectors' offices were controlled
by the Japanese gendarmerie or other
agencies. In some cases they had t:>
submit their books daily for insoection to the gendarmerie, whose aoproval had to be obtained for the dic::bursement of any moneys on public
objects such -as police, justice, education, etc. Any case of remittance of
taxes to the "hostile party" at Chinchow was to be at once reoorted to
the .Japanese authorities. At the same
time a Financial Readjustment Committee was organized, the chief business of which was to reorganize the
taxati:m sy::tem._ Japanese representa•tives and the representatives of Chinese
guilds were allowed to take part in
discussions on taxation. According to
a statement in the Histocy of the
Independenc'i of Manchukuo, dated
May 30, 1932, and submitted to the
commission hy the "Department of
Foreign Affairs" at Changchun, these
·discussions led to the abolition on
November 16, 1931, of six taxes, the
reduction of four others by half, the
transfer of eight others to local gov·ernments and tbe prohibition of all
levies, without a legal basis.
Industry · Board Opened
On October 21 the Board of lndustry
was ope.nEcl by the committee, w11ose
name was now changed to that of
"Liaoning Province Self-Governmeni"
Office. The consent of the Japanese
military authorities was sought and ob·s2

tained and a number of Japanese advisers were appointed. Before issuing
any orders the Director was required
to obtain the approval of the Japanese military authorities.
Lastly, the Liaoning Self-Government
Office organized a new Northeastern
Communications Committee, which gradually assumed control of various railways not only in Liaoning Province
but also in Kirin and Heilungkia.ng.
This committee was separated from the
Liaoning Self-Government Office on
November 1.
On November 1 the Liaoning Province Self-Government Office trans•
forn'led itse:f into the Liaoning_ Prot
vincial Go,qerrunent ad interim, which
issued a declaration by which it severed
'its relations with the former North.:.
eastern Government and with the Cenl,,,
tral Government at 'Nanking. It request•
ed the local governments in Liaoning
to abide by the decrees it had issued,
and announced that henceforth it
would exercise the authority o'f a Pro.:.
vincial Government. On November 10
a public opening ceremony took place
Simultaneously with the transforma"'
tion of the Self-Government Office in•
to the Liacming Provincial Goernment
ad interim, a Supreme Advisory Board
was inaugur.ated under the Chairmanship of Mr. Yu Chung-han, who had.
been Vice-Di'rector of the Peace and
Order Maintenance Commtttee. Mr.
Yu announcC:?d the objects of this Board
as: the maintenance of order, the im ..
provement of administration by the
suppression uf bad taxes, the xeduction of taxation and the improvement
of the organization of production and
sale. The board was, furthermore. to
direct and supervise the acting Provincial Government and to foster the development uf local self-11overnment in
accord:; nce with the traditions of local
communities and with modern needs.
It comprised sections dealing with
General Affairs, Investigation, Protocol,
Guidance, Supervision and an institute for Training in Self-Government.
Nearly all the important functionaries
were Jap,mesc.
On November 20 the name of the
Province was changed to that of Fengtien, which had been its name befor~
its union with Natio11alist China in 1928,
and on December 15 Mr. Yuan Chin-

kai was replaced by Gener.al Tsan~
who was ·r eleased from hi~
<ronfb:l:ement a,nd installed as, Governor
of Fengtien Province.
.
Kirin Task Easier
The task of establishing a Provincial
Government in the Province of Kirin
was far easier. On the 23rd the compiander of the 2nd Division, MajorGeneral Tamon, had an interview with
i,ieutenant-General Hsi Hsia, the acting head of the provincial administr~tion in the absence of General Chang
Tso-,bsiang, and invited him to assume
ijie, chairmanship of the Provincial Govermhent. After this interview General Hsi Hsia summoned the various
government organizations and public
associations to a meetiag on September 25 which was also attended by
Japanese military officers. No opposition was expressed to the idea pf e..s:tablishing a new provisional government, and a proclamation to th~t e~ect
was published on September 30. TbP.
Organic Law of the New Provincial
Government of Kirin was subsequently
announced. The committee system of
~overnment was abolishe4, and Governor Hsi Hsia took full responsibility
for the conduct of government. Some
days . later the principal officials of the
new Government were appointed by
him and some Japanese functionaries
were added lat~. The chief q:f thP.
Bureau of General Affairs was a Ja.:>anese. In the dic;tricts also some administrative reorganization and chan2e
of personnel took nlace. 0-q.t of 43
districts 15 w~re reorganized, which
involved the dismissal of the Chinese
District Officers. In 10 others the District Officers were retained after declaring their allegiance to General Hsi
Hsia. The other$ still remained under
Chinese military leaders loyal to the
old regime, or kept aloof from the
contending factions.
· The Chief Aclministrator of the
Special District, Lieutenant-General
Chang Ching-hui, was friendly to the
Japanese. He had no miiitary force
oehind him, whereas the old rel?ime
could still dispose of consideq1ble
forces both in Kil'in and Heilumtkiang,
as well as the railway guards in the
Special DistFict itself. On Septeqiper
?7 he summoned a conference in h~
office at Harbin to discuss the oraani-

S,h.Ui..:yi,

zati9n . 9f .th~ Em~r~.en<:Y, CQmmi~~e
9.f the Spe_c ial District. This committee was formed with q,eneral (;h~nz
as Chairman, and ~ieht 9ther members,
among whom were General Waµ2
Jui-hwa anQ Gen,eral Tin~ Chao. who
later, in Januacy, 1932, became the
leader of the "anti-Kirin" forces in
opposition to General Hsi Hsia. On
November 5 the anti-Kirin army ,mder
the command of the generals of Chang
Tso-hsiang, established a new Kirin
Provincial Government at Harbin.
After General Chang Ching-hui haq
been appointed, on January 1, 19~2,
Governor of Heilungkiang, he declared
in that capacity the independence o~
the Province on January 7. On J anuary 29 General Ting Chao took pos-,
session of the office of the Chief Administrator anQ placed Oeneral Chang
under restraint in his own house. The
latter regained his liberty when the
Japanese forces came north and occupied Harbin on Fabruary 5 after
ciefeating General Ting Chao. Fr?m
tha, time onwards the JaJ?anese m-:
fluence made itself increasingly fel~
in the SpeC'ial District. ·
Complications in Heilungkiang
In Heilungkiang Province a more
complicated situation had arisen owing
to the conflict between General Chan~
Hai-peng and General ~ Chan-shan.
which was described in the last chapter. After the occupation of Tsitsihar
by the Japanese on November 19, a
Self-Government Association of the
usual type was established, and this
Association which was said to represent the ~ill of the people, invited
General Chang Ching-h11i of the ~pecial District, to act concurrent~y as
Governor of Heilungkiang. As the
situation around Harbin was still unsettled and no definite agreement with
Gener~! Ma had been reached, this invitation was not accepted until early
in January, 1932. Even then General
Ma's attitude was ambiguous for some
time. He co-operated with General
Ting Chao until the latter's def.eat in
Fehruary, ;md then came to terms with
~he Japanese, accepting the Governorship of Heilungkiang out of General
Charig's hands, and subsequently c?operated with the qther Governors in. .
the establishment of the new "State."
A ~elf-Gov~ep Gui<}il}g Committe~
was. establisheg ~t Tsitsip.ar on ,Janu-

~ry 25 and the same form of Provincial
Government as in the other Provinces
was · gradually established.
The Province of Jehol has hitherto
kept aloof from the political changes
which have taken place in Manchuria.
.'rehol is part of Inner Mongolia. Over
3,000,000 Chinese settlers now live in
the Province and they are gradually
pushing out to the north the nomadic
Mongob, who still live under their
traditional tribal or Banner system.
These Mongols, who are said to number about one million, have maintained
some relations with the Mongol Banners settled in the west of Fengtien
Province. The Mongols in Fengtien and
Jehol have formed "Leagues," the most
influential of which is the Cherim
League. The Cherim League joined thP
independence movement, as did also
the Mongols in the Barga District, or
Hulunbuir, in the west of Heilungkiang
who have often attempted to free themselves from Chinese rule. The Mongols do not easily assimilate with the
Chinese. They are a proud race, and
every Mongol remembers the exploits
of Chenghis Khan and the conquest of
China by Mongol warriors. They resent Chinese overlordship and they
resent particularly the immigration of
Chinese settlers, by which they are
being gradually extruded from their
territory. The Leagues of Chaota and
Chosatu in Jehol are keeping in touch
with the Banners in Fengtien, which
are now ruled by committees. General
',l'ang Yu-lin, the Governor of the Province, is reported to have assumed full
responsibility for his Province on
Sept~mber 29, and to have kept in
touch with his colleagues in Manchuria. At the inauguration of "Manchukuo'' on March 9, J ehol was included
in the new "State." In fact, however,
no decisive step was taken by the
Government uf the Province. The
latest events in this Province were ref erre~ to at th~ end of the last chapter.

'Independent State' Created
, The local st!lf-governing administrations thus established in all the Provinces were subsequently combined
into a reparate' and independent "State."
To · understand the ease with which
this war accomplished and the amount
~f evidence which it has been possible to bripg ~o;rward of Chinese support' for· it · when it ·was accomplished,
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it is . ne~ary to •consider a peculiar
feature of Chinese organized life which
in some circumstances is a strength and
in others a weakness. As has been
already stated in Chapter I, the community obligations recognized by the
Chinese are rather to the family, to o
locality, or to persons, than to the
State. Patriotism as it is understood in
the West is only beginning to be felt.
Guilds, associations, leagues, armies,
are all accustomed to follow certain
individual leaders. If, therefore, the
support of a particular leader can be
secured by persuasion or coercion. the
support of his adherents over the whole
area of his influence follows as a matter of course. The fore going narrative
of events shoVlfl how successfully this
Chinese characteristic was utilized in
the organziatiou of the Provincial
Governments, and the agency of the
Eeme few individuals was used to com plete the final stage.
The chief agency in bringing about
independence was the Self-Government Guiding Board, which had its
central office in Mukden. By reliable
witnesses it was stated to the commission to have been organized and
in large part officered by Japanese,
although its chief was a Chinese, and
to have functioned as an organ of the
Fourth Department of the Kwantuil.ll
Army Headquarters. Its main purpose was to foster the independence
n1ovement. Under the direction and
supervision of this Central Board,
local Self-Government Executive Committees were formed in the districts
of Fen~ien Province. To those various districts, as occasion demanded,
the Central Board sent out members
from its large and experienced staff
of inspectors, directors and lecturers.
many of whom were Japanese. It utililized also a newspaper, which it edited and published.
The nature of the instructions given
by the Central Board is apparent from
the proc~amation which it issued as
early as January 7, under date of
January 1. The proclamation stated
that the North-east was faced with the
need of developing, without delay, a
great popular movement for the establishment of a new independent State
in Manchuria and Mongolia. It desci:ibed the development of its work in
various districts in Fengtien Province

and ou~lined its plan for the extension
of its activities to the remaining districts and even to the other Provinces.
It then appealed to the people of the
Northeast to overthrow Marshal Chang
:tJsueh-liang, to join the Se:£-Government Association, to co-operate in setting up a clean administration and improving the living conditions of the
people, and it ended with the words:
''Organizations of the Northeast, Unite
Toward the new State Toward Independence" Of this proclamation 50,000
copies were distributed.

Chief Makes Plans

As early as January, also, the Chief
of
the
Self-Government
Guiding
Board, Mr. Yu Chung-han, was already
making plans, together with Governor
Tsang Shih-yi, for the new "State"
which, it w.as reported, · was to be established on February 10. But the
Harbin outbreak of January 29, and
General Ma's ambiguous attitude during ihe conflict with Ting Chao, appear to have been the m ~in reasons
for the temi;iprary postponement of.
further preparations at that time.
. Later, after Ting Chao's defeat,
negotiations between Lieutenant-General Chang Ching-hui .and General Ma
had brought about, <ln February 14, a
settlement according to which GeneTal
Ma was to become Governor of Heilungkiang. The meeting at which the
foundation . of the new State was to be
arranged was held on February 16 and
l:7 at Mukden. The Governors of the
Three; Provinces ana the Special District were present in person, as well
as Dr. Chao Hsin-po, who had played
a· prominent part in all the preparatory work.
At a meeting of these five men it
was decided that a new State should
be established, that a Northeastern
Adininistrative 'Council should be organized which would exercise temporarily· the supreme authority over the
Provinces and the Special District, and,
finally, , that this Supreme Council
should,· without delay, make all necessacy pr-eparations for the founding of
l\eW ·"$tate." On the second day of
the conf~rence, two Mongol Princes
at;t~ded, one representing the . BargaI;?istri.c t-, (Hulu,nbuir) in western Hei1\mg~ng, · th~ ,cOthEµ", ~ince-Chiw~

of the Cherin Leagues, representing
practically all Banners, who respect
this Prince more than any other leader.
. The Supreme Administrative Council
was constituted the same day. Its mein..
hers were Lieutenant-General Chang
Ching-hui, Chairman of the council, the
Governors of Fengtien, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Jehol, and Prince Chiwang
and Prince Ling Sheng for the Mongolian districts. The first decisions of
the Council were: to adopt the republican system for the new "State"; to respect the autonomy of the constituting
Provinces; to give the title of "Regent"
to the Chief Executive and to issue a
J)eclaration ~f Independence, to be
signed by the Governors of the four
Provinces and the Special District; by
Prince Chiwang for all the Banners,
and by Prince Kueifu for Hulnnbuir
in Heilungkiang. The Commander-inChief of the Kwantung Army gave
that night an official dinner in honor
of the "Heads of the new State," whom
he congratulated on their success and
assured of his assistance in case of
need .

Independence Declared
The Declaration of Independence wall
published on February 18. It referred to the ardent wishes of the people
to have permanent peace and to the
duty of the Governors, who were said
~o have been chosen by the people,
to fulfill those wishes. The declaration referred to the necessity of the establishment of a new State, ·and claimed
that the N ortheastem Administrative
Council had been constituted for this
purpose. Now that relations with the
Kuomintang and the Government at
Nanking had been severed, the people
were promised the enjoyment of good
government.
This declaration was
sent by circular wire to all places in
Manchuria. Governor Ma and Governor Hsi Hsia then returned to their
respec~ive provincial capi~ls, but: they
desig.nated representatives to meet
Governor Tsang Shih-yi, Governor
Chang Chiilg-hui, and Mayor Chao
Hsin-po for the purpose of working
out the details Qf, the plan.
In a subsequent meeting held by this.
group, on · February 19, it was decided
to establish a , Repub:ic, to lay down
~e p:i;inciple of the :;eparation of
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powers in the Constitution, and to ask
the former Emperor Hsuan-Tung to
become the Chief Executive. In the
following days it was decided that thecapital should be Changchun; the ~ew
era of government was to be styled
''Tatung" (Great Harmony) and the
design of the national flag was fixed.
Notification of the decisions taken was
sent, on February 25, to all provincial
governments, including J ehol, as well
as to the Mongol admi.nistrative offices
of Hulunbuir and of the Cherim, Chacota and Chosatu Leagues. The lastnamed Leagues are established in Jehol. They could, therefore as already
stated, take no steps against the wishes
of the Chairman of the Government of
that Province.
' After the Declaration of Independence and the announcement of the
plans for the new State, the Self-Government Guiding Board took the leading part in organizing popular manifestations of support. It was instrumental in forming societies for the
"Acceleration of the Foundation of thP
New State." It instructed its branche'3
in the various districts throughout
Fengtien, the Self-Government Executive Committees, to do everything pos.iihle to strengthen and hasten the in'dependence movement. In consequence, the new "Acceleration" societies
sprang up rapid:iy centering around
the Self-Government Executive Committees.
.
From February 20 onwards, these
newly-formed "Acceleration Societies''
became active. Posters were prepared.
slogans printed, books and pamphlets
issued, a "Northeastern Civilization
Half..Monthly" was edited and red
scrolls were distributed. Leaflets were
sent by post to various prominent citizens asking them to help the propaganda work. At Mukden the scro)lc;
were distributed by the Chinese Cham
ber of Commerce, to be placed on the
door-posts.

Popular Approval Organized
. During the same time the ~elf-Government Ex~cutive Committees in the
districts summoned meetings of popular representatives, such as members
of the local gentry, and the chairmen
and prominent members of comrnf'rcial,
agricultural, industrial and educational associations. tp. addition, mass
meetings wet~ dt'ganized and pnrades
Bo

or processiO'.'lS were conducted through,
the principal str.eets of the district
capitals. Resolutions expressihg the
wishes either of the people in general
or of special groups were passed at
conferences of prominent local menand at the mass meetings, in which
it was claimed many thousancl.5 of
persons took part. These resolutions
were naturally sent to the Self-Government Guiding Board at Mukden.
After the Acceleration Societies and
the Self-Government Executive Committees had been active in various
districts of Fengtien, a provincial con-•
vention was organized at Mukden t.o
give concrete evidence of the general
desire of the people for the establishm~nt of the State. Accordingly, on
February 28, a meeting was held in
which about 600 persons took part,
including all the district officers of
the Province and the representatives
o.f nearly all classes and organizations.
This meeting issued a declaration
which stated that it expressed the joy
of the 16,000,000 inhabitants of Fengtien Province at the downfall of the
old oppressive military caste and the
dawn of a new era. As far as Fengtien was concerned, the movement had
thus been brought to a conclusion.
The movement in Kirin Province in
favOT of a new State was also organized and dirE"Cted. While in the
conference .at Mukden on February 16,
Governor Hsi Hsia sent a circular
telegram to his District Officers asking them to enligliten him as to pubJic
opinion in regard to the policy to be
followed by tlie new State. The District Officers were enjoined to give
adequate guidance to the various guilds
and associations in their districts. In
dixect response to the telegram, independence movements sprang up everywhere. On February 20, the Kirin
Provincial Government created the.
State Foundation Committee, which
was to guide the vaTious organizations
in conducting their independence campaigns. On February 24, the People's
Association at Changchun held a mass
meeting in which about 4,000 persons .
are reported to have taken part. They
demanded the acceleration of the foundation of the new "State." Similar
meetil)gs were held in other di$tricts
and a.lso in Harbin. On February 25,

the mass meeting for the whole J>rovince was held at the city of Kirin.
About 10,000 persons were reported to
have been present. A declaration was
duly issued similar to that passed at
Mukden on February 28.

Heilungkiang Independent
. In Heilungkiang Province, the Mukden Self-Government Guidance Board
played an important part. On January
7, after General Chang Ching-hui had
accepted the governorship of Heilung~..iang, he- declared the Province to hf>
independent.
The board lent its assistance in conducting the acceleration movement in
Heilungkiang. Four directing officeHi,
of whom were Japanese, were di.._
patched from Mukden to Tsitsihar. Two
days after their arrival, on February
22, they convened a meeting in the
r-eception hall of the Government
House, in which a lar,ge number of asso~iations were :represented. It was
a Pan-Heilungkiang conference, which
~as to decide upon the mthods of.
preparing for the establishment of the
State. It was resolved to hold a mass
demonstration on February 24..
Many thousands of persons took part
in the mass demonstration at Tsitsihar.
which was covered with posters, scrolls,
streamers and -penno.nts in commemoration of the event. The Japanese artillery fired 101 guns in honor of the
day. Japanese plane,c:; circled overhearl,
dropping down leaflets. A declaration
was promptly issued which favored a
republican form of government, with
a responsible form of government,
with a responsible cabinet and a president as the head of the State. All
powers were to be concentrated in the
Central Government, and the provinda 1
government.c:; were to be abolished.
leaving districts and municipalities as
the units of local .f!overnment.
By the end of February, Fengtien
Kirin, Heilungkiang and the Speci 1
District had passed the stages of district and provincial declarations. The
Mongol Banners had also given thPir
allegiance to the new State, since it
was known that it would mRt 'k off
special autonomous Mongol districts
and would in other ways guarantP.e
the rights of the Mongol inhahitant..c:;.
The Mohammedans had already, at a
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meeting on February 15, at Muk,den..
pledged their allegiance. The majority
of the .small number of una::-simila~d
Man,chus were also in favor of thP
new "State" es s6on as it had become
known that their former Emperor
would probably be offered the post o(
Chief Executive.
After the districts and provinces had
given formal support to the plan ot
a new State, the · Self-Government
Guiding Board took the lead in convening an All-Manchuria Convention.
which was held at Mukden on· February 29. There were present ·officia1
delegates from the provinces, the districts of Fengtien Province and the
Mongol territories, and, in addition
many others, including representatives
of various groups, such as the Kore~ns
in Kirin Province and the Speci&.l District, and the branches of the Y onth
League of Manchuria and Mongolia
altogether over 700 persons.

Resolutions Adopted
Speeches were delivered and a declaration and resolution were unanimously approved, the former denouncing
the previous regime, the latter welcoming the new "State." A second resolution was also adopted designating as
the provisional President of the new
State the former Emperor Hsuan Tung,
now known by his personal name as
Mr. Henry Pu-yi.
The
Northeastern
Administrative
Council met at once in urgent session
and elected six delegates to proceed to
Port Arthur, to convey their invitation
to the former Emperor at Port Arthur,
where he had been residing since he
left Tientsin in the previous November.
Mr. Pu-yi at first declined it, but on
March 4 a second delegation comprising 29 delegates, obtained his consent
to accept the post for one year only.
Then the Administrative Council elected its chairman, Lieutenant-General
Chang Ching-hui, and nine others, t<,
be the reception committee. On March
5, the committee went to Port Arthur
and was received in audience. 1n response to its request the former Emperor, on March 6, left Port Arthur for
Tangkangtze, and after two days began,
on the 8th, to receive homage as the
Regent of "Manchukuo."
The inauguration ceremonies were
held at the new capital, Changchun,
on March 9. Mr. Pu-yi, as Regent,
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made a declaration in which he promised to found the policy of the new
State upon the basis of "morality, benevolence and love." On the 10th, the
principal members of the Government
were appointed; the members of the
Cabinet, the Presidents of the Board
of Legislation and the Board of Control; the President and Vice-President
and Councillors of the Privy Council,
the Governors of the Provinces and
of the Special District. the Commanders of the Defense Forces of the Provinces and some other high officials.
A notice regarding the establishment
of "Manchukuo" was issued by telegram on March 12 to the foreign
Powers. The declared vurpose of this
notice was to communicate to the foreign Powers the fundamental object
of the formation of "Manchukuo"; and
the requ_e st that they recognize it as
a new State
Prior to the arrival of the Regent. a
number of laws and regulations, on
which Dr. Chao Hsin-po had been
working for some time, had been made
ready for adoption and promul~ation.
They came into force on March 9.
simultaneously with the law regulating the organization of the Gover11.ment, while the laws which theretQfore had bP.en in effect, insofar as
they were not in conflict with thP.
new laws. or with the fundamental
policy of the State. were provisionally
adopted by gpecia l ordinance nf th P
same date.

All Sources Used
This narrative of the stages by which
the "State of Manchukuo" was created
ha'd been compiled from all the sources
of information available. The event..
were reported at length as they occurred in J apa.."'lese newspapers and
most fully perhaps in the columns -0f
the Japanese-edited Manchuria Dailv
News. The two documents entitled
Histoire de l'lndependance du Manchuku~Ministere des Affaires Etran:.
geres 'du Manchukuo and A General
Out:ine of Manchukuo,-Department of
Foreign · Affairs, Manchukuo, which
were prepared at Changchun on May
30 by the present administration; and
the Memorandum on the so-called Independence Movement in the Three
~stem Provinces, prepared by the Chinese assessor, have also been· carefully
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studied'. In addition, wherever possible. neutral sources of information
were utilized.
The measures of civil administration
taken by the Japanese military authorities between September 18 and the establishment of the "Manchukuo Government," notably the control of the
banks, the administration of the public utility services and the management of the railways, indicated that
from the commencement of the operations objects more permanent than the
requirements of a temporary military
occupation were being pursued. Immediately after the occupation of Mukden, on September 19, guards were
placed in or in front of all Chinese
banks, railway offices, the administra~ive offices of public utility services, the
office of the Mining Administration and
simii.ar premises. Investigations were
then ·conducted into the financial and
general situation of these enterprises.
When they were allowed to reopen,
Japanese were appointed as advisers,
e~perts, .o r secretnries to officials, usually with administrative powers. Many
business enterprises were owned by the
former administration of th e Three
Eastern Provinces, as well as by the
provincial administrations; and as the
previous Government was r egarded as
are enemy Governments in time of war,
no bank, no mining, agricultural or
tndustrial enterprise, no railway offices,
no public utility- in fact, no single
source of revenue in which t hey had
been interested in either their public
or private caoacities, was left without
s?-pervision.
· ~way Measures Taken
, As regards railways, the measureci:
taken by the Japanese authorities from .
the outset of the per iocl of military,
Qccupation were designed to settle definitely; in a manner favor.able to Japanese interests, some of the questioni;which had Iona- been in dispute between the Chinese and Japanese railways, i;i,nd which have been described
in Chapter III. The fo:lowing measures we:r:e promptly taken:
. ·1. All ·the Chinese-owned r.s ilways
north of the Great Wall, and the
moneyg standing to their credit in
banks in Manchuria, were seized.
,: 2. In order that the railways might
be :co~rdinated with the:, South Man- ·

<;huria Railway, certain cban11;es were
iµade in the arrangement of' tracks in
~d around Mukden, by cutting the
tracks of the Peiping-Mukden Railway at the viaduct under the 8011th
Manchuria Railway, thus closing the
(.iaoning Central sta~ion, the Fengtien
E;ast station, the Fengtien North Gate
station and thus severing the connec~ion with the Chinese Government
railway to Kirin Oater replaced).
3. At Kirin a physical connectiotJ
was made between the Hailun-Kirin
line and the Kirin-Tunhua and KirinChangchun railways.
4. A staff of Japanese technical advisers was installed in various de·
partments of the railways.
1 5.
The "special rates" adopted by the
Chinese authorities were abolished and
the original tariffs restored,
thus
bringing freight rates on Chinese railways more into conformity with those
of the South Manchuria Railways.
During the period between September 18, when the Northeastern Communications Committee ceased to function, and the date of the creation of
the "Manchukuo Ministry of Com~uni~tions," the Japanese authorities
assumed entire respondbility for the
administration of the railways.
Measures of a similar kind, which
went beyond those which were nec•'.Ssary for the protection of the lives nnd
property of their nationals, were take1!
by the Japanese in respect of the pnblic electricity supplies at Mukden and
Antung. Also, in the period between
September 18 and the establishment of "Manchukuo," the Japanese
authorities made changes in the administration and management of the
Chinese Government telephone, telegraph and wireless services which
would ensure their intimate co-ordination with the Japanese telephone and
telegraph services in Manchuria.
Conclusions Presented
. Since September 18, 1931, the activi~es of the Japanese military authorities, in civil as well as in military
1:0atters, were marked by essentially
political considerations. The proin-essive military occupation of the Three
Eastern Provinces removed in succession from the control of the Chinese
~-µthorities the towns of Tsitsihar,
Chincliow and Harbin, finally all the

µnportant towns of Manchuria; and following each occupation the civil administration was reorganized. It is
dear that the Independence Movement
which had never been heard of in Manchuria before September, 1931, was only
made possible by the presence of the
Japanese troops.
A group of Japanese civil and military officials, both active and retired,
who were in close touch with the new
political movement in Japan to which
reference was made in Chapter IV, conceived, organized and carried through
this movement, as a so:ution to the
situation in Manchuria as it existed
after the events of September 18.
With this object they made use of
the names and actions of certain Chinese individuals, and took advantage
of certain minorities among the inhabitants, who bad grievances against the
former administration.
It is also clear that the Japanese
General Staff realized from the start, or
at least in a short time, the use which
could be made of such an autonomy
movement.
In
consequence they
provided a&,Sistance and gave direction to the organizers of the movement.
The evidence received from all
sources has satisfied the commission
that while there were a numbei: of
factors which contributed to the creation of "Manchukuo" the two which,
in combination, were most effective,
and without which, in our judgment,
the new State could not have ~n
formed, were the presence of Japanese
troops and the activities of Japanese
officials, both civil and military.
For this reason the present regime
cannot be considered to have been
called into existence by a genuine and
spontaneous independence movement .

Part D
The Present Govemmepi .. of
"Ma.nchukuo"
"Manchukuo" is governed in accordance with an Organic Law and a
Guarantee Law of Civil Rights. The
Organic Law prescribes the fundamental organization of the Governmental organs.. It was promul~ted by
Qi:dinance ,No. 1 issued on March 9,.
the ,first year .of Tatung (1932>.
. The Rege:n't is ·head. of the State. All
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e-xecutiv~ l)ower is vest~d in him., an.d
he .has also the authority to ovenult'
the Legislative Coun~l. He ls as~isted by a Privy Council, which is to
advise him upon impo,rtant affairs.
. A characteristic feature of the Or-•
ganic Law is the separation of departments: the Executive, the Le£i~lative, . the Judicial and the SuDervisory.
The functions of the Executive o~
partment are carried out, under th~
direction of the Regent, by the PrPi;nier and tl1e Ministers of State, who
together form :\ State Council or Cabiet. The Premier supervises the work
of the Ministries, and, throu,gh the
r?owerful Board of General Affairs. ha;
direct charge of their confidential
matters, perconnel, accountlng aud
supplies. Subordinate to the f;tate
Council are various bureaus, especially the important Advisory Bureau and
the Legislative Bureau.
Executive
f)ower is thus largeiy concentrated in
the hands flf the Premie~ and the Regent.
· The legislative power ls vestE'r1 ln
the Legislative Council. Its approval
uri.ll be nece~~ry for ail laws anrl rPvenue acts. But should it reject any
Bill, the Regent may ask the Council
to reconsider its decision, and if it
should again reject it, the Re,gent,
after consulting the Privy Council,
sb,all decicJe the matter. At present,
l:owever, no law has yet been ·pass~d
for the organization of the Council,
with the result that laws are drafted
by the State Council and become effective after the Privy Council has
been consulted and the approval of
the Re~ent has been obtained. Ro
long as the Legislative Council is i,ot
or£'$a,ni?.Prl, the Premier's position Is
predominant,
The judiciary comori~es a number
of law courts, divided into three
grades, the Sunreme Court, Higher
Courts and District Courts.

Supervisory Council
The Supervisory Council supervtses
the conduct of officials, and aurlits
their accounts. The members of the
Council may not be dismis.c;ed except
fo:I" a criminal offenc~ or disciplinarv
punishment and may not be ~bjected
to suspension or transfer .of pffice. ,-.r
Mduction of salary, against their wishes.
00

For p~oses of local ~ove,rmnen~
~•Manchukuo" is divided into five Provinces and two S~cial Districts. "he
Provinces are Fengtien, Kirin, HeiIungkiang, Jehol and Hsin-An oi: Hsingan. The last-named, which conb:\ins.
the Mongol districts, is sub-divide~
into three areas or Sub-Provinces, so
as to conform to the traditionr1 l Banner system and the union of Banners
into Leagues. The Special Districts
are the old Chinese Eastern Railway,
or Harbin District, and the newlyestablished Chientao, or Korean Di&ttict. By means of this administrative
division the important minorities, Mongols, Koreans ~d Russians. are to be
guaranteed, as far as possihle, special
administration in conformity with
their needs. Although the commission
made several requests to be f;hown a
map of the area claimed to be included
in the "State of Manchukuo," this was
not provided, but a letter was received giving the boundaries of the "State"
as follows:
"The new State is bounded on the
south by the Great Wall, and the Mongol Leagues and Banners in the ::rune
comprise Hulinbuir and the Le~e,
of Cherim, Chaota and Chosatu and
their Banners."
At the head of the Provinces ere
Civil Governors. But since it is desired to concentrate executive power in
the Central Government, they are to
be given no authority over either troqp:,
or finance. In the Provinces, as well
as in the Central Government, the
General Affairs Department holds a
controlling position. It is in charge of
confidential matters, of personnell accounting, correspondence and matters
which do not come under other departments.
Provinces are divided into districts.
These are administered largely py dis ...
trict Self-Government officers, wh1ch
have- under their direction varlou'i
governmental departments, particularly
that of General Affairs. Municipal gov~ents exist at Mukden, Harbin and
Changchun. At llarbin, however, it is
planned to create a Greater Hiirbin
which will include both the R-us:-ian
and the Chinese cities. The Sp~i~l
~ilway District is to be abg~ished.
Part of it will be included in Greijt;er
!Jarbi,n, i}nd the remainder stretching
eaat and west along the Chine&.e Ea&t-.

em Railway~ is to be added to Heilungkiang and Kirin Provinces.
Units of Finance
The "Government .o f Manchuku.o" regards the Provinces as administrative
area~ and the districts and the municipalities as units of finance. It determines the amount of their taxes and
passes upon the budget. All local revenues must be paid into the central
treasury which will then supervise the
propet disbursement. These revenues
may not be retained, in whole or in
part, by the local authorities, as was
·c ustomary under the old regime. Natural:y, this system has not as yet
been brought into satisfactory 0peraion.
In the "Government: of Manchukuo"
Japanese officials are prominent, and
Japanese advisers are attached to all
important departments. Although the
Premier and his Ministers are all Chihese, the heads of the various Boards
'Of General Affairs, which in the organization of the new State exercise the
igreatest measure of actual power, are
Japanese. At first they were designated ·a s advisers, but more recently those
olding the most important posts have
been made full Government officials on
the same basis as the Chinese. In the
<centra11 government alone, not incl~ding those in local governments or in
the War Office and the military forces,
or in government enterprises, nearly
•200 Japanese are "Manchukuo'' offi·cials.
Japanese control the Board of General Aff2irs and the Legislative and
Advisory Bureaus, which in practice
constitute a Premier's office, the General Affairs Department in the Ministries and in the Provincial Governments,
and
the
Self-Government
Directing Committees in the Dis:ricts,
•and the police departments in the
Provinces of Fengtien, Kirin and Heilungkiang. In most bureaus, tnoreover, there 2re Japanese advisers, councillors and secretaries.
There are also many Japanese in the
railway offices and in the Central
Bank.
In the Supervisory Councn
Japanese hold the pos~s of Chief of the
Bureau of Gener.21 Affairs, Chief of
the Control Bureau, and Chief of the
Auditing Board. In the Legis1ativt?
Council the Chiel Secretaty is a Japa-

nese. Finally, some of the most important officials of the Regent ate
Japanese, including the Chief oI the
Office of Internal Affairs and the Commander of the Regent's bodyguard.
The aim of the Government, as expressed in the proclamation of the
Northeastern Administrative Commit-·
tee of February 18, and of the "Government of Manchukuo" of March 1, is
to rule in accordance with the fundamental principle of "Wang Tao." It
is difficult to find an exact English
equivalent for this phrase. The interpreters provided by the "Manchukuo"
authodties trainslated it "love,'' but
scholars give the meaning as the
"kingly way," which may have many
shades of meaning; which according to
Chinese tradition, has been of old the
basis of a good administration, sincerely concerned with the welfare of
the peo;,le. Traditionally, the ChinesE:·
have used the expression "Wang Tao"
as antithetical to "Pa Tao,'' whi.ch latter expression as discussed by Dr. Sun
Yat-sen in his "San Min Chu Yi''.
{Three Peoples' Principles), connotes
reliance upon physical force and compulsion. Sun Yat-sen explained that
"Wang T-20," therefore, was the antithesis of "Might makes right."

Policy Continued
The policy of the Self-Government
Guiding Board, the chief agency in
the creation of the new Governmenf:,
was continued by the Advisory Bureau,
which had superseded it. Militar1 officers were not to be allowed to interfere in matters of administration.
Regulations governing the qualifications
for government service are to enacted,
and appointments are to be made on
the basis of the ability of the candidates.
Taxatioh is to be reduced and placed
on a legal basis, and reformed in accordance with sound principles of
economics and administration. Direct
taxes are to be transferred to the District and Municipal Governments,
while the Central Government is to
SE>cure the income derived from indirect taxes.
The documents supplied by the
Changchun autborities ~hte th:it a
num bPr of 'taxes have already been
abolished, while others have been re91

duced. Hopes are expressed that readjustment of Government enterprises'
and Government-owned resources wili
increase revenue, and that the eventual
reduction of the military forces wm'
lessen expenditure. However, for the'
time being, the financial position of the
new State is unsatisfactory. Guerilla
warfare has kept military expenditure
high, while, at the same time, the
Government is not receiving revenues
from various normal sources. Expenditure for the first year is now roughly
estimated at $85,000,000, against revenue
$65,000,000, showing a deficit of $20,000,000, which it is intended to cover
by a loan from the newly established
Central Bank, as explained hereafter.
The Government declares its intentions, as financial conditions improve,
to spend as much as possible of its
revenue upon education, public welfare, and development of the country,
including reclamation of waste land,
exploitation of mineral and forestry
resources and extension of the system of communications. It states that
it will welcome foreign financial as.:
sistance in the development of the
country and that it will adhere to the
principles of Equal Opportunity and
of the Open Door.
The Government has already begun
to reopen primary and secondary
schoois, and it intends to train a large
number of teachers who will thoroughly understand the spirit and policies
of the new State. A new curriculum
i's to be adopted, new textbooks compiled, and all anti-foreign education
aboiished. The new educational system will aim to improve primary
schools and tc stress vocational education, the training of the primary
school teachers, and the teaching of
sow1d ideas as to sanitary living. The
teaching of English and Japanese is to
be com;,ulsory in the middle schools
and of Japanese is to be voluntary in
the Primary Schools.

Justice and Police
The "Manchukuo" authorities have
decided that in the domain of justice,
the interference of administrative authorities should not be tolerated. The
status of judicial officers is guaranteed
by the law and their salaries are to be
adequate. The qualifications for judicial positions will be raised. Extrater92

ritorial r ights, for the time being, will
be respected, but the Government in~
tends to start negotiations with for..)
eign Powers for their abolition as soon
as adequate reforms in the present system shall have been effected. The police
are to be properly selected, trained and
paid, and completely separated from the
army, which is not to be allowed to
usurp police functions.
Reorganization of the army is planned, but since at present it consists
largely of the old Manchurian soldiery,
caution is felt to be necessary in orde?
to avoid increasing discontent and
mutiny.
The Central Bank of "Manchukuo"
was established on June 14, and officially opened its doors for business
on July 1. The bank has its head
offices in Changchun, the capital o-f
"Manchukuo" and branches and subbranches to the number of 170 in most
of the cities of Manchuria.
The bank was organized as a Joint
Stock Company with a charter to · run
for 30 years. Its first officers were
Chinese and Japanese bankers and financiers. It was empowered to "regulate the circulation of the domestic
currency, maintain its stability and
control the financing service." The capi ~
tal of the bank was authorized at $30,000,000 (silver) and permission was
given it to issue notes against a specie
reserve of at least 30 per cent.
The old provincial banks, including
the Frontier Bank, were amalgamated
with the new Central Bank and their
,entire businesses, including affiliated
enterprises, were turned over to it.
Provision was further made for liquidating the non-Manchurian branches of
the old provincial banks.
In addition to what it will be able
to salvage from the old banks, the Central Bank has a Japanese loan reported
at ¥20,000,000 and a subscription to its
capital of $7,500,000 (silver) from the
"Manchukuo" government on which to
· establish itself. The bank has planned
to unify all the Manchurian currencies
by redeeming them for new notes at
rates which have been officially prescribed as from July 1, 1932. These
notes are based on the silver dollar
and are to be covered to the extent of
at least 30 per cent by silver, gold,
foreign currency or deposits. Whether
or not the new currency is to be convertible on demand and without limit

.into hard money is not made clear in
official pronouncements. The old notes
will be permitted to circulate for two
years from the passage of the Conversion Act but will not be valid after
that time.
Not Yet in Circulation
The order for the new Central Bank
notes has been placed with the Japanese Government but thus far neither
the notes nor the new hard money are
in circulation. The present currencies
of Manchuria remain what they w~re
prior to September 18, 1931, with the
exception that the notes are being surcharged with the signature of Mr.
Yung-hou, (the presidemt of the new
Central Bank) as they . pass through
the various banks.
It is not clear how the new "Manchukuo" bank can hope to accomplish
its ambitious program of unifying and
siabilizing all Manchurian currencies
with the limited amount of capital at
its disposal. The resources inherited
from the old provincial banking institutions with the addition of a loan
from Japanese banks and a subscription to its capital from the "Manchukuo" Government seem entirely inadequate for the purpose. Moreover·,
it is not clear on what basis the financial relations between the bank
and the "Manchukuo Government"
will be established. According to the
preliminary "Manchukuo" budget supplied to the commission by the Fin&nce Minister, "Manchukuo" expects
to face a deficit of over 20,000,000 Yuan
( *) during its first year of existence.
According to the Minister, this was
to be covered by a loan from the
( •) This and the following items in the
budget were given as Yen in an interview
by the "Manchukuo" Finance Minister
with a Commissioner but in the English
translation of A General Outline of Manchukuo presented by the "Department of
Foreign Affairs, Manchukuo," they are
given in terms of Yuan. The commission therefore takes the liberty of using
Yuan rather than Yen in its reference to
this and the following budgetary items.
The fact that the Chinese symbol for
Yuan is the same as the one which the
Japanese employ for the Yen has been a
constant source of difficulty in dealing
with the English and French translations
supplied the commission by both the Chinese and Japanes~ .

Centl·al Bank (not then in existence>.
A government which subscribes 7,500.000 Yuan to its bank and then borrows over 20,000,000 Yuan from it to
baiance its 1::udget is not establishing
either its central bank or its budget
on a sound financial basis.
Unless the Q_entral Bank can obtain
rr.ore actual hard money than it now
nppears to possess, it can hardly hope
to unify and stabilize all :Manchuriaj1
currencies on a convertible silver
dollar basis. Even if it were to succ:eed in creating a currency which was
uniform though not convertible it
would possibly have accomplished
something, but even a uniform currency, the stability of which is not
guaranteed by· conversion, falls short
of the requirements of a sound mone"."
tary system. •
Systems Linked
In regard _to various public utilities,
as well as m regard to the railways,
arrangements have been made which
have tended to link up the Chinese an<J
Japanese system. Before the outbreak
at Mukden the Japanese were anxious
to bring this about, but the Chinese
consistently refused to give their con;,_
sent. Between September 18 however
and the formation of "M~nchukuo,';
steps were at once taken to realize the
wishes of the Japanese, as already mentioned in the first section of this chap·ter. Since the formation of the "new
State" the policy of the "Manchukuo
Ministry of Communication" seems to
be to enter into agreements with the
South Manchuria Railway Company for
.the exploitation of at least some of the
main railway lines under its authority.
The Chinese telephone, telegraph and
radio systems in Manchuria, being entirely Government-owned, had their
own executives, and, in addition were
subject to a unified control by the
Northeastern Telephone; Telegraph and
Radio Administration. Since September
· 18, all three of these sytems have been
brought into closer co-operation with
existing Japanese systems throughout
Manchuria.
Moreover, arrangements
have been made between the Japa. nese and the Northeastern Telegraph
Administration for through telegrams
from or to any place in Manchuria and
to or from any place in Kwantung
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mosa and the South Sea Islands. Between the principal centers in North
Manchuria and the Japanese postoffices
at Dairen, Mukden and Changchun,
tlitect circuit lines have been construct.~d to ensure the quick transmission
of messages.
, Jl;\Panese "kana" messages have been
given especially low rates. To learn
to handle Japanese "kana" syllables,
spE>cial training is being given to the
Chinese staff, and it is planned to have
Japanese clerks gradually join the
Chinese telegraph workers at the chief
centers. Thus, every facility has been
given to favor telegraphic intercourse
between Manchuria and the whole Japanese Empire. Naturally, the commercial connections between the countries are thereby greatly strengthened.
After the events of September 18-19,
,the Japanese authorities issued orders
to the offices and banks in which the
revenue of the Salt Gabelle was reta1ned that no payment from these
funds was to be made without their
consent.
Supervision over the Salt Gabelle was
insisted upon on the ground that the
greater part of the revenue from this
source, though nominally national, had
in fact been retained by Marshal Chang
Hsueh-liang's government. Income from
this source, in 1930, had amounted to .
about $25,000,000, silver, of which $24,000,000 had been retained in Manchuria. Only $1,000,000 had been remitted to the Inspectorate-General of
the Salt Gabelle in Shanghai.
Chang Agreed to Pay
After Marshal Chang Hsueh-liar.g had
joined the National Government in Decemoer, 1928, he agreed to p ay the
monthly quota of $86,600 silver which
had been fixed as the amount due from
Manchuria t:>ward the loans secured on
the Salt Gabelle. Somewhat later, in
April, 1930, a revised table was announced in which the Manchurian
mon~hly quota was raised to $217,800.
Because of local pressure upon th<?
Manchurian finances, however, Ma rshal
requested a postponement of the new
a~signment. At the time of the MukdE'r.
Incident, h i:, arrears amounted to $576.200. The first TE:mi:tance at the new
·rate of $217,800 was actually made on
September 29, 1931, by consent of the
Japanese army officers. Since then, '
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to March, 1932, inclusive, tne newly:.
established authorities in Manchuria
have ren1itted to the Central Gl>vernrment not only these monthly · quota$
but also the quota arrears leff llnpaid
by Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang.- The
surplus from the salt revenue, however. they regairded as Manchurian.
and not National income, and therefore considered that they were justified
in retaining it for local purp:>ses.
After th-e Mukden Committee for the
Maintenance of Peace and Order had
been transformed into the Provincial
Government ad interim, it ordered the
District Salt Inspectorate at fiew.'.
c.hwang to transfeT all its funds to the
Provincial Bank for disbursement by
the Board of Finance. According t9
Chinese official reports the Bank of
China at N ewchwang was, likewise, on
October 30, forced to give Ui> the salt
funds on deposit, amounting to $672, 709.56 silver without authority from
the original depositors. A receipt was
given in the name of the Liaoning
Finance Board, which was si ctned only
by the Japanese adviser to that •B oard.
The new Kirin Provincial Government took similar steps with regard to
the Salt Transportation Office of Kirin
and Heilungkiang. According to Chinese official report it demanded the
transfer of the salt revenue to its
provincial treasury. When the Chief
of the office refused, he was detained
for some days and replaced by a
nominee of Governor Hsi Hsia, who, on
October 22, forcibly took possession of
the office, while the Auditorate Office
was closed under Governor Hsi" Hsia's
orders. In this case, too, the salt funds
de~osited in the Bank of China antl
the Bank of Communications were
claimed by the new Kirin authorities,
and on November 6, were transferred
to the Provincial Bank. Since then
salt funds 'h ave from time to time been
withdrawn and expended by the local
authorities, while the monthly quotas
have been sent r egularly to ~han1h-'.3 i.
From October 30, 1931, to August .25,
1932, for which period Chinese offi::ial
.figures are available, rnlt revenu.e
amounting to .$14,000,000, silver, was
retained in Manchuria.

Properties· Taken Over
--The Salt Administration thr~ughout
Manchuria continued to function, although under the restrictions described
and under supervision until March 28,
when the Minister of Finance of the
"Manchukuo Government" ordered that
the deposits, accounts, documents and
other properties belonging to the Inspectorate shou1d be handed over on
the following day to the Salt Comptroller of "Manchukuo" and that the collection of Salt revenue, which was originally undertaken by the Bank of the
Tmee Eastern Provinces. He stated that
those officials who wished to continue
their service in the Salt Gabelle Administration of the "Manchukuo'' should
report their names to the Salt Comptroller's office and promised that their
applications would receive serious consideration provided they first renounced allegiance to the Government of the
Republic of China.
On April 15, the District Inspectorate
at Newchwang was dissolved by force.
The Director and Deputy-Director were
put out of office. The premises were
occupied and safes and documents and
seals were seized. The remaining officials were requested to continue their
service, but they are all reported to
have refused. A number of those who
had been in the Salt Administration
followed the Director to Tientsin and
waited for further instructions from
Shanghai. The work of the former
Salt Inspectorate in the Three Eastern
Provinces was thus completely taken
over ·by the new Comptroller's Office
of· "Manchukuo." The new "Government," however, has stated that it is
prepared to continue to pay its equitable proportion of the sums required
for the service of the foreign loans
secured on the salt revenue.
Since the customs funds collected in
Manchuria ha-1 always been remitted
to the Central Government, the Japanese miatary authorities did not interfere with the customs administration nor with the remittance of funds
to Shanghai. Interference with this
revenue was first made by the "Manc1mkuo Government" on the ground
that their "State" was independent.
One of the first acts of the Northeastern
Administrative · Committee,
which was established on February 17

as the Provincial "Goverpment of·
Manchukuo," was to instruct the Superintendents of Customs at the Manchurian treaty ports that although the'
customs reven-ie belonged of right
"Manchukuo" and would, in the·
future, be under the control of the
committee, for the time being the
Superintendents and Commissioners of
Customs should carry on their duties
as usual. They were informed that
a Japanese Customs Adviser had been
aroointed at each Manchurian port
for the purpose of supervising the
general Customs administration. ·The
ports concerned were Lungchingtsu:n,
Antung, Newchwang and Harbin, together with some sub-stations, at
which the revenue collected in 1931
amounted respectively to HK. Tls.
574,000, 3,682,000, 3,792,000 and 5,272,000.
The port of Aigun, which is still outside the i;;phere of control of the
"Manchukuo Government," is functioning under the Chinese Customs Serv-:
ice. The port of Dairen, in the Kwan.:
tung Leased Territory, has a distinct
status." The fact that the customs revenue coli:eoted in the Mancliurlian
ports, including Dairen, amounted in
1930 to 14.7 per cent and in 1931 to
13-5 per cent of the total for all Chin~.
shows the importance of Manchuria in.
the Chinese Customs Administration. ·
Antung Procedure Described
The procedure by which the "Manchukuo" authl)rities took over the entire customs administration in Manchuria, is well illustrated by the ac-·
tion taken at Ar,tung, which has been
described as follows by the Inspectorate-General of Customs:
A Japanese Customs Adviser was
appointed to the Antung Customs Office in March, but he took no active
steps until the middle of June, when'
he sent definite orders from the "Manchukuo" Ministry of Finance to the
Bank of China that customs funds were
no longer to be remitted to Shanghai.
On June 16, four armed "Manchukuo"
police, accompanied by the Assistant
Superintendent of Police, a Japanese,
visited the Bank of China and informed the manager that they had come
to guard the revenue: On June 19 the
Bank of China handed over to the
Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces•
Tls. 783,000 and informed the commis-

to
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sioner that this action was taken as a
result of force majeure.
On June 26 and 27 a Japanese Adviser
of the "Manchukuo Government" demanded that the Customs House at
Ant... ng should be handed over to him.
The commissioner refused, but "Manchukuo" police, all Japanese subjects
fwced the commissioner to leave the
Customs House. The commissioner,
however, still attempted to carry on
the customs work in his home, since
80 per cent of the Antung customs
revenue is collected in the railway
area, hoping that the Japanese authorities would not permit interference
withi1;1 this area. But the "Manchukuo" police entered the Japanese railway area, arrested a number of the
customs staff, intimidated the others
and forced the commissioner to suspend
the Chinese Customs Service.
Until June 7, the Dairen Customs revenue was remitted to Shanghai at intervals of three or four days, but.
under date of June 9, the "Manchukuo
Government" gave notice that these
i::emittances should no longer be made.
When no further funds reached Shanghai, the Inspector-General of Customs
took up the matter by telegraph with
the Japan commisEioner at Dairen. As
a result the commissioner refused to
send on the customs receipts 011 the
ground that the Chief of the Foreign
Section of the Government of the Japanese Leased Territory had advised him
that the remittance of the customs
revenue might severely affect JapaneSt'
interests.
The
Inspector-General.
therefore, on June 24, dismissed th<>
Dairen commissioner for insubordination.
Named Manchukuo Officials
The "Manchukuo Government" on
June 27, appointed the diEmissed commissioner and the members of h~s staff
as "Manchukuo'' officials, to serve in
their former positions. It had threa-·
tened to establish a new Custom House
at Wafangtien, on the frontier of th~
Leased Territory, if the Japanese authorities should prevent them from
taking charge of the Dairen customs.
The Japanese authorities of the Leased
Territory did not oppose the paEsing
of the customs administration into thP
hands of the .newly-appointed "Manchukuo" officials. They maintained
that the problem did not co1;1cem Japan,
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but was an issue solely between "Manchukuo" on the one hand the Government of China and its Dairen com·
mis:ioner on the other.
The "Manchu~uo GQ_vernment" maintains that, since "Manchukuo'' is an
independent state, it exercises the
right of complete jurisdiction over the
Customs Administration of its territory.
Bu,t it has slated that, in view of the
fact that various foreign loans and indemnities were based upon the Chinese
customs revenue, it is prepared to pay
its equitable proportion of the annual
sums necessary to meet these obligations. It hopes that after . depositing
this amount in the Yokohama Specie
Bank, there will be a customs surplus
for 1932-1933 available for local use of
about $19,000,000 silver.
The Japanese military authorities in
Manchuria after September 18 did not
greatly interfere with the Postoffice,
apart from exercising a certain censorship of newspapers and letters. After
the establishment of "Manchukuo" the
"Government" desired to take over the
postal services of the territory, and appointed, on April 14, special officers
to take charge of the transfer of the
postal administration. On April 24, it
applied for permission to join the International Post Union for which they
have not yet qualified.
As the Pos4rl Commissioners refused
to surrender their offices, the status
quo was for some time respected, although "Manchukuo" supervisors were
placed in certain offices with a view to
exercising a measure of control. · The
"Manchukuo Government," however,
finally decided to issue its own stamps
and to discontinue the use of the Chinese stamps. By ordinance of the Ministry of Communications of July 9, it
informed the nublic that the new
stamps and cards would be offered for
sale on August 1. At this stage the
Chinese Government ordered ·i.he Postal
Commissioners to close the offices in
Manchuria and to give the staff the
choice of receiving three months' pay
or of returning to designated bases in·
China for service at other places. The
"Manchukuo" authorities in turn offered to take into their service all the
postal employes who wished to remain
and promised to guarantee their nnancial and other rights acquired under
the Chinese Administration. On July ·

26 the "Manchukuo Gov rnment" took
over completely the postal service
throughout Manchuria.
Private Property
The "Manchukuo Government" has
stated that it will respect private property and all concessions awarded by
either the Central Government of
Manchuria provided the concessions
were legally granted in accordance with
the laws and regulations previously in
force. It has also promised to pay the
lawful debts and obligations of the
former administration and has appointed a commission to pass upon claims of
indebtedness. In regard to the properties belonging to Marshal Chang
Hsueh-liang and some of the other
prominent leaders of the former regime, it · yet too early to state what
action will be taken. According to Chinese official reports, all the personal
property of Marshal Chang Hsuehliang, General Wan Fu-lin, General
Pao Yu-lin and certain others has been
confiscated.
The "Manchukuo" authorities, however, take the view that
since the former Government officials
used their power to amass wealth for
themselves; they are not yet prepared
to recognize property thus acquired
as properly "private property." A careful investigation is being made of the
possessions of the former officials. This
is reported to have been finished as far
as bank deposits are concerned.
Having thus described the organization of the "Manchukuo Government,"
its program and some of the measures
it has taken lo affirm its independence
from China, we must state our conclusions regarding its operations and
its principal characteristics.
·
The progr.s m of this "Government"
contains a number of liberal reforms,
the application of whicH would be
desirable not only in Manchuria but
in the rest of China; in fact, many of
these reforms figure equally in the
program of the Chinese Government.
In their interviews with the commission the representatives of this "Government" claimed that with the lielp
of the Japanese they would be able
to establish peace and order within a
reasonable time, and would thereafter
be able to maintain it permanently.
They expressed the belief that they

would be able to secure the support
of the people in time by assuring them
an honest and efficient administration.
security from bandit raids lower taxation as the result of reduced milit:::ry
expenditure, currency reform, improved communications and popular
political representation.
But after making every allowance for
the short time which has hitherto been
at the disposal of the "Manchukuo
Government"for carrying out its policy
and after paying due regard to the
steps already taken, there is no indication that this "Government'-' will m
fact be able to carry out many of its
reforms. To mention but one example,
there seem to be serious obstacles in
the way of the realization of their
budgetary .anq currency reforms. A
thorough program of reforms, orderly
conditions and economic prosperity
could not be realized in the conditions
of insecurity and disturbance which
existed in 1932.
Titular Heads Chinese
As regards the "Government" and the
public services, although the titular
heads of the Departme11ts are ChinesP
residents in Manchuria, the main political and administrative power rest ·
in the hands of Japanese officials and
advisers. The political and administrative organization of the "Government"
is such as to give to these officials
and advisers opportunities not merely
of giving technical advice but of actual],y controlling and directing the
administration. They are' doubtless not
under the orders of the Tokyo Government, and their policy has not always coincided with the official policy
either of the Japanese Government or
of the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army. But in the case of all
important problems these officials and
advisers, some of whom were able to
act more or less independently in the
first days of the new organization, have
been constrained more and more to follow the direction of Japanese official
authority. This authority, in fact, by
reason of the occupation of the country by its troops, by the dependence
,o f the "Manchukuo Government" in
those troops for the maintenance of its
authority both internally and external ly, in con.c;equence, too, of the more
and more important role entrusted to
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the South Manchuria Railway Company in the management of the railways under the jurifdiction of the
"Manchukuo Government," and finall'\'
by the presence of its consuls, as liaison agents, in the most important urban centers, posserses in every contingency the means of exercising an
irresistible pressure. The liaison between the "Manchukuo Government"
and Japanese official authority is still
further emphasized by the recent appointment of a special ambassador, not
officially accredited, but resident in the
capital of Manchuria, exercising in his
capacity -of Governor-General of the
Kwantung Leased Territory a control
over the South Manchuria Railway
Company and concentrating in tht.
same office the authority of a diplomatic representative, the head of thecollfular ~rvice and comm.ander-inchief of the Army of Occupation.
The relations between "Manchukuo"
and Japan have hitherto been somewhat difficult to define, but the latest;
information in the possession of the
commission indicates that it is the intention of the Japanese Government
to define them before long. A letter
dated August 27, 1932, addressed to
the commission by the Japanese assessor, states that the Special Ambassador, General Muto, "left Tokyo on
August 20 fot Manchuria. On arrival
he will commence negotiations for the
conclusion of a fundamental treaty
concerning the establishment of friendly relations between Japan and Manchuria. The Government of Japan regards the conclusion of this treaty as
a formal recognition of Manchukuo."
Part m
The Opinions of 'Ihe Inhabitants of
Manchuria
It was one of the objects of the
commission to ascertain the attitude
of the inhabitants of Manchuria toward the new "State." Owing to the
circumstances in which the inquiry
had to be made, however, the obtainlng of evidence presented some difficu~ty. The danger, real or supposed,
to the commission from bandits, Kore&n Communists or supporters of the
new "Government" who might be
angered by the presence of the Chinese assessor on ~ccount of his criticism _o.f that regime, provided a rea-
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son for exceptional measures of protection. There were no doubt occasional real dangers in the unsettled
conditions of the country, and we are
grateful for the efficient protection
with which we were provided throughout our tour.
But the effect of
the police measures adopted was to
keep away witnesses; and many Chi-•
nese were frankly afraid of even
meeting members of our staff. We
were informed at one place that before our arrival it had been announced
that no one would be allowed to see
the commission without official permission. Interviews were therefore
usually arranged with considerable
difficui. ty and in secrecy, and many
informed us that it was too dangerous
for them to meet us even in this way.
In spite of these difficulties we were
able to arrange private interviews with
businessmen, bankers, teachers, doctors,
police, tradesmen and others, in addition
to our public interviews with "Manchukuo" officials, Japanese consuls and
military officers. We also received over
1,500 written communications, some delivered by hand, the majority sent by
post to different addresses. The information so received was checked
far as possible from neutral sources.
Many delegations representing public bodies and associations were received and usually presented to us written statements. Most of the delegations were introduced by the Japanese
or "Manchukuo'' authorities and we
had strong grounds for believing that
the statements left with us had previously obtained Japanese approval
In fact, in some cases persons who
had presented them informed us afterwards that they had been written or
substantially revised by the Japanese,
and were not to be taken as the expression of their real feelings. These
documents were remarkable for the
studied neglect to comment either
favorably or otherwise upon Japanese
participation in the estab:ishment or
maintenance of the "Manchukuo" administration. In the main these statements were concerned with the relation
of grievances against the former Chinese administration, and contained expressions of hope and confidence in the
future of the new "State."

as

- Letters Relate Feelings
The letters received came from farmers, small tradesmen, town workers
and students, and related the feelings
and experiences of the writers. After
the return of the commission to Peiping in June this mass of correspondence was translated, analysed and arranged by an expert staff specially
selected for the purpose. All these
leters, except two, were bitterly
hostile to the new "Manchukuo Government" and to the Japanese. They
appeared to be sincere and spontaneous expressio~ of opinion.
The higher Chinese officials of the:
"Manchukuo Government" are in office for various reasons. Many of them
were previously in the former regime
and have been retained either by inducements or by intimidation of one
kind or another. Some of them conveyed messages to the commission to
the effect that they had been forced
to remain in office under duress, that
all power was in Japanese hands, that
they were loyal to China, and that
what they had said at their interviews
with the . commission in the presence
of the Japanese was not necessarily to
be · believed. Some officials have remained in office to prevent their property from being confiscated, as has
happened in the case of some of those
who have fled into China. Others, men
of good repute, joined in the hope that
they would have the power to improve the administration, and under
promise of the 1Japanese th.at they
would have a free hand. Some Man•
chus joined in the hope of getting benefits for persons of Manchu race. Some
of these have been disappointed and
complained that no real authority was
_conceded to them. Lastly, a few men
are in office because they had personal
grievances against the former regime
er for reasons of profit.
The minor and local officials have in
the main retained their offices under
the new regime, partly because of the
necessity of earning a living and supporting their families, and partly because they feel that if they go, worse
men might be put in their place. Most
of the local magistrates have also remained in office, partly from a sense
of duty to the people under their
charge and partly under pressure.
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While it . was often difficult .to_.fill the
higher posts with reputable Chinese,
it was an easy matter to get Chinese
for service in minor posts and local
offices, though the loyalty of the service rendered in such circumstances i.s
at least questionable.

Partly New Recruits
The "Manchukuo'·' police are partly
composed of members of the former
Chinese police, partly of new recruits.
In the larger towns there are actually
Japanese officers in the police, and in
many other places there are Japanese
advisers. Some individual member of
the police spoke to us expressed their
dislike of the new regime, but said
they must continue to serve to make
a living.
The "Manchukuo ATmy" also con·sists in the main of the former Manchurian soldiers reorganized under
Japanese supervision. Such troops were
at first content to take service under
the new regime provided they were
merely required to maintain local
order. But since they have on occasions been called upon to engage in
serious warfare against Chinese forces
and to fight under Japanese orders
side by side with Japanese troops, the
"Manchukuo A.nfiy" has become . increasingly unreliable. Japanese sources
report the frequent defection of
"Manchukuo" forces to the Chinese
side, while the Chinese claim that one
of their most reliable and fruitful
sources of warlike supplies is
"Manchukuo Army."
The Chinese business men and
ba~kers who were interviewed by us
were hostile to "Manchukuo." They
disliked the Japanese; they feared fo-r
their lives and property, and frequently remarked: "We do not want to become like the Koreans." After September 18, there was a large exodus of
businessmen to China, but some of the
less rich ones are now returning. Generally speaking, the smaller shopkeepers expect to suffer less from Japanese
competition than do the larger merchants and manufacturers, who ofter..
had profitable relations with the former
officials. Many shops were still closed
at the time of our visit. The increase
in banditry adversely affected business
in the countryside, and the machinery

the
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of credit has largely broken down. The
announced Japanese intention to exploit Manchuria economically, and the
numerous visits of Japanese economic
missions to Manchuria in the last fev.
months have caused apprehension
among Chinese businessmen, in spite
of the fact that many of these missions are :reported to have returned to
Japan disappointed.
The professional claEses, teachers and
doctors, are hostile to "Manchukuo."
They allege that they are spied upon
and intimidated. The interference with
· education, the closing of Universiti~
and some schools and the alteratiom.
in the Echool textbooks have added to
their hostility, already great on patriotic grounds. The censorship of tht
press, post and opinion is resented, as
is also the prohibition of the entry
into "Manchukuo" of newEpapers pub•
lished in China. There are, of course.
Chinese who have been educated in
Japan who are not included in this
generalization. Many letters were received from students and young people directed against "Manchukuo."
Farmers' Attitude Divergent
Evidence regarding the attitude of
farmers and town workers is divergent
and naturally difficult to obtain. Opinion among foreign~s and educated
Chinese was to the effect that they were
either hostile or indifferent to "Manchukuo." The farmer and worker is
politically uneducated, usually illiterate, and normally takes little interest
in · the Government. The following
reasons were advanced by witnesses
for the agricultur~l population being
hbstile to "Manchukuo,', and were confirmed in some of the letters received
from this class of person. The farmers
have good grounds for believing that
the new regime will lead to an in.creased immigration of Koreans, and
possibly of Japanese. The Korean immigrants do not assimilate with the
Chinese, and their methods of agriculture are different. While the Chinese
farmer mainly grows beans, kaoliang
and wheat, the Korean farmer cultivates rice. 1'his means digging canals
and dykes and 'flooding the fl.elds. If
there are heavy rairts, the dykes built
by the Koreans are liable to burst and
flood neighboring Chinese land, ruining the crops. There have also .been
constant quarrels in the past with
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Koreans over land ownership and rents.
Since the establishment of "Manchukuo" the Chinese allege that the
Koreans have often ceased to pay rent,
that they have seized lands from the
Chinese and that the Japanese have
forced the Chinese to sell their lands
at unfavorable prices. The farmers
near the railways and towns have suffered from orders forbidding the planting of kaoliang-a crop which grows
to 10 foot in height and favors the
operations of bandits-within 500 meters
of railway lines and towns. The falling
off of the seasonal migration of laborers
from China Proper, due to the economic
depression and accentuated to some extent by the political disturbances, continues. The public lands, usually available on terms to immigrants from
China, have now been taken over by
"Manchukuo."
Since September 18, 1931, there has
been an unparalleled growth of banditry and lawlessness in the countryside, partly due to disbanded soldiery
and partly due to farmers who, having
been ruined by bandits, have to take
to banditry themselves for a living.
Organized warfare, from which Manchuria, compared to the rest of China,
had been free for many y¥;!arS, is now
being waged in many parts of the
Three Provinces between Japanese and
"Manchukuo" troops and the scattered
forces still loyal to China. This warfare naturally inflicts great hatdshi~
on the farmers, especially as the Japanese airplanes have been bombing villages suspected of harboring anti-.
"Manchukuo" forces. One result has
been that large areas have not been
planted and next year the farmer will,
find it harder than ever to pay his
taxes. Since the outbreak of disorders,
large numbers of the more recently
established immiJrants from China have
fled back inside the WaU. These material reasons, when added to a certain
ingrained dislike of the Japanese,
caused many witnesses to tell us that
the Chinese farmers, who constitut
the ove.rwhelming mass .:,f the population of Manchuria. suffer from and
dislike the new regime, and that their
attitude is one of passive hostility.

Troop Behavior Good
As regards the towmpeople, in certain places they have suffered fro:tl\

the attitude of Japanese soldiers, gendarmes and police. Generally speakin.F.
the behavior of the Japanese troo~
has been good, there being no widespread l-0otings or massacres, though
we have received in our letters complaints of individual brutality. On the
other hand, the Japanese have been
vigorous in suppressing elements that
they believed to be hostile. The Chinese allege that many executions have
taken place, and also that prisoners
have been threatened and tortured in
Japanese gendarmerie stations.
It was, we were told, impossible to
stimulate in the towns a show of popular enthusiasm for the inauguration
ceremonies of "Manchukuo." Generailv
spe~kin~, the ~ttitude of the town population 1s a mxture of passive acquiescence and hostility.
While we found the Chinese majority either hostile or indifferent to
the "Manchukuo," the new "Government" rec_eives ~om~ support from
among various mmority racial groups
in Manchuria, such as the Mongols,
Koreans, White Russians and Mane-hue;
They have in varying degrees suffered
oppression from the former administration or economic disadvantage from
the large immigration of Chinese in
the last few decades, and while no
section is entirely enthusiastic they
hope for better treatment from the ne~
regime, whose policy in turn is to encourage these minority groups.
The Mongols have remained a race
apart from the Chinese, and, as already
state~, have preserved a strongly raceconsc1ousness, as well as their tribal
sy~m, aristocracy, language, dress,
special modes of life, manners customs
and religio,n. Though still ~ainly a
pastoral people, they are increasingly
engaged in agriculture and in the transportation of products by carts and animals. The Mongols bordering Manchuria have suffered increasingly from
Chinese immigrants who obtain possession of and cultivate their lands from
which they are being gradually extruded. This leads to chronic and unavoidable ill-feeling. Mo:ngol delegations we
reoeivea, com~lained also of past suf,.
ferings from the rapaciousness of Chinese officials and tax-gatherers. The
Mongols of Inner Mongolia have seen
Outer Mongolia pass under the i.nfluence of the U.S.S.R., whose extension
to Inner Mongolia they dread. They

wish to preserve their separate national
existence against the encroachments of
the Chinese on the one hand and the
U.S.S.R. on the other. P:aced i.n this
precarious position, they have greater
hope of preserving their separate existence under the new regime. It must
be observed, moreover, that the Princes are mainly dependent for their
wealth on ~eel property and on their
special privileges, and that they therefore tend to become amenable to de
facto authorities. A deputation, however, of Mongol Princes was received
by the commission i.n Peiping, and
stated their opposition to the new regime. At present the connection between the Mongols bordering on Manchuria and the "Manchukuo Government" is undefined and the "Manchukuo Government'' has so far refrained
from interfering in their administration. While the support of certain of
these Mongol elements at present is
genuine, if cautious, they are quite prepared to withdraw it should the Japanese prove a menace to their independence or economic interests at some
future date.
Manchus Considered
The Manchus have been almost completely assimilated with the Chinese,
although in Kirin and Heilungkiang
there still exlst small and politically
unimportant colonies of Manchus who,
though bilingual, r emain distinctly
Manchu. Since the establishment of
the Republic the remnants of the
Mancfiu race lost their privileged position: although the Republic promised
to continue the payment of their subsidies, they were paid in depreciated
currency, and were therefore forced to
take up farming and trade in which
they had no experience. The few distinct Manchu groups that remain may
cherish hopes that with the establishment of "Manchukuo," whose backers
spoke so often about the inhabitants
of Manchuria being distinct in :race
from those of the rest of China and
in which the last of the Manchu Emperors is the Chief Executive, they
may once more get priv-ileged treatment. Persons of M,mchu race have
entered the "Government" with such
hopes, but Chinese witnesses in Manchuria alleged that these office-holders
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have been disillusioned by finding all
the power in Japanese hand~ and their
own proposals ignored.
Although
there may still exist some sentimental
loyalty to the ex-Em;>eror among persons of Manchu blood, there does not
exist any xace-c.onscious ManchUJ
movement of any significance. They
have been so largely assimilated with
the Chinese that although efforts have
been made to recruit Manchus for the
administration and to stimulate Manchu race-consciousness, this source of
support for the new "Government" is
not sufficient to give it any title t9
represent the people.
In the past there has been much
friction between Korean farmers backed by the Japanese authorities on the
one hand, and Chinese officials, landowners and farmers, on the other.
There is no doubt that in the paE.t
Korean farmers suffered from violence
and extortion. The Korean deputation
which ·appeared before the commission
generally welcomes the new regime,
but we cannot say to what extent they
were representative of their community.
In any case, these Koreans who are
political refugees, having emigrated to
escape Japanese domination, might not
be expected to welcome an extension of
that domination. These refugees have
proved a fertile ground for communist
propaganda and maintain contact with
the revolutionary groups inside Korea.
White Russians
Of all the minority communities in

Manchuria, the small colony of White
Russians-at least 100,000 in number-in
and around Harbin has suffered the
most in recent years. Because they
are a minority community with no
national Government to protect them,
they have been subjected to every kind
of humiliation by the Chinese officials
and police. They are in conflict with
the Government of their own country
and are, even in Manchuria, in constant anxiety on that account. The
richer and more educated members of
-t heir community can earn a livelihoo4,
but they have been liable to suffer
whenever the Chinese authorities have
·thought some advantage was to be
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gained from the U.S.S.R. at their expense. The poorer members find it
very hard to make a living and have
suffered continually at the hands of
the police and the Chinese courts. In
a province where taxes are assessed b:,
a process of bargaining, they have bee.a
made to pay a higher portion of their
assessed truces than their Chinese neighbors. They have experienced many
restrictions on their trade and movements, and have had to pay bribes to
the officials to have their passports examined, their contracts approved or
their land transferred. It is not to
be wondered at that many members
of this community, whose condition
could not well be made worse, should
have welcomed the Japanese and now
entertain hopes that their lot may be
improved under the new ad.ministration.
We received a deputation of White
Russians when we were in Harbin, as
well as many letters, and we gathered
from them that they would support
any regime which would guarantee .t o
them:
(1) The right of asylum;
(2) . An honest and efficient police
administration.
(3) Justice in the law courts;
(4) An equitable system of taxation;
(5) Rights of trade and settlement.
not dependent on the payment ..of
bribes;
(6) Facilities for educating their children.
Their requirements in this respect
were chiefly efficient teaching of for~
eign languages to enable them to emigrate and good technical education to
enable them to obtain business employment in China;
(7) Some assistance regarding land
settlement and emigration.
Such are the opinions of the local
population conveyed to us during our
tour in Manchuria. After careful study
of the evidence presented to us in
public and private interviews, in letters and written statements, we have
come to the conclusion that there is ne
general Chinese support for the "Manchukuo Government," which is regarded by the local Chinese as an instrµment of the Japanese.

CHAPTER, VII
Japan's Economic Interests and the Chinese Boycott ( *) ·
The three preceding chapters have
.b een chiefly confined to a description
of military and policica1 events since
September 18, 1931. No survey of the
Sino-Japanese conflict wou:d be accurate or complete without some account
of another important factor in the
struggle, namely the Chinese boycott
of Japanese goods. To understand the
methods employed in this boycott
movement and their effect on Japanese
trade, some indication must be given
of the general economic position of
Japan, of her economic and financial
interests in China and of the foreign
trade of China. This is also necessary
to understand the extent and character
ef the economic interests of both China
and Japan in Manchuria, which will
be discussed in the next chapter.
During the Meiji Restoration period
in the sixties of the last. century, Japan
.t,merged from her isolation of over two
-centuries, and within less than 50 years
developed into a world P~wer of ".he
first rank. A population formerly almost
stationary started to grow rapidly from
33,000,000 in 1872 until it reached a ftgm-e of 65,000,000 in 1930; and this tremendous growth still continues at the
rate of about 900,000 per year.
The population of Japan compared
with its total surface is approximately
437 persons per square mile, as against
about 41 in the United States, 330 in
Germany, 349 in Italy, 468 in Great
Britain, 670 in Belgium and 254 in
.China.
Comparing the population of Japan
per square mile of arable land with
that of other countries, the r:rdo for
Japan is exceptionally high, due to the
·particular geographical formation of the
Island Empire:
Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,774
Great Britain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,170
Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,709
Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
819
·Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
806

France .. .. . . ... . .. . . .. . . ... .. .
467
United States . . . . . .. . . . . . . . ..
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Due to a highly concentrated populaion on agricultural land, the individual holdings are exceedingly small, 35
per cent of the farmers tilling less
than one acre and 34 per cent less
than two and one half acres. Tlie expansion limit of tillable land has been
reached, as has also the limit of cul.tivation intensity-in short, the soil of
Japan cannot be expecte'd to produce
much more than it does today, nor can
it provide much additional employment.
Agrarian Dlfflculties
Moreover, as result of intensive cultivation and the widespread use of fertilizers the cost of production is high.
The price of land is far higher than
in any other part of Asia and even in
the most overcrowded parts of Europe.
Much discontent seems to exist among
the heavily indebted population, and
conflicts between tenants and landowners are on the increase. Emigration has
been considered a possible remedy. but
for reasons dealt with in the next
chapter it has not, up to the present
time, proved to be a solution.
Japan at first turned to industrialism
to foster the growth of an urban
population which would both provide
(• ) BOYCOTT : The word was first used
in Ireland and was derived from the name
of Captain Charles Cunningham Boycott
(1832-97) , agent for the estates of the
Earl of Erne in County Mayo. For refusing in 1880 to receive rents at figures
fixed by the tenants, Captain Boycott's
life was threatened, his servants were
compelled to leave him, his fences tom
down, his letters intercepted and his food
supplies interfered with. The teffl). soon
came into common English use, and was
speedily adopted into many foreign languages.
Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th. edition;
1929,
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a home market for agricultural products and turn labor to the production
of goods for domestic and foreign use.
Several changes have occurred since
that time. Where, formerly, Japan
was more than self-sufficing from the
point of view of food supply, of recent
years from 8 per cent to 15 per cent of
her total imports have been foodstuffs,
the fluctuation being due to the varying conditions of the home crops, principally rice. The importation of foodstuffs, and the probable increasing need
of these imports necessitate an attempt to offset the country's already
unfavorable trade balance by an increase in exports of industrial products.
If Japan is to find employment for
hei· increasing population through the
process of further industrialization, the
development of her export trade and
of foreign markets capable of absorbing an increasing amount of her manufactured and semi-manufactured goods
becomes more and more essential. Such
markets would, at the same time, serve
as a source of supply of raw materials
and of foodstuffs.
Japanese export trade, as hitherto
developed, has two main directions:
her luxury product, raw silk goes to
the United States; and her staple manufactures, chiefly cotton textiles, go to
the countries of Asia, the United States
taking 42.5 per cent of her exports and
the Asia market as a whole taking
42.6 per cent of this latter trade China,
the Kwantung Leased Territory, and
Hongkong take 24.7 per cent, and a
large share of the remainder is handled
by Chinese merchants in other. parts of
Asia.
During 1930, the last year for which
complete figures are available, the total
exports of Japan amounted to ¥1,469,852,000 and her imports to ¥1,546,071,000.
Of the exports, ¥260,826,000, or 17.7 per
cent, went t.'o China (excluding the
Kwantung Leased Territory and Hongkong), while of the imports ¥161,667, 000, or 10.4 per cent, came from China
(excluding the Kwantung Leased Territory and Hongkong).
Analysing the principal commodities
exported by Japan to China, it will be
found that China takes 32.8 per cent
of all aquatic products exported by
Japan; 84.6 per cent of refined sugar;
75.1 per cent of coal, and 31.9 per cent
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of cotton tissues, or an average of 51.6
per cent.

Imports From China
The same analysis applied to the
commodities imported from China
shows that 24.5 per cent of the total
amount of beans and peas imported by
Japan comes from China; 53 per cent
of the oil cake; and 25 per cent of
vegetable fibers; or an average of 34.5
per cent.
As these figures are for China only,
excluding Hongkong and the Kwantung
Leased Territory, they do not indicate
the extent of Japanese trade with Manchuria, which passes mainly through
the port: of Dairen.
The facts and figures just given clearly show the importance to Japan of
her trade with China. Nor is Japan's
interest in China limited to trade alone;
she has a considerable amount of capital invested in industrial enterprises,
as well as in railways, shipping and
banking, and in all of these branches
of financial a.nd economic activity the
general trend of development has been
increasing considerably during the last
three decades.
In 1898 the only Japanese investment
of any consequence was a small cotton gin in Shanghai owned jointly with
Chinese, representing a value of about
100,000 taels. By 1913 the estimated
total of Japanese investments in China
nd Manchuria amounted to ¥435,000,000,
out of a total of ¥535,000,000 estimated
investments abroad. By the end of the
World War, Japan had more than
-doubled her investments in China and
Manchuria over those of 1913, a considerable part of this increase being
due to the famous "Nishihara Loans,"
which had been partially granted for
political considerations. Notwith-,tanding this setback, Japan's investments
in China and Manchuria in 1929 were
estimated at almost ¥2,000.000,000, (*) out
of her total investments abroad of ¥2,100,000,000, showing that Japan's investments abroad have been almost entirely confined to China and Manchuria, the latter having absorbed by
far the greater part of this investment
(particularly in railways).
( •) According to another estimate,
Japan's investments in China, including
Manchuria, total approximately ¥1,800,000,000.

Apart from these investments, · China
has been indebted to Japan for varioUs state, provincial and municipal
loans which in 1925 were estimated at
a total of ¥304,458,000 (the greater part
unsecured) plus ¥18,037 ,000 interest.
Although the bulk of Japan's investments are in Manchuria, a considerable
amount is invested in industries, ship.
ping and banking in China proper.
Nearly 50 per cent of the total number
of spindles operated in the spinning
and weaving industry in China in 1929
were owned by Japanese. Japan was
second in the carrying trade of China.
e.nd the number of Japanese banks in
China in 1932 is put at 30, a few of
which are joint Sino-Japanese enterpri es.

Interest of Chinese
Althoue;h the foregoin~ figures are
stated from the standooint of Japan, it
is easy to see their relative importance
from the standpoint of China. Foreign trade with Japan has held first
place in the total foreign trade of
China up to 1932. In 1930, 24.1 per cent
of her exports went to Japan, while
in the same year 24.9 per cent of her
imports came from Japan. This, in
comparison with the figures from
Japan's standpoint, shows that the
trade of China with Japan is a greater
percentage of her total foreign trade
than is the trade of Japan with China
of the total foreign trade of Japan.
But China has no investments, banki!n~ or shipping interests in Japan.
China requires, above all else, to be
able to export her products in increasi-n g quantities to enable her to
pay for the many finished products she
needs and in order to establish a sound
basis of credit on which to borrow the
caoital required for further development.
From the foregoing, it is evident that
Sino-Japanese economic and financial
relations are both extensive and varied,
and, consequently, easily affected and
disorganized by any disturbing factor.
It also appears that, in its entirety,
Japanese dependence on China is
greater than China's dependence on
Japan. Hence Japan is the more vulnerable and has more to lose in cas
of disturbed relations.
It is therefore clear that the man:r

political disputes which have arisen
between the two countries since the
Sino-Japanese war of 1895 have in t'Um
affected their mutual economic relations, and the fact that in spite of
these disturbances the trade between
them has continued to increase proves
that there is an underlying economic
tie that no political antagonism has
been able to sever.
For centuries the Chinese have been
familiar with boycott methods in the
organization of their merchants, bankers and craft guilds. These guilds although they are being modified to meet
modern conditions, still exist in large
numbers and exercise great power over
their members in the defense of their
common professional interest.
The
training and attitude acquired in the
course of this century old guild life
has been combined, in the present-day
boycott movement, with the recent fervent nationalism, of which the Kuomintang is the organized expression.
The era of modern anti-foreign lx>ycotts employed on a national basis as
a political weapo.n against a foreign
Power (as distinct from a professional
instrument used by Chinese traders
against each other) can be said to have
started in 1905 with a boycott directed against the United States because
of a stipu:ation in the Sino-American
Commercial Treaty, as renewed and
revised in that year, restricting more
sevetely than before the entry of Chinese into America. From that moment
onward until today there have been
10 distinct boycotts which can be considered as national in scope (besides
anti-foreign movements . of a local
character), nine of which were directed against Japan (•) and one only
against Great Britain.
(•) The date and immediate cause of
each of these boycotts are:
1908 The Tatsu Maru incident.
1909 The Antung-Mukden Railway question.
1915 The "21 Demands."
1919 The Shantung question.
1923 Port Arthur and Dalren recovery
question.
1925 May 30th. incident.
1927 Despatch of troops to Shantung.
1928 Tsinan incident.
1931 The Manchurian affair (Wanpao-•·
~han and Mukden events).
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Causes of Boycotts
U these boycotts are studied in detail, it will be found that each of them
can be traced back to a definite fact,
event or incident, generally of a politi•
cal nature and interpreted by China
as directed against her material inter•
ests or detrimental to her national
prestige. Thus, the boycott of 1931
was started as a direct sequel to the
massacre of Koreans in July, following
the Wanpaoshan incident in June of
that year, and has been accentuated by
the events at Mukden in September
and at Shanghai in January, 1932. Each
boycott has its own immediately trace•
able cause, but none of the causes in
themselves would have initiated eco•
nomic retaliation on so extensive a
·scale had it not been for the mass psy•
chology described in Chapter 1. The
factors contributing to the creation of
this psychology are: a conviction of
in.justice (rightly or wrongly considered ·as such), an inherited faith in
Chinese cultural superiority over for•
eigners and a fervent nationalism of a
Western type, mainly defensive in aims
but in which certain aggressive ten•
dencies are not lacking.
Although a Society for the Regen•
eration of China (Hsing Chung Hui),
which may be considered the progenitor
of the Kuomintang, was founded as far
back as 1893, and although there can be
no doubt that all the boycotts from
1905 to 1925 were launched with the
war•cry of Nationalism, there is no
concrete evidence that the original na•
tionalist associations, and later the
Kuomintang, had a direct hand in their
organization. Inspired by Dr. Sun
Yat-sen's new creed, Chambers of
Commerce and Student Unions were
fully capable of such a task, guided as
they were by century.old secret socie-ties, guild experience and guild ment•
ality. The merchants · furnished the
technical knowledge, means of organiza.
tion and rules of procedure, while the
students inspired the movements with
the enthusiasm of their newly acquired
conviction and their spirit of deter•
mination in the national cause and
helped to put them into operation.
While the students were ·generally mov•
ed by nationalistic feelings alone, the
Chambers of Commerce, though shar-
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ing these feelings, thought it wise to
participate from a desire to control
the operation of the boycott. Th~
actual rules of the earlier boycotts were
designed to prevent the purchase of
the goods of the country against 1whicb
the boycott was directed. Gradually,
however, the field of action was extended to a refusal to export Chinese
goods to the country concerned, or to
sell or render services to its nationals
in China. Finally, the avowed purpose
of the more recent boycotts has beJ
come to sever completely all economic
relations with the "enemy country."
It should be pointed out that the rules
thus established were never carried out
to the fullest extent, for reasons which
have been fully dealt with in the spe·
cial study annexed to this report. Generally speaking, the boycotts have always had more impetus in the south,
where nationalistic feelings found their
first and most fervent adherents, than
in the north, Shantung especially having withhold support.

Movement Since 1925
From 1925 onward a definite ·change
took place in the boycott organization. The Kuomintang, having from
its creation supported the movement
increased its control with each suc.,cessive boycott until today it is the
real organizing, driving, co-ordinating
and supervising factor in these demonstrations.
In dofng this, the Kuomintang, as
indicated by evidence in the possession
of the commission, did not d ~ the
associations which had hitherto been
re.sponsible for the direction of boycott movements. It rather co-ordinated
their efforts, systematized and made
uniform their methods and put unreservedly behind the movement the
moral and material weight of its
powerful. party organization. Having
branches all over the country, possessing vast propaganda and information
services, and inspired by a strong nationa]istic sentiment, it rapidly succeeded in organizing and stimulating a
movement which had, up to that time,
been somewhat sporadic. As a consequence, the coercive authority vf the
organizers of the boycotts over the merchants and the general public became
stronger than ever before, although at
the same time a fair margin .of · auto-

nomy and initiative was left to the
individual boycott associations.
The boycott rules continued to vary
according to local conditions but parallel with the strengthening of the organization, the methods employed by
the Boycott Societies became more uniform, more strict and effective. At the
same time the Kuomintang Party issued instructions prohibiting the destruction of commercial houses belonging to
Japanese or the infliction of physical
harm. This does not mean that the
lives of Japanese in China have never
been threatened in the course of a
boycott, but as a whole it may be
stated that during the more recent
boycotts, acts of violence against J apanese subjects have been less numerous and serious than in earlier days.
An examination of the technique of
the methods employed shows that the
atmosphere of popular sentiment without which no boycott could succeed is
created by a formidable propaganda
uniformly carried out all over the
country, using slogans well chosen to
incite the popular mind against the
"enemy" country.
In the present boycott directed
against Japan which the commission
has seen in operation, every availabl,.!
means was employed to impress upon
the people the partriotic duty of not
buying Ja;,anese goods. The columns of
the Chinese prers were filled with propaganda of this kind, the walls of
buildings in the towns were covered
with posters, often of an extremely violent character;(*) anti-Japanese slogans
were printed on currency notes, on letters and telegn m forms; chain letters
went from hand to hand, etc. These examples were by no means exhaustive,
but serve to show the nature of the
methods employed. The fact that this
propaganda does not differ essentially
from that ured in certain countries of
Europe and America during the World
War 1914-1918 only proves the degree
of hostility toward Japan which the
Chinese have come to feel as a result
(*) In most cities visited by the commission these posters had been removed
beforehand but declarations from reliable
local witnesses who often possessed
samples of thf'se posters bore out the fact
mentioned above. Moreover, . samples are
to be found in the archives of the commission. .

of the political tension between the
two ~ountries.
·

Boycott Rules Adopted
Essential ·as the political atmosphere
of a boycott may be to its ultimate
success, nevertheless no such movement could be effective if the boycott
associations had not secured a certain
uniformity in their rules of procedure.
The four general principles adopted at
the first meeting of the Shanghai AntiJapanese Association held on July 17,
1931, may serve as an illustration of the
main objects aimed at by these rules.
They were:
a. To withdraw the orders for Japanese goods already ordered.
b. To stop shipment of Japanese
goods already ordered but not yet consigned;
c. To refuse to accept Japanese
goods already in the godowns but not
Y,et paid for;
.
. d. To register with the Anti-Japanese Association Japanese goods already purchased and to ~uspend temporarily the selling of these goods. . Th.e
procedure of registration will be separately decided upon.
Subsequent resolutions adopted by
the same association and reproduced in
the annex are much more detailed and
contain provisions for all possible cases
and eventualities.
A powerful means of enforcing the
QOycotts is the compulsory registration of Japanese goods held in stpck
by Chinese merchants. Inspectors of
the Anti-Japanese societies watch the
movement of Japanese goods, ex~mine
those of doubtful origin in order to
ascertain whether or not , they are
Japanese, undertake raids on stores
and godowns where they suspect the
presence of non-registered Japanese
goods and bring to the attention of
their principals any case of the violation of the rules they may discover.
Merchants who are found to be guilty
of such a breach of the rules are fined
by the Boycott Associations themselves
and publicly exposed to popular disapp!!oval, while the goods in their
possession are confiscated and sold at
public auction, the proceeds going into
the funds of the Anti-Japanese organization.
The boycott is not limited to trade ·
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alone. Chines~ z re '!'a1ned not to
travel on Japanese ships,. to use Japanese in any capacity, either in business or in - domestic- serviee. Those
who disregard these instructions are
subjected to various forms of disapproval and intimidation.
Another featme of this boycott, as
of previous ones, is the wish not only
to injure Japanese industries, but to
further Chinese industries by stimulating the production of certain articles
which have hitherto been imported
from Japan. The pri:nci_:;i.sl result has
been an extension of the Chinese textile industry at the expense of the
Japanese-owned mills in the Shanghai
area.
That boycott of 1931, organized on the
lines just described, continued until
abou.t December of that year, 1932, when
a certain relaxation became apparent.
In January, 1932, in the course of the
negotiations then proceeding between:·
the Mayor of Greater Shanghai and
the Japanese Consul-Gene.,,al in that
city, the Chinese even undertook to
dissolve voluntarily the local antiJapanese association.

Marked Revival
During the hostilities in Shanghai.
and the months immediately following the evacuatidn of the Japanese
troops, the boycott, although never
completely abandoned, was moderated,
and during late spring and early summe~ it even looked as if Japanese trade
in different parts of the country might
resume. Then, quite suddenly, at the
end of Julr and beginning August.
coinciding with the reported military
activity on the borders of J ehol, there
was a marked revival of the boycott
movement. Articles urging the people
not to buy Japanese goods appeared
anew in the Chinese press, Hie Shanghai Chamber of Commerce published
a letter suggesting the resumption of
the boycott and the Coal Merchants'
Guild in the same city decided to
restrict to the minimum the importation of Japanese coal. At the same
tim~ more violent methods were employed, such as the throwing of a
bQmb into the compound of a coal dealer suspected of · having handled Japanese coal and the sending of lettf;rs
to storekeepers threatening to destroy
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their property unless they stopped
selling Japanese commodities. Some
of the letters reproduced in the newspapers were signed the "Blood and Iron
Group or the "Blood and Soul Group
for the punishment of traitors."
Such is the situation at the timf! of
writing this Report. This recrudescence of the boycott activity caused
the Jap.anese Consul-General in Shanghai to lodge a formal protest with the
local authorities.
The various boycott movement~, and
the present one in particular, have
seriously affected Sino-Japanese relations, both in .a material and in a
psychological sense.
As far as the material effects are
concerned, that is, the loss of trade,
the Chinese have a tendency to understate them in their desire to present
the boycott as rather a moral -pEotest
than as an act of econ.omfc injuTy,
while the Japane$8' attach too absolute a value ta certain trade statistics.
The araunients used in this connection. by the two p arties are examined.
in the annexed study already refer:red
to. In that study will also be found
full particulars of the extent of the
damage done to Japanese trade, which
has certainly been considerable.
Another .aspect of the subjecf should
also be mentioned. The Chinese themselves suffer losses from goods already
paid for, not registered with the Boycott Associations, and seized for public a-uction; from :fines paid to the associations for violation of the boycott
rules from revenue not ireceived by
the Chinese Maritime Customs; and
generally speaking, from loss of trade.
These losses are considerable.
The psychological effect of the boycott on Sino-Japanese .relations, although even more difficult to estimate
than the material effect, is certainly
not less serious in that it h -: s had a
disastrous re_;,ercussion on the feelings
of large sections of Japanese public
opinion toward China. Dur ing the
visit of the commission to Japan, both
the Tokyo and the Osaka Chambers of
Commerce stressed this subject.
Public Onlnion Exasoerated
The knowledge that Japan is suffering injwies against which she canpot
protect herself has exasperated Japa-

nese public opinion. The merchants
whom we interviewed at OSaka were
inclined to exaggerate certain abuses
of boycott methods, such as racketeering and blackmailing, and to underestimate or even to deny completely
the close relationship between Japan's
recent policy toward China and the
use of the boycott as a defensive weapon ag inst that policy. On the contrary instead of regarding the boycott
as China's weapon of defense these
Japanese merchants insisted that it was
an act of aggression against which the
Japanese military measures were a retaliation. Anyway there is no doubt
that the boycott has been among the
causes which have profoundly embittered the relations between China and
Japa,n in recent years. .
There are three controversial issues '
invo~ved in the policy and . methods
of the boycott.
The first is the question whether th<'
movement is purely spontaneous, as the
Chinese themselves claim, or whether,
as the Japanese allege, it is an organized movement impo:,ed upon the
people by the Kuomintang, by method&
whi!;h at times amount to terrorism. On
this :,ubject much may be said on both
sides. On the one hand it would appear to be impossible for a nation to
exhibit the degree of co-operation and
sacrifice involved in the · maintenance
of a boycott over a wide area and for
a long period if there did not exist a
foundation of strong popular feeling.
On the other hand, it has been clearly
shown to what extent the Kuomintang,
using the mentality and the methods
which the Chinese people have inherited from their old guilds and secret societies, has taken control of the recent boycotts, and particularly of th
present one. The rules, the discipline .
and the sanctions used against the
"traitors," which form such an essential part of the present boycott, show
that however spontaneous, the movement is certainly strongly organizt1d.
All popular movements require some
measure of organization to be effective. The loyalty of all adherents to
a common cause is never uniform1y
strong, and discipline is required to
enforce unity of purpose and action.
Our conclusion is that the Chinese boycotts are both popular and organized;
that though they originate in and are

supported by strong national sentiment,
they ar,e, controlled and directed by
organizations which can start or call
them off, and that they are enforced
by methods which certainly amount to
intimidation.
While many separate
bodies are involved in the organization,
the main controlling authority is he
Kuomintang.
The S€'COJld issue is whether ·or not
in the conduct of the boycott movement the methods employed have always been: legal. From the evidence
collectEd by the commission it is difficult to draw any other conclusion
than that illegal acts have been constantly committed and that they have
not been sufficiently su9pressed by the
authorities and the courts. The fact
that thE'Se methods are mainly the same
as those used in China in olden days
may be an explanation but not a justification. When in former days a guild
elected to declare a boycott, searched
the houses of suspected members
brought them before the Guild Court,
punished them for a breach of rules. ·
imposed Jines and sold the goods seiz~d, · it ·acted in conformity with the
customs of. that time. Moreover, it
was an internal affair of a Chinese
community. and no foreigner was inv.olved. The present situation · is different. China has adopted a code of ,
modern laws, and these are incompatible with the traditional methods of
trade boycotts in China. The memorandum in which the Chinese assessor·
has defended his country's point of
view with regard to the boycott does
not contest this statement but argues
that "the boycott . . .. is pursued, generally speaking, in a legitimate manner." The evidence at the disposal
of the commission does not bear out
this contention.
Distinction Required
In this connection a distinction
should be made between the illegai°
acts committed directly against foreign · residents, ih casu Japanese, tmd
those committed against Chinese wi
the avowed intention, how iVer, of
causing damage to Japanese inte.rests.
As far as the former are conce~d,
they are clearly not only illegal undel'
the laws of China but also incompatible with treaty obligations to prot.ect
life and property and to main~in
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liberty of trade, residence, movement
and action. This is not contested by
the Ch,inese, . and the boycott ·associations, as well as the Kuomintang authorities, have tried, although they
may not always have been successful,
to prevent offences of this · kind. As
already stated they have occurred less
frequently during the present boycott
than on previous occasions. (•)
With regard to illegal acts committed ·
against - the Chinese, the Chinese assessor observed on page 17 of his memorandum on the boycott:
"We would like to observe in the
first place that a foreign nation is not
autliorized to raise a question of internal law. In fact, we find ourselves .
confronted with acts denounced as unlawful but committed by Chinese nationa:is in prejudice to other Chinese
nationals. Their suppression is a matter for the Chinese authorities, . and it
seems to us that no one has the right
of calling into account the manner in
which the Chinese penal law is applied
in matters where both offenders and
sufferers belong to our own nationality.
No ·state has the right of intervention
in the administration of exc:iusively
domestic affairs of another State. This
is what the principle of mutual respect for ea,~h others' sovereignty and
independence means."
.
So stated, the a:rgument is incontestable, but it overlooks the fact that
the ground of the Japanese complaint
is not that one Chinese national has
been illegaay injured by another, but
that the injury has been done to Japanese interests by the employment of
methods which are -illegal under Chinese law, and that failure to enforce
the law in such circumstances implies
the responsibility of the Chinese Government for the injury done to Japan.
This leads to ·a consideration of t:he
last controversial _point involved in
(*) According to recent Japanese information, there were 35 instances in
which goods belonging to Japanese merchants were seized and kept in detention
by members of the Anti-Japanese Associations in Shanghai during the period
from July, 1931 to the end of December,
1931. .The value of the goods involved
was estimated approximately at 287,000
d,oliars. Of these instances, in August,
1932, five were reported as stilf remaining

unsolved.
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the policy of the boycott, namely the
extent of the responsibility of the. Chinese Government. The Chinese official
attitude is that "the liberty of choice
in making purchases is a personal.
right which no government can inter- .
fere with; while the governments are
responsible for the protection of lives.
and property, they are not required
by any commonly-recognized regulations and principles to prohibit and
punish the exercise of an elemental
right of every citizen."

More Direct Than Indicated
The commission has been suppaed
with documentary evidence ·which is
reproduced in the Study No. 8 annexed '
to this report and which indicates that
the part taken by the Chinese Gov- •
ernment in the present boycott has been
somewhat more direct than the quota- ·
tion above would 1:end to indicate.
We do not suggest that there is .anything improper in the fact that Gov- .
ernment Departments should support ,
the boycott movement: we only wish.
to • point out that official encourage- '.
ment' involves a measure of Government . responsibility. In this connection the question of relations between
the Government and the Kuomintang
must be considered. Of the respon- .
sibility of the latter there can be no ,
question. It is the controlling and co- ,
ordinating .o rgan behind the whole boycott movement. The Kuomintang may .
be the maker and the master of the
Government, but to determine at what
point the responsibility of the Party .
ends and that of the Government begins is a complicated problem of constitutional law on which the commiss_ion does not feel it proper t o oronounce.
The · claim of the Government that
the boycott is a legitimate wea~on of
defence against military aggression by
a stronger country, especially in cases
where methods of arbitration have not
previously been utilized, raises a ·question of a much wider character. No
one can deny the right of the individu- .
al Chinese to refuse to buy Japanese
goods, use Japanese banks, or ships,
or to work for Japanese employers,
to sell commodities to Japanese, or to
maintain ·s ocial relations with Japanese. Nor is it possible to deny that
the , C4inese, · acting individually · or

even in organized bodies, are entitled
to make propaganda on behalf of these
ideas, always subject to the condition. of course, that the methods do
not infringe the laws of the land.
Whether, however, the organized application of the boycott to the- trade
of one particular country is consistent
with friendly relations or in conformity
with treaty obligations is rather a problem of international law than a subject for our inquiry. We would exprESS the hope, however, that in the
interest of all States this problem
should be considered at an early date
and regulated by international agreement.
In the course of the present chapter
it has been shown first that Japan, in
connection with her population problem, is seeking to increase her industrial output and to secure for this purpose reliable oversea markets; secondly,
that, apart from the export of raw silk
to the United States, China constitutes
the · principal market for Japanese exports and at the same time supplies
the Island Empire with an important
amount of raw materials and foodstuffs.
Further, China has attracted nearly the
whole of Japan's foreign investments,

and even in her present disturbed and
undeveloped condition, offers a profitable field to Japanese economic and
financial activities of various types.
Finally, an analysis of the injury caused
to Japanese interests in China by the
various boycotts which have succeeded
one another from 1908 until today ha.~
drawn attention to the vulnerable character of these interests.
The dependenc~ of Japan on the Chinese market is fully recognized by the
Japanese themselves. On the · othe~
hand, China is a country which stands
in the most urgent need of development in all fields of economic life, and
J-a.pan, which in 1931, notwithstanding
the boycott, occupied the first place iri
her total foreign trade, seems more thari
any other foreigri Power Indicated
an ally in eeonomic matters.
·
The interdependence of the trade of
these two neighboring countries and
the interests of both call for an economic rapprochement, but there can
be no such. rapprochement so long · as·
the political relations between them are
so, unsatisfactory as to call forlli the
use of military force by one and the
economic force of the boycott by the
other.

as
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CHAPTER VIII
Economic Interests in Manchuria
It has been shown in the preceding
chapter . that the economic requirements of Japan and China, unless disturbed by political considerations,
would lead to mutual understanding
and co-operation, and not to conflict.
':qle study of the inter-relation between
J.apanese and Chinese economic interests itJ. _!\fanchuria, taken in themselves
and apart from the political events of
recent years leads to the same conclusion. The economic interests of both
countries in Manchuria are not irreconcilable; indeed, their reconciliation
is necessary if the existing resources
and .futur.e economic pos.5ibilities of
Manchuria are to be developed to the
fullest extent.
In Chapter III the claim of Japanese
public opinion that the resources, both
actual and potential, of Manchuria are
essential to the economic life of their
country has been fully examined. The
object of this chapter is to consider
how far this claim is in conformity
with economic facts.
It is a fact that in South Manchuria,
Japan is the largest foreign investor,
whereas in North Manchuria the same
is true of the U,S.S.R. Taking the
three provinces as a whole, the Japanese investments are more important
than those of the U.S.S.R., although it
is difficult to say to what extent because of the impos.5ibility of obtain ing reliable comparative figures. As
the subject of investments is examined in detail in an annex to this report, a few essential figures will be
sufficient to illustrate the relative importance of Japan, the U.S.S.R. and
other countries as participating factors
in the economic development of Manchuria.
According to a Japanese source of
information, Jap&nese investments were
estimated in 1928 at about ¥1,500,000,000,
a figure which, if correct, must have
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grown today to approximately ¥1,700,000,000. (*) A Russi.an source puts
Japanese investments at the present
time at about ¥1,500,000,000 for the
whole of Manchuria inclusive of the
Kwantung Leased Territory and at
about ¥1,300,000,000 for the Three
Provinces, the bulk of J aplanese
capital being invested in Liaoning
Province.
Mostly in Railways
With regard to the nature of these
investments it will be found that the
majority of the capital has been devoted to transportation enterprises
(mainly railw8ys), agriculture, mining
ar.d forestry coming next. As a matter of fact, the Japanese investments
in South Manchuria center mainly
round· the Scuth Manchuria Railway
while the investments of the U.S.S.R.
in the North are to a great extent,
directly or indirectly, linked up with
the Chinese Eastern Railway.
Foreign investments other than Japanese are more difficult to estimate, and
in spite -of the helpful aEsistance of
those immediately interested, the information obtained by the commis.5ion
has been meagre. Most of the figures
given by the Japanese are prior to 1917,
and consequently out of date. For the
U.S.S.R., as has been stated, no definite
estimate is pos.5ible. With regard to
other countries, a recent Russian estimate for North Manchuria only, which
it has not been possible to verify, indicates Great Britain as the next largest
investor with G. $11,185,000, followed
by Japan with G. $9,229,400, the United
States with G. $8,220,000. Poland with
G. $5,025,000, France with G. $1,760,000,
Germany with G. $1,235,000 and miscellaneous investments G. $1,129,600, mak( * ) Another Japanese authority puts
the total of Japanese investments in
China, including Manchuria, in 1929 at a
figure of approximately ¥1,500,000,000.

ing a total of G. $37,784,400. For South
Manchuria similar figures are not available.
It is now necessary to analyze the
part Manchuria plays in the economic
life of Japan. A detailed study on this
subject will be found in an annex to
this report from which it will be seen
that although this part is an important
one, it is at the same time limited by
circumstances which must not be overlooked.
It does not seem from past experience that Manchuria is a region suitable for Japanese emigration o,n a large
scale. As already stated in Chapter
II, the farmers and coolies from Shantung and Chihli have in the last few
decades taken possession of the soil.
Japanese settlers are, and for many
years will mostly be, businessmen, officials, salaried employees who have
come to · manage the investments of
capital, the development of various
enterprises and the utilization of natural resources.
As regards her supplies of agricultural produce, Japan today depends on
Manchuria mainly for the soya bean
and its derivatives, the use of which
as foodstuff as forage may even increase
in the future. As a fertilizer, which
is today one of its chief uses, its importan~e is likely to decrease with the
growth of chemical industries in Japan.
But the question of food supply is not
at the moment acute for Japan, the
acquisition of Korea and Formosa having helped to solve, at least for the
time, her rice problem. If at some
future date the need of this commodity
becomes urgent for the Japanese Empire, Manchuria may be able to provide an additional source of supply.
But in that case a large amount of
capital would have to be spent in the
development of a sufficient irtigation
system.

Heavy Industries
Larger still, it seems, will be the
~ount of capital necessary for the
creation of Japanese heavy industries,
if these are destined to become independent of foreign countries, as a
result of the utilization of the resources of Manchuria. Japan seeks
above all to develop in the Three
Eastern Provinces the production of
those raw materials which are indispensable to her national defence.

Manchuria can supply her with coal.
oil and iron. The economic advantc' ges
however, of such supplies are
uncertain. For coal, only a comparatively small part of the production is
utilized in Japan; oil is extracted from
shale only in very limited quantities ;
while it would appear that iron is definitely produced at a loss. But economic considerations are not the only
ones which influence the Japanese
Government. The resot.U"ces of Manchuria are intended to assist the development of an independent metailurgic system. In any case Japan must
seek abroad a great part of her coke
and certain nonsiliceous ores. The
Three Eastern Provinces may ensure
greater security in the supplies of certain pr-oducts which are indispensable
for her national defence, but heavy
financial sacrifices may be involved in
obtaining them. The strategic interests
of Japan in Manchuria involved "in
this question have been mentioned ·
elsewhere. Further, Manchuria is not
likely to supply Japan with those raw
materials which she needs most for
her textile industries.
The Three Northeastern Provinces
provide a t·egular market for Japanese manufactured· goods; and the im,t:.ortance of this market may even increase with their growth in prosperity.
But Osaka in the past has always depended more on Shanghai than on
Dairen. The Manchurian market may
perbaps offer more security, but it is
more restrictea than the . Chinese
market.
The idea of "Economic Blocs" has
penetrated to Japan from the West .
The possibility of such a bloc comprising the Japanese Empire and Man- ·
churia is ·often found in the 'w ritings
of Japanese statesmen, professors and
journalists. In an article written
shortly before he took office, the present Minister of Commerce and Industry pointed to the formation in , the
world of such economic blocs, American, Soviet, European and British, and
stated that Japan should also create
with Manchuria such a bloc.
There is nothing at present to show
that such a system is practicable.
Some voices have recently been raised
in Japan to warn their compatriots
against dangerous illusions. Japan de113

pends for the bulk of her commerce
far less on Manchuria than she does
on the United States, China proper and
British India.
Manchuria may become in the future
of great assistance to an overpopulated
Japan , but it is as dangerous not to
discern the limitations of its possibilities. as it is to underestimate their
value.
China's Economic Relations
When studying the economic relations
of the rest of China with her Three
Eastern Provinces, it will be apparent
that, contrary to what we have seen in
the case of Japan, her chief earlier
contribution to their development consisted in the sending of seasonal workers and permanent settlers to whom the
great agricultural development of the
country is due. More recently, however, particularly in the last decade,
her participation in railway constructino and in the development. of mineral
and forestry resowces and in industry,
trade and banking, has also shown a
marked progress, the extent of which
cannot be adequately shown due to
lack of data. On the whole it may be
said that the principal ties between
Manchuria and the rest of China are
racial and social rather than economic.
It has been recalled in Chapter II that
the present population of Manchuria is,
in the main, drawn from recent immigrations. The spontaneous character
of these immigrations show clearly how
they have fulfilled a real need. They
have been a consequence of famine,
although they were encouraged to some
extent by both the Japanese and Chinese-.
The Japanese hav~ for a number of
years recruited. Chinese labor for the
Fushun mines, for the Daire,n harbor
works and for the construction of railway lines. But the number of Chinese thus recruited has always been'
very limited and this recruitment ceased in 1927, when it appeared that the
local supp:ies of labor were sufficient.
The Provincial authorities in Manchuria have also on several occasions
assisted the settlement of Chinese immigrants, although in practice these
activities of the authorities of the
Three- Eastern Provinces have only
had a limited influence on immigration.
The authorities in North China, and
the charitable societies, have also in
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certain periods endeavorEtl to encourage the settlement of families in Manchuria.
The principal assistance received by
the immigrants has been the reduced
ra~s offered by the South Manchuria
Railway, the Chinese lines and the
Chinese Eastern Railway. These encouragements given to newcomers
showed that at least until the end of
1931, the South Manchuria Railway. the
Manchurian provincial authorities and
the Chinese Government regarded this
exodus with favor; all of them profited by the peopling of the Three East.em Provinces, although their interests
in the movement were not always identical.
Old Relations Kept
Emigrants, once settled in. Manchuri~
maintain their relations with their prer
vince of origin in China proper. This
is best shown by a study -0£ the remittances that the emigrants sent back
to their families in the villages of their
birth. It is impossible to estimate the
total of these remittances, which are effected through banks, through the post
and through money taken back by returning emigrants. It is believed that
twenty million dollars are so take•
annually into Shantung end Hopei
while the postoffice statistics showed ia
1928 that the Provinces of Liaoning and
Kirin remitted to the Province of
Shantung by money orders a sum equal
to the amount remitted to that province by all the other provinces in
China. There is no doubt that these
remittances. foi-m an important economic
link bettween Manchuria and China
P.toper. They are the index of the
contact maintained between the emigrants and their families in the provinces of their origin. This contact is
all the eader because conditions on
either side of the Great Wall do not
greatly differ. The produce of the soil
is in the main the same and the agricultural methods identical. The m:>st.
pronounced variations between agricultural conditions in Manchuria and in
Shantung are caused by differences of
climate, varying density of population
and different states of economic de~
velopment. These factors do not prevent the agriculture of the Three Eastern Provinces from tending to resemble
more and more- the agricultural condi~
ti.ans in Shantung. In Liaoning, a long

settled territory, rural conditions resemble more closely those in Shantung
than do those in Heilungkiang, a territory more recently opened up.
The organization of direct trade with
the agriculturalists in Manchuria resembles also the conditions in China
proper. In the Three Provinces such
commerce is pi the hands of Chinese.
who alone buy directly from the
farmers. 'Similarly in the Three Provinces as in China Proper, credit performs an important function in such
local trade. One can even say that
the resemblance in commercial organization in Manchuria and China Pro,per is found not only in local countryside trade but also in trade in the

towns.
In -fact, the social and economic Chinese organization in Manchuria is a
transplanted society which has kept
the customs, dialect and activities of
tts home. The only changes necessary
,are those required to meet the conditions of a land more vast, less inhabited and more open to outside in-

fluences.
The

question

arises

whether this

mass migration has been merely an
episode or whether it will continue in
the future. When account is taken of
the areas in South Manchuria and
certain valleys in the south and• east,
such as the Sungari, Liao and Mutanchiang valieys, it is clear that from
the purely agricultural p-oin_t 'Of view,
Manchuria can still absorb inwnerous
colonists. According to one ,of lthe
best experts on the staff of 'file Chinese Eastern Railway, the population
of Manchuria could reach in ~ years
a figure of 75,000,000.

Conditions May Limit
But economic conditions may in the
future limit the rapid growth of the
population of Manchuria. Economic
conditions in fact alone render the
future of soya bean farming uncertain.
On the other hand, crops recently introduced into Manchuria, especially rice
farming, may develop there.
The
hopes which some Japanese have placed
in the development of cotton growing
Seem to be subject to certain limitations.
Consequently economic and
technical factors may to some extent
limit the entry of newcomers into the
Three Provinces.

The recent political events are not
the only cause of the decline of Chinese migration into Manchuria. The
economic crisis had already in the first
six months of the year 1931 diminished
the importance of the seasonal migration The world depression added·_ to
the effect of an unavoidable local
cnSls. Once this economic crisis is
over and order }-_as been re-established,
Manchuria may once more serve as an
outlet for the population of China
proper. The Chinese are the people
best adapted for the colonisation of
Manchuria. An artificial restriction of
this migration by arbitrary politica.l
measures would be prejudicial to the
interests of Manchuria as it would be
to the interests of ,Shantung and
Hopei.
The ties between Manchuria and the
rest of ·C hina remain chiefly racial and
social. At the same time economic ties
are continuously becoming stronger,
which is shown by the growing commercial relations between Manchuria
and the rest ot China. Nevertheless,
according to customs' returns, Japan
remains the best customer and chief
supplier of Manchuria, China Proper
occupying the second place.
The chief imports from Manchuria
into the rest of China are the soya
bean -and its derivatives, coal and
small amounts o'f groundnut.s, raw .silk,
miscrellaneous ceueals and a very limited amount of .iron, maize, wool and
timber. 'The chief exports to Manchuria from China Proper are cotton piece
goods, tobacco preparations, sllken and
other texiles, tea, cereals and seeds,
raw cotton, paper and wheat flour.
Consequently China Proper relies on
Manchuria for certain foodstuffs, most
important of which is the soya bean
and its derivaties, but her imports of
minerals with the exception of coal
and her imports of timber, animal products and raw materials for manufacturing purposes have in the past been
slight. Furthermore, China proper is
able to use only a portion of Manchuria's favorable balance to offset its own
unfavorable balance. It is able to do
this not by virtue of its poltical affiliation as such, as is generally thought,
but chiefly because the Manchurian
postoffices and customs have been highly profitable institutions and because
of the substantial remittances of Chi115

nese settlers ·to their families in Shanghai and Hopei.

Comments Offered
The resources of Manchuria are great,
and as yet not fully ascertained. For
their development they require population, capital, technical skill, organization and internal security. The population is almost entirely supplied by
China. Large numbers of the existing
population - were born in provinces of
North China where their family .ties are
still very close. Capital, technical skill
and organization have hitherto chiefly
been provided by Japan in South Manchuria and by Russia north of Changchun. Other foreign countries to a
much smaller degree have inter~
throughout the Three Provinces but
, principally in the large cities; Their
· representatives have exercised a con. ciliatory influence in the recent years
of political tension, and will continue
to do so, provided that Japan, as the
dominating rconomic Power, does not
attempt to monopolize the field. The
all-important problem at the present
time is the establishment of an administration, acceptable to the population and capable of supplying the last
. need-namely the maintenance of law
and order.
No foreign Power could develop
Manchuria' or reap any benefit from
an attempt to control it without the
· good will and wholehearted co-operation of the Chinese masses which form
the bulk of the population, tilling its
soil, and supplying the labor for practically. every enterprise in the country. Neither will China ever be free
from anxiety and danger unless these

northern Provinces cease to afford a
battleground for the conflicting ambitions of neighboring Powers. It is as
necessary therefore for China to satisfy the economic interests of Japan in
this territory as for Japan to recognize
the unalterably Chinese charact~r of
its population.
Parallel to an understanding of this
kind and in order to allow all interested Powers to co-operate in the de. velopment of Manchuria it seems essential that the principle of the Open
Door should be maintained, not only
from the legal point of view but also
in the actual practice of trade, industry and banking. Among foreign
businessmen in Manchuria other than
Japanese there is a fear that .Japanese
, business concerns will try to· reap
benefit from the present political position by other means than those of free
competition. If this fear came to b~
justified, foreign interests would be
· discouraged and the population of
·Manchuria might be the first to suffer.
The maintenance of a real Open Door
manifested by free competition in the
field of trade, investment, and finance,
would be in the interest of both Japan
China.(•)
( * ) In this connection it is necessary
to mention the extraordinary extent to
which goods are being smuggled into
Manchuria, especially over the Korean
border and through Dairen. Not only ls
this practice • detrimental to the Customs
revenue but it disorganizes trade, and
rightly or wrongly gives rise to the belief
that the Power which has virtual cantroi
over the Customs Administration might
discriminate against the trade of other
Powers.

.:,--
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CHAPTER IX
Principles and Conditions of Settlement
In the previous chapters of this reit has been shown that, though
the issues between China and Japan
were not in themselves incapable of
solution by arbitral procedure, yet the
handling of them by their respective
Governments, especially those relating
t,0 Manchuria, had so embittered their
relations as sooner or later to make
· a conflict inevitable. A sketch has been
given of China as a nation in evolution with all the political upheavals,
social disorders, and disruptive tendencies inseparable from such a period
of transition. It has been shown how
seriously the rights and interests claimed· by Japan have been affected by the
weakness of the authority of the Central Government in China, and how
· anxious Japan has shown herself to
keep Manchuria apart from · the Goverrunent of the rest of China. A brief
• survey of the respective policies of the
Chinese, Russian and Japanese Governments in Manchuria has revealed
the . fact that the administration . of
these Provinces has more than once
been declared by their rulers to be independent from the Central Government of China, yet no wish to be separated from the rest of China has ever
been expressed by their population,
which is overwhelmingly Chinese. Fin.ally, . we have examined carefully and
thoroughly the actual events which
took place on and subsequent to
September 18, 193.l, and have expressed our opinion.
A point has now been reached when
attention can be concentrated ou the
future, and we would dismiss the past
with this final reflection. It must be
apparent ta every reader of the preceding chapter that the issues involved in
this conflict are not as simple as they
are often represented to be. They are,
on the contrary, exceedingly complicated, -and only an intimate knowledge of
all the facts, as well as of their his-

port

torical background should entitle any
one to express a definite op.inion upon
them. This is not a case in which one
country has declared war on another
country without previously exhausting
the opportunities for conciliation provided in the Covenant of the League
of Nations. Neither is it a simple case
of the violation of tl'e frontier ·of. one
country by the armea forces of a neighboring country, because in Manchuria
there are many features without an exact parallel in other parts of the wurld.

Rights Not Clearly Defined
The dispute has arise~ between two
States, both members of 'the League.
concerning a territory the 'size of
France and Germany comp~ed, in
which both claim to have rights and
interests only some of which are clearly defined by international law; o. territory which, although legally an integral part of China, had a local administration of sufficiently autonomous
character to carry on direct neg.>tiations with Japan on tlie matters which
lay at the root of this conflict.
~.
Japan controls a railway and a strip
of territory running from the sea right
up into the heart of Manchuria, and
she maintains for the protection of tbat
property a force of about 10,000 ~oUiers,
which she claims the right by treaty
to increase, if necessary, up to 15,000.
She also exercises the rights of jurisdiction over all her subjects in Manchuria, and maintains consular police
throughout the country.
.
These facts must be considered by
those who debate the issues. It is a
fact that without a declaration of war
a large area of what was indisputably
the Chinese territory has been forcibly
seized and occupied by the armed
forces of Japan, and has in consequence of this operation ~en separated
from and declared indepetidfnt of the
rest of. China. The steps by which this
1lJ

was .accomplished are claimed by Japan
to have been consistent with the obligations of the Covenant of the League
of Nations, the Kellogg Pact and the
Nine-Power Treaty of Washington, all
of which were designed to prevent action of this kind. Moreover, the operation which had only just .b egun when
the matter was first brought to the
notice of the League was completed
during the following months and is held
by the Japanese Government to be con!;iistent with the assurances given by
their representative at Geneva on
September 30 and December 10. The
justification .in this case has been that
all the military .operations have been
~egitimate acts of self-defence, the .right
of whicb is implicit in all the multilateral treaties mentioned above, and was
not taken away by any of the resolutions of the Council of 'the League.
Further, the administration which has
been substituted for tbat of China in
the Three Pro'9inces is justified on the
grounds that its .establishment was the
act of the local population who, by
· a spontaneous assertion of tbeir independence, have severed all connection
with China and established their own
Government. Such a genuine independence movement, it is claimed, is not
prohibited by any international ,t reaty
or by any of tbe resolutions of the
Council of the League 'o f Nations; -and
the fact of its having taken place has
profoundly modified the application of
the Nine-Power Tre-aty and entirely altered the whole character of t1le probJezn bein_g investigated by the LeaguE'.

Both Complicated, Serious
It is this plea of justification which
makes this particular conflict at once
.EO complicated and so _serious. 'It is not
the fuhction of our Commission to argue
the issue, but iW'e have tried to p.rovide
sufficient .material to enable the League
of Nations to settle the dispute consistently with the honor, dignity and
•national .interest of both the contending
parties. ·Criticism alone will not accomplish this: there must also be practical efforts at conciliation. We have
been at pains to find out the truth regaraing past events in Manchuria, and
to state it frankly we recognise that
this is only part, .and by no mea~ the
most important part, of ou:r work. We
have throughout our mission offered to
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the Governments of both countries the
help of the League of Nations in composing their differences and we conclude it by offering to the League our
suggestions for securing, consistently
with justice and with peace, the permanent interests of China and Japan in
Manchuria.
It must be clear from everything
that we have already said that a mere
restoration of the status quo ante would
be no solution. Since the present conflict arose .out of the conditions prevailing before last September, to restore
these conditions would merely be to invite a repetition of the trouble. It
would be to treat the whole question
theoretically and to leave out of aceount the realities of the situation.
From what we have said in the· two
preceding chapters. the maintenance
and recc:ignition of the present regime
in Manchuria would be equally unsatisfacfory. Such a solution does not
appear to us compatible with the
fundamental principles of existing international obli,:?ations, nor with the
good understanding between ,t he twn
countries upon which peace in the Fa'l"
East depends. It is opposed to the
interests of China. It disregards the
wishes of the people of Manchuria, and
it is at least questionable whether it
would ultimateJ,y serve the perman~
interests of Japan.

Chinese Feelings Certain
About the feelings of the people of
Manchuria toward the present regime
there can really be no doubt; and China
would not voluntarily accept as a lasting solutio,n the complete separation
of her Three Eastern Provinces. The
analogy o1 the distant province of Out...
er Mongolia is not an entirely pertinent one, as Outer Mongolia is bound
to China by no strong economic or
social ties, and is sparsely inhabited
by a population which is mainly nonChinese. The situation in Manchuria
is radically different from That in Outel" Mongolia. The millions of Chinese
farmers now setfled permanently on the
land have made Manchuria in many
respects a simple extension of China
south of the Wall. The Three ·E astern
Provinces ha-o-e become almost as Chinese in race, culture and national senUment as the neighboring Provinces of
Hopei and 'Shantung, from whidh most
of the immigrants <?ame.

· Apart from 1:his, past experience
-has shown that those who control
Manchuria have exercised a consider·able influence on the affairs of the
rest of China-at least of North China
-:.and possess unquestionable stTategic
and political advantages. To cut off
fuese Provinces from the rest of Chin!l,
either legally or actually, would be to
ereate for the future a serious irridentist problem which would endanger
peace by keeping alive the hostiliw
of China and rendering probab1.e the
continued boycott of Japanese goods.
The Commission received ,f rom the
Japanese Government a clear and
valuable statement of the vital interests of the'ir country in Manchuria.
Without •exaggerating the economic dependence o'f Japan on Manchuria 'be!Y'Ond the limits ascribed to it in a
~revious chapter. and certainly without suggesting that economic relationship entitles Japan to contro-1 the economic, still less the political development of those Provinces, we rec.
ognize the great importance of Manchuria in the economic development
Qf Japan. Nor do we consider · uneasonable her demand for the estabiishment of a stable government whi~
ould be -capable of maintaining the
order necessary for the economic deelopment o'f the country. But ·such
conditions can only be securely and
effectively guaranteed by an admini.slration which is in conformity with
the wishes of 'the population and
which takes full account of their feelings and aspirations. And equally is
H only in an atmosphere of external
confidence and internal peace verv
different from that now existing' in the
Far :East, that the capital which is
necessary for the rapid economic clPvelopment of Manchuria will be forth .

coming.

Japanese Need Chinese Market
In spite of the pressure of increasing over-population, the Japanese have
not as yet fully utilized their existin~
facilities for emigration, and the Japanese Governmetit has no't hitherto contemplated a large emigration of their
t>OOPle to Manchuria. But the Japanese do look to further industrializatidn as a . means to cope with 'the a2rarian C'risis and with 'the poptda'tiion

problem: Such !industrialization would
require further economic outlets, and
the only large and relatively sUJ.1e
markets that Japan can find are in
Asia 'and particularly in China. Japan
requires not only the Manchurian but
the whole Chinese market, and the ris<.'
in the standard of living which will
certainly follow the consolidation and
modernization nf China should stimulate trade and raise the purchasinli!
power of the Chinese market.
This economic rapprochement between .Japan ·and China, which is of
vital interest to .Japan, is of equal interest to China, for China would find
that a closer economic .and technical
collaboration with Japan would as~t
her in her primary task .of national reconstruction. China could assist this
rapprochem_e nt by restraining the more
intolerant tendencies of her nationalism
· and by giving effective guarantees that
as soon as ordial relations were reestablished ithe practice of. organized
!boycotts would not be revived. Japan,
on her side, -could facilitate this rapiprochement by renouncing any attempt
to :solve the Manchurian problem by
isolating it from the p:r:oblem of her
relations with China as a whole, in
uch a way as to make impossible the
fu-iendship and collaboration of China.
It may, however, be less economic
consid anons than -aruciety -for b-er own
security which has determined the actions and policy of Japan :in Manchuria.
it is especially in this connection that
her statesmen and military authorities
are ,accustomed to -speak of MaDchuria
as "the We-line of Japan." One can
sympathize with ·such anxieties and
try 'to appreciate the actions and
motives -0£ those who hav-e to bear the
1heavy
responsibility of securing the
defen.ce of their country against :all
eventualities.
While acknowledging
the interest of Japan in preventing
Manchuria from serving as a base of
operations directed against ·h er own
territory, and .even her wish to be able
to take all appropriate military measures if in certain circumstances the
frontiers of Manchuria should be crossed by the forces of a foreign Pewer,
it may still be questioned whether the
military occupation· of Manchuria Jf.oy
an indefinite perit>d, involving, as it
must, a ht-avy financial burden, is re:al...
ly the most effective way of in1 r: ,

against this exter~l danger; and whe. ther, in'.·the event of aggression having
to be resisted in tp.is way, the Japanese troops in Manchuria would not
·be seriously embarrassed if they were
, surrounded by a restive or rebellious
population backed by a hostile China.
It , is surely in the interest of .Jap&n
· to consider also other possible solutions of the problem of security, which
would be more in keeping with the
principles on which rests the present
peace organization of the world, and
analogous to arrangements concludec
by other Great Powers in various par!s
of the world. She might even find it
possible, with the sympathy and gooci\Vi.11 of the rest of the world, an'd :.:it
no cost to herself, to obtain better security than she will obtain by the cost..
ly method she is at present adopfrng

Other Powers Interested
Apart from China and Japan, other
Powers of ·the world have also im. portant interests to defend in this Sino. Japanese conflict. • We have already re. £erred to existing multilateral treaties,
and any real and lasting solution by
· agreement ·must be compatible with the
· stipulations· of these fundamental agreements on which is based the peace organisation of the world. The considerations which actuated the representatives
of the Powers at the Washington Con. ference are still valid. It is quite as.
much in the interests of the Powers
now as it was in 1922 to assist the reconstruction of China and to maintain
· her sovereignty and her territorial and
· administrative integrity as indispensable to the maintenance of peace. Any
disintegration of China might lead, per. haps rapidly to serious international
rivalries, which would become all thP
more bitter if they should happen to
. coincide ,with rivalries between diver. gent social gystems. Finally thf" inter~
ests of peace are the same the world
over. · Any loss of confidence in . the
application of the principles of the
Covenant and of the Pact of Paris in
any part of the· world diminishes the
value and efficacy of those principles
. everywhere.
,
The Commission has not been able
to obtain direct information as to the
· extent of the interests of the U .S.S.R.
in Manchuria, nor to ascertain the
views of the Government of the U.S.S.R.
on the Manchurian question. But even
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without sources of direct information
it cannot overlook the part played by
Russia in Manchuria nor the important
interests which the U.S.S.R. have iu
that region as owners of the Chinese
Eastern Railway, and of the territory
beyond it,; north and northeast frontiers. It is clear that any solution of
. the problem of Manchuria which ignored the important interests of the U.
S.S.R. would risk a future breach of
.the peace and would not be permanent.
"These considerations are sufficient
to indicate the lines on which a solution .might be reached if the Governments of China and Japan could recognize the identity of their chief interests and were willin2 to make them
· include the maintenance of peace and
the establishment of cordial relations
with each other. As already stated.
there is no question of returning to
.the conditions before September. 1931.
A satisfactory regime for the future
might be evolved out of the present one
without any violent change. In the
next chapter we offer certain ~uggestions for doing this, but we -would first
define the general principles to which
any satisfactory solution should conform. They are the following:
1. Compatibility with the interests
of both China and Japan.
.
"Both countries are members of the
League and each is entitled to claim
. the same consideration from the
League. A solution from which both
did not rferive benefit would · not be a
gain to the cause of peace.
2. Consideration for the interests of
U.S.S.R .
To make peace between two of the
neighboring countries without regard
for• the interests of the third would be
neither just nor wise, nor in the interests of peace.
3. Conformity with existing multilateral treaties.
Any solution should confo.n n to :·he
provisions of the Covenant of the
League of Nations, the Pact of Paric;,
and the Nine-Power Treaty of Wash. ington.
4. Recognition of Japan's interests
in Manchuria.
The rights and interests of Japan
in Manchuria are facts which canaot
be ignored,. ar.d any solution which
failed to recognize them and to takP.

int.o account also the historical associations of Japan with that country
would not be satisfactory.
5. The establishment of new, treaty
relations between China and Japan.
A · re-statement of the Tespective
rights, interests and responsibilities ~
both countries in Manchuria in new
treaties, which shall be part of the
settlement by agreement, is desirable
, if future friction is to be avoided, and
mutual confidence and co-ol)eration is
to be restored.
6. Effective provision for the settlement of future disputes.
As a corollary to the above, it is
necessary that provision should be
made for facilitating the prompt settlement of minor d~putes as they arise.
7. Manchurian autonomy.
The government in Manchuria should
be modified in such a way as to secure,
consistently with the sovereignty and
administrative integrity of China, a
large measure of autonomy designed to
meet the local conditions and special
characteristics of the Three Provinces.
The new civil re2ime must be so constituted and conducted as to satisfy the
essential requirements of good government.
8. Internal
or der
and
security
against external aggression.
The internal order of the country
should be secured by an effective local
gendarmerie force, and security against
external aggression should be provided
by the withdrawal of all armed forces
other than gendarmerie and by the conclusion of a treaty of non-aggression
between the countries interested.
9. Encouragement of an economic
rapprochement between China and Japan.
For this purpose a new commercial
treaty between the two countries is desirable. Such a treaty should aim at
placing on an equitable basis the commercial relations between the two countries and bringing them into conformity
with their improved political relations.
10. International
Co-operation
in
Chinese reconstruction.
Since the present political instability
in China is an obstacle to friendship
with Japan and an anxiety to the rest
of the world, as the maintenance of

peace in· the Far ' East· is ·a ·matter of
international concern; and since "the
conditions enumerated &hove cannot be
· fulfilled without a: strong Central Gov, ernment in China, the fin&l requisite
for a satisfactory solution is temporary
international co-operation in the ·internal reconstruction of 'China. as suggested by the late Dr. S~n Yat-sen.
· If the present S\iuation could be
modifted · in such a way as to satisfy
these conditions, and embody these
ideas; China and Japan would have
achieved a solution o their difficultle$
which might be made the starting point
of a new era of close understandmg
and political 'co-operation between them.
If such a rapprochement is not secured, no solution, whatever its terms,
can really be fruitful. Is it really impossible to contemplate such a new relationship even in this hour of crisis?
Young Japan is clamorous for stroni
measures in China and a policy of
thoroughness in Manchuria. Those who
make these demands are tired of the
delays and pin-pricks of t1'e pre-September period; they are impetuous, and
impatient to gain their end. But even
in Japan appropriate means must be
found for the attainment of every end
After making the acquaintance of ~ome
of the more ardent exponents of this
'positive' policy, and those especially
who, with undoubted idealism and
great personal devotion have constituted themselves the pioneers of a delicate undertaking in the 'Manchukuo•
regime, it is impossible not to realize
that at the heart of the problem for
Japan lies her anxiety concerning the
political development of modern China,
and the future to which it is tendinJ;?.
This anxiety has led to action with the
object of controlling that development
and steering its course in directions
which will secure the economic interests of Japan and satisfy strategic requirements for the defence of her
Empire.
Japanese oprmon is nevertheless
vaguely conscious that it is no lonJ!er
practicable to have two separate policies. one for Manchuria and one for
the rest of China. Even with her Manchurian interests as a goal, therefore.
Japan might recognize and welcome ·
sympathetically the renaissance of Chinese national sentiment; might make
friends with it, guide it in her direc-

-Uon· · and -offer it support, if only to
ensure that it does not seek suoI>ort
elsewhere.
In China, too, as thoughful men
have c-ome to recognize that the vital
problem, the real national problem, fa!:
their country is the reconstruction .and
mod'ernization of the State, they .cannot fail to realize that this policy of
reconstruction and modernization, already initiated with so much promiseof ,s uccess, ·necessitates for its ful:fillment the ·c ultivation ·of frierully re1a. tfobs' with all countries, and ·~hove all
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with that great nation which is theiJ?
nearest neighbor. China needs, in political and economic matters, the cooperation of all the leading Powers,
but especially valuable to her would
be the 'friendly attitude of the Japanese Government and the economic cooperation of Japan in Manchuria. All
the other claims of her newly awakened nationalism-'legitimate and urgent
though they may be-should be subordinated 'to this one dominating need
for the effective internal reconstruc.tion of the State.

CHAPTER X
Consideration and Suggestions to the Council
It is not the function of the Commission to submit directly to the Governments of China and Japan recommendations for the solution of the
present dispute. But, in order 'to facilitate the final solution of existinJ?
causes of dispute between the two
countries,' to quote the words used
by Mr. Briand when explaining to the
Council the text of the resolution which
originated the Commission, we now
offer to the League of Nations, as the
result of our studies, suggestions designed to help the appropriate organ
of the League to dTaw up definite proposals fcl:' submission to the parties to
the dispute. It is should be understood
that these suggestions are intended ·1s
an illustration t,£ one way in which the
conditions we hav'° laid down in tht=>
preceding chapter might be met. They
are mainly concerned with broad principles; they leave many details to be
filled in and are susceptible of considerable modification by the parties to the
dispute if they are willing to accept
some solution on thes lines.
Even if the formal' recognition of
'Manchukuo' by Japan should take
place before our report is considered
in Geneva-an eventuality which we
cannot ignore-we d'o not think that
our work will' have been rendered
valueless. We believe that in any casP.
the Council would find that our report contains suggestions which wou1'i
be helpful for its decisions or for i .·
recommendations to the two great
Powers concerned, with the object of
satisfying their vital interests in Man~
churia.
It is with this obj•e ct that, whilst
bearing in mind the principles of the
League of Nations, the spirit and letter
of the treaties concerning China and
the general interests of peace, we havf"!
not overlooked existing realities, and
have taken account of the administrative machinery existing and in proc~
13

of evolution in the Three Eastehl
Provinces. It would be the function
of the Council, in the paramount interest of world peace, whatever may
be the eventuality, to decid how t
suggestions made in our report may b
extended and applied to events which
are still developing from day to day;
always with the object of securing a
durable understanding between China
and Japan by utilizimg all the sound
forces, whether in ideals or persons.
whether in thought or action, which
are at present fe11nenting in Manchuria.
Should Invite Discussion
We suggest in the first place
t
the Council of the League should i,n,.
vite the Governments of China and
Japan to discuss a solution of their
dispute on the lines intlieated in the
last. chapter.
If the invitation is accepted, the
next step would be the summoning u
soon as possible of an advisory conference, to discuss and to recommend detailed' proposals for the constitution of
a special regime for the administration
of the Three Eastern Provinces.
Such a conference; it is suggested.
might be composed of representativeit
of the Chinese and Japanese Governments and of two delegations representing the local population., on
selected in a manner to be prescribed
by the Chinese Government and one
selected in a manner to be prescribed
by the Japanese Government.
H
agreed by the Parties, t);ie assistance of
neutral observers might be secured.
If the conference were unable to
reach agreement on any particulal'
point, it would submit to the Council
the point of difference, and the Council would then attempt to secure an
agreed settlement on these points.
Simultaneously with the sitting of
the advisory conference, the matters at

issue- between Japan and China re]ating to respective rights and interests
should be discussed separately, in this
case also, if so agreed, with the help
of neutral observers.
Finally, we suggest that the results
of these discussions and negotiations
should be embodied in four separate
instruments:
1. A declaration by the Govern- .
ment of China constituting a sp~ial
administration for the Three Eastern
Provinces, in the terms recommended
by the advisory conference;
2. A Sino-Japanese treaty dealing
with Japanese interests;
3. A Sino-Japanese treaty of con- ciliation and arbitration, non-aggression and mutual assistance.
4. A
Sino-Japanese
commercial
treaty.
It is suggested that, before the meeting of the advisory conference, the
broad outlines of the form of administration to be considered by that body
should be agreed upon between the
parties, · with the · assfstance of the
Council. Among the matters to be
considered at that stage are the following:
The place of meeting of the advisory conference, the nature of the
representation, and whether or not
neutral observers are · desired;
. The principle of the maintenance of
the territorial and administrative .integrity of China and the grant of &i
large measure of ,autonomy to Man·
churia;
The policy of. creating a special
gendarmerie as the sole method of
maintaining internal order;
· The principle of setting the various
matters in dispute by means of thP
separate treaties suggested;
· The grant of an amnesty to all
those who have taken part in the recent · political developments in Man- ·
churia.

Rest Left to Conference
When once these broad principles
have been agreed upon beforehand ,
the fullest possible discretion as regards the details would be left to the
representatives of the partie.c: at thP
advisory conference or when negotiat- ·
ing the treaties. Further reference to
the _Council of the League of Natjo,ns: .
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would only take place in the event of
faiiure to agree.
Among the advantages of this procedure, it is claimed that, while it ic:
consistent with the sovereignty of
China, it will enable effective and practical measures to be taken to meet
the situation in Manchuria as it exisu:
today, and at the same time allow for
such modifications hereaftler as the
changes in the internal stuation in
China may warrant. Notice, for instance, has been taken in this report
of certain administrative and fiscal
changes which have either been proposed or actually carried out in Manchuria recently, such as the reorganization of provincial governments, the
creation of a central bank, the employment of foreign advisers. These
features might be with advantage retained by the advisory conference. The
presence at the conference of representatives of the inhabitants of Manchuria, selected in some such way as
we have suggested, should also facilitate the passage from the present to the
new regime.
The autonomous regime contemplated for Manchuria is intended to apply
to the three provinces of Liaoning
(Fengtien), Kirin and Heilungkiang
only. The rights at present enjoyed
by Japan in the province of Jehol
(Eastern Inner Mongolia) would be
dealt with in the treaty on t~ subject of Japanese interests.
The four Instruments can now be
considered ·seriatim:
1. The Declaration.
The final proposals of the advisory
conference would be submitted to the
Chinese Government, and the Chinese
Government would embody them in D
Declaration which would be trans·
mitted to the League of Nations :md
to the signatory Powers of the NinePower Treaty. The members of the
League and the signatory Powers of thP.
Nine-Power Treaty would take note of
this declaration, which would be stated
to have for the Chinese Government
the binding character of an international engagement.
The conditions under which subsequent revision of the declaration, if
required, might take place would bP
laid . down in the declaration itself as
agreed to in accordance with the Drocedure suggested here above.

-. The. declaration would distin~
between the powers of the Central
Government of China in the ThreP
Eastern Provinces and those of tht;!
Autonomous Local Government.
It is suggested that the powers to
be reserved to the Central Government should be the followin2:
· 1. The control of general treaty and
foreign relations not otherwise provided for; it being understood that the
central government would not enter
into any international engagements inconsistent with the terms of the declaration.
2. The control of the Customs, the
Post Office, and the Salt Gabelle and
possibly of the administration of the
stamp duty and the tobacco and wine
taxes. The equitable division between
the Central Government and the Three
Eastern Provinces, of the net income
from these revenues, would be determined by the advisory conference.
3. The power of appointment, at
least in the first instance, of the Chief
Executive of the Government of the
Three Eastern Provinces in accordance
with the procedure to be laid down in
the declaration. Vacancies would be
filled in the same way or by some
system of selection in the Three Eastern
Provinces, to be agreed upon by the
advisory conference and inserted in the
declaration.
4. The power of issuing to the Chief
Executive of the Three Eastern Provinces such instructions as might be
necessary to ensure the carrying out of
the international engagements entered
into by the Central Government of
China in matters under the administration of the autonomous Government of
the Three Eastern Provinces.
5. Any additional powers agreed
upon by the conference.
Rest to Manchuria
All other powers would be vested
in the autonomous Government of the
Three Eastern Provinces.
Some practical syst~m might be devised to secure an expression of thP
opinion of the people on the policv
of the Government, possibly through
the traditional agency of the Chambers
of Commerce, Guilds, and other civil
organizations.
· Some provision should also be made

to safeguard the interes~ of W1i\te.
Russians and other minorities.
·
It is · suggested that a special geridarmerie should be organized, with. ·the
collaboration of foreign instructors,
which would be the only armed force
within the Three Eastern Provinces.
The organization of the gendarmeriPshould either be completed within a
period to be specified in advance, or
the time of its completion should be
determined in accordance with a procedure to be laid down in the declara- ,
tion. As this special corps would hP
the only armed force in the territory
of the Three Eastern Provinces, its organization. when completed, should be
followed by the retirement from this
territory of all other armed forces. including any special bodies of police or
1·ailway guards, whether Chinese or
Japanese.
An adequate number of foreign advisers would be appointed by the Chief
Executive of the autonomous Government, of whom a substantial proportion should be Japanese. The details
would be worked out by the pr~edure·
described above, and would be stated
in the declaration. Nationals of small
States, as well &s of the Great Powersr
wo11ld be eligiblt::.
The appointment of two foreigners
of different nationalities to .have suoervision of (1) the constabulary, and (2)
the fiscal administration, would be made
by the Chief Executive from a pane(
submitted by the Council of the
League. These two officials would have
extensive powers during the period of
organization and trial of the new re••
~ime. The powers of the - advisers
would be defined in the declaration.
1

Basel to Suggest Financier
The appointment of one foreigner
as a general adviser to the Central
Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces
would be made by the Chief Executive from a panel submitted by the
Board of Directors of the Bank for
International Settlements.
The employment of foreign advisers
and officials is in conformity with thP
policy of the founder of the Chinese
Nationalist Party, and with that of.
the present -National Government. Jf.
will not, we hope, be difficult for Chinese opinion to recognize that the actual •
situation a~!f the complexity of the
l25

forei'.gn interests, rights arid irtfluenc

in

these

provinces require special
measures in the interests of peace anu
good, government. But it cannot be
too strongly emphasized that the pre:,ence · of the foreign, advisers and of ..
ficials here suggested, including those
who,. during the period of the organization of the new regime, must exer~is,e exceptionally wide powers, merely represents a form of international
co-'oi>eration. They must be selected
ih .a , ~anner acceptable to the Chinese
dovernment and one which is consis•
ten't . with th~ sovereignty of China.
W'fi-en appointed they must ·r~rd
therilselves as- the- servants of thi; Government employing them, as has alwah· been the case in the past with
the foreigners employed in the Customs
and Postal administration or with the
technical organizations of the League
that. hav~ collaborated with China. Jn
this- connection the following passage
fn the sp.e ech of Count Uchida in the
,tapane1ie Diet on August 25. 1932. is of
~~erest:
!J "Our own
Government since the
M~i. -~ toration, have employed many
foreigners as advisers or as regular officials; their number for instancf!, in
the- year 1875 ,or thereabout, exceeded
5Q0.".
,The point must .also be stressed that
the appointment of a relatively large
number of Japanese advisers in an ~tmosphere of Sino-Japanese co-operation, would enable such officials to conttibute the training and knowledge
specially suited to local conditions. The
goal to be kept in view throughout the
period of transition is the creation of a
civil service composed entirely of Chinese who will ultimately make- the employment of foreigners unnecessary.
2. The Sino-Japanese Tte.aty, d.ealing
with-Japanese Interests.
Full discretion would of cows,e be
left to those who will negotiate the
three suggested treaties between China
and Ja:pan, but it may be useful to
indicate the matters with which it is
suggested that they should d~al
The· treaty d'e aling· with Japanese interests in the Three Eastel'n Provinces
and. with some Japanese interests in the
Province of J ehol would' have to d eal
principally with certain economic rights
of Japanese- nationals and wrt:h, l'ail1,26·

way questions. The aims 0, this tr~
s-hould .be:- '
Ji. The free participation of JapQJl ill
the economic development of Maa-churia, which would not carry with.
it a right to control the country either
economically_or politicalbr;
.,
Z. The continuance in the Provinceof Je~10l of such rights as Japan nowenjoys there;
· 3. An extension to the wli.ole of
Manchuria of the right to settle and
!'ease land, coupled with some modification of the principle of extraterritoriality;
4. An
agreement regarding .me ,
operation · o_f the railways.
Extrality Might Be Modified
Hitherto, the rights of settlement
of Japanese nationals have b een coo- •
fined to South Manchuria, thougn n
definite boundary line between North.
and South Manchuria has ever been
fixed. a1td to J ehol. These rights have
been exeircised under conditions which
China . found unacceptable, and this.
caused, continued friction and conflicts.
Extraterritorial status as regards taxa-.
t;ion an~ justice was claimed both for
the Japanese and the Koreans, and ill,
the case -of the latter there were special stipulations which were ill-defi»ecl an9, the subject of disputes. From
evidence given before the commission
we have reason to believe that China
would be willing to extend to the whole
of Manchuria the present limited right
of settlement~ provided it was not accompanied by extraterritorial status,
the effect of which, it was claimed..
would be to create a Japanese State pi
the heart of a Chinese territory.
· Two methods of compromise have .
suggested themselves. One ts that. the .
existing rights of settlement, accornpanied
by
extraterritorial
status,
should be maintained and that such
rights shoulrl be extended both ~o
Japanese· and Koreans in North- M~nchuria and Jehol without extraterritorial status. The othei: is that the ·
Japanese Should be granted the. ri~ht
to settle anywhere in Mancburln and
Jehol with extraterritorial status• and
that the Kore::ins should have the same
rights without extraterritorial status;.
Both proposals have some advantages
to recommend them, and both have
rather seri<>us objections, Jt i<;. obviou,

thaf the · most ·satisfactory solution of
the problem is to make the administration of these Provinces so efficient
that extraterritorial status will no
longer· be desired. It is with th!$ object that we · recommend that at lea:;t
two foreign advis~rs, one · of whom
should be of Japanese nationality,
should be attached to the Supreme
Court, and other advisers might with
advantage be attached to other Courts.
The opinions of these advisers mig~t
be made public in all cases in which
the Courts were called upon to anjudicate on matters in which foreign
nationals were involved. We also think
that in the period of reorganization
some foreign sup~rvision of the administration of finance is desirable,
and, in dealing with the declaration.
we have presented some suggestions
i.o that effect.
Arbitration Tribunal Advised
A further safeguard would be provided by the establishment, under the
treaty of conciliation, of an arbitration tribunal to deal with any complaints which the Chinese or Japanese
Governments might bring in their own
names or in those of their nationals.
The decision of this complicated and
difficult question must rest with the
parties negotiating the Treaty, but the
present system of foreJgn protection,
when applied to a minority group as
numerous as the Koreans, who are,
moreover, increasing in number, and
who live in such close touch with the
Chinese population, is bound to produce m~ny occasions of irritation, leading to local incidents and foreign interyention. · In the interests of peace
it is desirable that this fruitful source
of friction should be removed.
Any extension of the rights of settlement in the case of Japanese would
apply on the same conditions to the
nationals of all other Powers which enjoy the benefits of a 'Most Favored
Nation' clause, provided that those
Powers whose nationals enjoy extraterritorial rights. enter into a similar
treaty with China.
.
As regards railways, it has been
pointed out in Chapter Ill that there
has been little or no co-operation in
the past between the Chinese and Japanese railway builders and authoritie;

a-

directed to achieving
compreh~nsive'
and mutually beneficial railway plan. ·
It is obvious that · if future friction ·1s
to be avoided, provisions must be made
in the treaty at present under discussion ·for bringing ·to an end the · competitive system of the past; and · sub- ·
tituting ·a common understanding as regards freights and tariffs on the' variow.
systems. The subject is disc~ed •in
the special Study No. 1, annexed to
this report. In the opinion of the commission there are two possible- solutions,
which could be considered either as
alternatives or as stages to one final
solution. . The first, which is the more
limited in scope, is a working agreement
between the Chinese and Japanese J;ailway administrations which would facilitate their co-operation. China and
Japan might agree to manage their respective railway systems in Manchuria
on the principle of co-operation and
a joint Sino-Japanese Railway Commission, with at least one foreign adviser
might exercise functions analogo~
to those of boards which exist
in some other countries. A more
t~orough remedy would be provided by an amalgamation . of the
Chinese and Japanese railway interests. Such ~n amalgamation, if it
could be agreed upon, would be the
true mark of that Sino-Japanese economic collaboration, to secure which
is one of the objects of this report.
While safeguarding the il\terests of
China, it would place at the di,sposal
of all the railways in Manchuria the
benefit of the great technical experience of the South Manchuria Railway
and could be evolved without difficulty
from the system which has been applied to the railways of Manchuria
in the last few months. It might even
pave the way in the future to some
wider international agreement which
might include the Chinese Eastern
Railway. Though a fairly detailed description of such all amalgamation is
to be found in the appendix as an example of the ~ort of thing that might
be done, only direct ne.t otjatioru; between the parties could evolve a detailed scheme. Such a solution of the
railway quesiion would make the South
Manchuria Railway a purely commercial enterprise, and the security provided by the special corps of gendarmerie, when once this body was fully
organized, would enable the railway

guard~ to be . withdrawn, thus saving
i:t - .considerable item of expense.
If
this. is donei it would be well that special land regulations and a special
municipal administratiO'n should prPviously be, institute(i in the railway
area in order to safeguard the vested
interests of the South Manchuria Railway and of Japanese nationals.
. If a treaty on these lines could be
agreed upon, a ·legal ·basis for Japanese rights in the Three Eastern :Provinces and in Jeh61 would have been
found which would be at least as heneftcia-1: fu ,Jat:>an as the present treatiei;
and agreements, and one which would
be more acceptable to China. China
might then find no difficulty in recogl}izing alt the definite gra,nts made
th Japan by such treaties and J;lgreements as those of 1915, unless abrogated
or modified by the new treaty. All
~inor ri_ghts claimed by Japan. the
va1idity of which may be opeµ to dispvte, should }>e the subject of agreement1 · In c~se of disagr~ement resort
should be made to the procedure outlined ' in- the Treaty of Conciliation.
., Treaty of Conciliation
3.- The Sino-Japanese Treaty of
Conciliation and Arbitration, Non-Aggression and Mutual Assistance.
,It is not necessary to describe in
any detail the subject matter of this
treaty, of which there are many precedents and existing examples.
Such a treaty would provide for a
Board of Concfliation whose function:,
would l;>e to assist ih the solution flf
any difficulties as they arise · betweer.
the Governments of China and Japan.
It would glso · P.stablish an arbitration
tribunal composed of persons with
judida1 experience and the necessary
knowledge of the Far East. This trihurial would deijl with any disputes between the Chinese and Japanese Governm~nis regarding the interpretation
of the 'declaration or of the new treaties; and with such other categories of
disputes as might be specifiecl in the
treity . of conciliation.
Finally, in conformity with the provJ~ions for Non-}\ggression and Mutual -Assistan<;_e inse~ted \n the Treaty,
the contra~ting parties should a~ree
that Manchuria should gradually he ···
c~lll~ ~- d-~mili.jarize.d ~re3 . . With this ,
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object it would be provided that after
the organisation of the gendarmerie
had been effected any violation of the
demilitarized territory by either of the
parties or by a third party would constitute an act of aggression entitli~
the other party, or both parties in the .
case of a third party attack, to take
whatever measures might be deemed
advisable to defend the demilitarizedterritory, without prejudice to the
right of the Council of the League to
take action under the Covenant.
if the Government of the U.S.S.R.
desired to participate in the NonAggression and Mutual Assistance section of suclJ. a treaty, the appropriate .
clauses co\lld be embodied in a separate tripartite agreement.
4, The Sino-Japanese Commercial
Treaty.
The Commercial Treaty would naturally have as its object the establishmer.t <>f conditions which would encourage as much as possible the exchange ot goods between China and
Japan, while safeguarding the existing
treaty rights of other countries. This
treaty shc)Uld also contain an undertaking by the Chinese Government ro·
take all measures within its power to
forbid and repress organized boycott
movements against Japanese trade,
without prejudice to the individual
rights of Chinese consumers.
The above suggestions and consideratio,ns regarding the objects of the proposed declaration and treaties are submitted . for the consideration of the
Council_ of the League. Whatever may
be the details of future agreements,
the essential point is that negotiations
should qe · begun as soon as possible
and should be conducted in a spirit
of mutual confidence.
Our work is finished.
Manchuria for a year past has been
giv~ over to strife and turmoil.
The population of a large, fertile
and rich country has been subjected
to conditions of distress such as it has
probably never experienced before.
The relations between China and
Japan are those of war in disguise,
and the future is full ·of anxiety.
We have reported the circumstances
which have created these conditions.
~verY.9ne _is ._fully aware_ of J!l~ gr~-

vity of the problem which confronts the
League of Nations, and of the difficulties of the solution.
At the moment of concluding our
report we read in the press two statements by the Foreign Ministers of
China and Japan, from each of which
we would extract one point of the utmost importance.
On August 28 Mr. Lo Wen-kan
declared at Nanking:
"China is confident that any reasonable proposal for the settlement of the
present situation will necessarily be
compatible with the letter and spirit of
the Covenant of the League of Nations
and the anti-war Pact, and the Nine
Power Treaty, as well as with China's
sovereign power, and wm also effectively secure a durable peace in the
Far East."

On August 30th Count Uchida is
reported to have declared at Tokyo:
"The Government considers the
question of Sino-Japanese relations as
more important than the question of
Manchuria and Mongolia."
We cannot close our report more
appropriately than by reproducing here
the thought underlying these two
statements, so exactly does it correspond with the evidence we have collected, with our own study of the
problem, and consequently with ottr
own convictions, so confident are we
that the policy indicated by these declarations, if promptly and effectively
applied, could not fail to lead to a
satisfactory solution of the Manchuian
question in the best interests of the
two great countries of the Far East
and of humanity in general.

Reprinted from
The Japan Advertiser
of October 6, 1932
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